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1972 INTRODUCTORY  REMARK 
Material  difficulties have  delayed  for  more  than  one  year  the  publication  of the 
present report submitted to  the  Commission of the European Communities at  the 
end  of 1969.  The  reader  should  therefore  be  fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  the 
following  forecasts  were  prepared  during  the  autumn  of 1968 and  the  spring  of 
1969, thus on the basis of statistical data which, in the  field  of seaborne trade,  did 
not go  beyond the  calendar year 1967. 
The acceleration  of the  growth  of seaborne  trade  in  1968,  1969 and  during  the 
first  six months of 1970, would lead  the  authors,  today,  to  step  up some of the 
forecasts appearing in this report, at least as  far  as the medium term is concerned. 
It  should  be  noted,  in  this  respect,  that  the  statistics  published  by  the  United 
Nations Organization for  the calendar year 1969 place international seaborne trade 
at  2 280m.  tons,  that  is  to  say  slightly  above  the  line  representing  the  sum  of 
forecasts of the sectoral analysis high estimates, such as plotted on figure  B  of this 
report. 
Although this difference may have notably increased in  1970, on  the other hand it 
seems that, during the first six months of 1971, a slow down has been recorded in 
the growth of seaborne trade,  which would tend to  bring the latter back to  a level 
more in  accordance with the above-mentioned forecasts. 
Besides, on the basis of the  tonnage in  service and on order at mid-1971, it seems 
now obvious that the world merchant fleet  should fairly  well exceed, in  1975, the 
highest  theoretical  level  determined  in  this  report  according  to  the  forecasts  of 
seaborne trade requirements. 
This is attributable to  an unprecedented boom in demand for  newbuilding tonnage 
over the  past two years,  and the  authors wish  to  point out here that they did not 
claim to  foresee  the short-term development of this demand-a phenomenon which 
is  too  greatly  subject  to  cyclical  hazards-but  only  to  estimate  newbuilding 
requirements in  the  long  and medium  term,  according  to  the  fundamental  trends 
of the maritime economy. 
Nevertheless,  this past demand will have a definite bearing on the  future  evolution 
of supply, at the level of both transport capacity and shipyards'  production capa-
city. 
5 It is therefore deemed indispensable to  bring the  forecasts  and conclusions of this 
report up to date.l 
Under  the circumstances, the authors seriously wondered whether it would not be 
advisable to  abandon the publication of a document the forecasts of which already 
appeared to  be partly contradicted by the facts. 
However, they decided, in agreement with the Commission of the European Com-
munities that in spite of the delays incurred the publishing procedure proposed by 
the  Commission  should  be  carried  out,  considering  the  deep  interest  aroused  by 
the very existence of this report in  the circles concerned, and the many references 
already  made  to  it,  especially  as  regards  methodology  in  various  recent  publica-
tions and papers dealing  with forecasting  in  the maritime economy. 
August 1971. 
(1)  See Memorandum, p. 15 8. 
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REPORT ON 
THE LONG AND MEDIUM TERM DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE SHIPBUILDING MARKET 
Foreword 
1.  The present report has been drawn up at the request of the European Economic 
Community Shipbuilding Liaison Committee, in accordance with suggestions made 
by  the Council of European Community Ministers'  Committee  for  medium  term 
economic policy. 
2.  Its  preparation was  entrusted  to  a  Working  Group  of  representatives  of the 
Shipbuilders'  Associations  (employers)  of  West  Germany,  Belgium,  France,  Italy 
and Netherlands. 
3.  The composition of this Working Group was a follows: 
Chairman: 
Mr. de Mas Latrie, General Manager of the Chambre syndicale des construc-
teurs de navires  et de  machines  marines (France). 
Members: 
Dr.  Bracht, General Manager of Rheinstahl Nordseewerke (West Germany). 
Dr.  Eng.  Gabbrielli,  Commercial Director  of Cantiere N a  vale  Breda (Italy). 
Dr.  Molenaar, Head of the Economic Research Department at the Stichting 
Nederlandse  Scheepsbouwindustrie  (Netherlands). 
Mr.  Tribout, Group Director at Fabrimetal (Belgium). 
Substitutes: 
Mr.  Bloch,  Verband  Deutscher  Schiffwerften  EV  (West  Germany). 
Mr.  Duddeldam, Economist at the Stichting Nederlandse Scheepsbouwindus-
trie  (Netherlands). 
Mr.  Javor,  Secretary of the Shipbuilding Section at Fabrimetal (Belgium). 
Secretary reporter: 
Mr.  Dobler,  in  charge  of international  relations  at  the  Chambre  syndicale 
des  constructeurs  de navires  et de  machines  marines,  Paris  (France). 
Every  effort  has  been  made  in  the  preparation  of  this  report  to  refer  to  as 
many sources  of statistical  and economic data as  were  available,  it being under-
stood that time and means were str,ictly limited for the Working Group. 
The material gathered has enabled a forecast of the medium and long term trends 
of demand and supply on the world shipbuilding  market to  be made. 
11 Though,  on many points,  the  authors would have wished  to have  access  to more 
comprehensive  and  precise  information,  they  have  given  in  this  report  the 
estimates and figures  they were  asked  to  supply. 
However, they ask that this report should be considered as  a preliminary approach 
and not as  an exhaustive  and definitive survey.  Particularly, the figures,  estimates 
and  conclusions  must  be  considered  only  as  working  hypotheses  submitted  to 
the EEC Shipbuilding Liaison  Committee. 
Working Group No.  1 wishes its task to be continued in the coming years so that 
the  basis  of  its  forecasts  may  be  built  on  and  re-evaluated  according  to  future 
developments  in  maritime  economics. 
12 INTRODUCTION 
According  to  the  traditional  shipbuilding  criterion,  namely  annual  launchings, 
measured in gross registered tonnage, world merchant ships output has  practically 
doubled in the last six years, rising from 8.5m.  grt in  1963 to  16.9m. in  1968. 
Over  the  same  period,  from  1 January  1963  to  1  January  1969,  orders  in  the 
world's shipyards, also measured in grt, have more than trebled, rising from  16m. 
to  49m. 
At 30 June  1969, the  world  orders  reached  54. 7m.  grt,  which,  on  average,  cor-
responds  to  over  three  years'  activity  at  the  level  of  production  in  1968.  This 
order  situation  is  the  most  favourable  experienced  since  the  beginning  of  the 
present decade. 
This  year,  1969,  it  may  thus  be  said  that,  on  the  whole,  the  shipyards  in  the 
world,  apart  from  a  few  exceptions,  are  working  nearly  at  their  full  existing 
capacity, their workload on hand being sufficient to  enable them to employ their 
staff resources fully  and  to use  all  their production facilities.  In fact,  at least in 
the  main  shipbuilding  countries,  the  present  level  of  output  is  determined  by 
employment factors. 
Despite  the current buoyant situation in  the  international market of newbuildings 
and bright prospects of activities  implied,  in the short term,  by present orders  in 
the  world's  shipyards,  the European Economic  Community  Shipbuilding  Liaison 
Committee has thought it necessary to make longer range forecasts of the develop-
ment of newbuilding supply and demand, in order to consider the future conditions 
in  which  the  Common Market shipyards  will  operate. 
Basis of the study 
The \Vorking  Group  has  considered  it impossible  to  provide  a  market  study  as 
such,  including  accurate  estimates  of  newbuilding  supply  and  demand  during 
each of the next years. Normally numerous contracts are negotiated on the inter-
national  market  simultaneously :  some  of  them  are  for  vessels  being  delivered 
within a few  months whereas others are for units to be commissioned several years 
later.  Conversely,  the ships  delivered during  any given  period have been ordered 
at differing dates. 
It  would  thus  have  been  necessary  to  make  an  exhaustive  classification  of 
estimated  requirements  and  building  facilities  available  for  each  successive  year 
according to  size  and type  of vessel,  in  order to  redistribute each element of  the 
annual overall requirements at the suitable preceding year due consideration being 
given  to  the  time  elapsing  between  contract  and  delivery  for  this  peculiar  class 
of ships. 
Moreover,  annual forecasts  could not take  into  account irrational factors  which, 
more  than calculable  quantities,  often  explain the  short term  fluctuations  of  the 
newbuilding  market. 
13 Consequently, to be in a position to disregard the effects of these irrational factors 
as  well  as  to leave out the difficulties  arising from variations in  length of delivery 
dates,  it has  been considered necessary to  think  in  terms  of periods long  enough 
to make forecasts.  For this reason, a comparison shall be made here, not between 
supply  and demand  in  the  immediate  term,  which  cannot  be  properly  assessed, 
but  between  accumulative  requirements  and  facilities  which  are  demonstrably 
quantifiable. 
Demand for  newbuildings 
As  regards  the  demand for  newbuildings,  the  first  part of  the  present  report  is 
thus dedicated to the estimated medium and long term trend of needs for additional 
tonnage  to  cope  with  the  expansion  and  the  replacement  of  the  world  merchant 
fleet. 
The limit  chosen for  the  period  considered  was  thus  1980  as  this  year,  ending 
the  8th decade of the century, happens to be that most frequently  adopted in the 
recent works  on the future  of  world  economy  which  this  report has  taken  as  a 
basis  for  determining  the  estimated  volume  reached  at  that  time  by  sea-borne 
trade  and  to  infer  from  it the  corresponding  capacity  that  the  world  merchant 
fleet  should  have  at  the  same  period. 
Similar  estimates  have  been  made  for  a  closer  target year:  1975,  which  at  the 
time of writing this  report, represents  the  end of the medium  term  and makes  it 
possible to divide this  trend analysis into two roughly equal periods of time. 
It must  also  be  pointed  out,  in  connection  with  newbuilding  demand,  that  the 
present report has  only considered the needs  of  the world  merchant fleet,  whilst 
yards build other types  of vessels,  such as  fishing  vessels,  service craft,  dredgers, 
drilling  platforms  and,  of  course,  warships. 
Newbuilding capacity 
Warship  production  was  also  left  out  of  the  foreseeable  development  of  new-
building capacity, as it was estimated, in the second part of this report, in terms of 
merchant ship  tonnage.  It is  true,  however,  that in yards building both warships 
and  merchant ships,  part of the  capacity planned for  one  can be turned  over  to 
the other, as  limits between the two activities  are not very strict. 
This  is  also  true  for  other  categories  of  floating  craft  which  are  neither  mer-
chant ships,  strictly  speaking,  nor warships.  Nevertheless,  at present,  these  craft 
only represent a small fraction of the shipyards' output and it has seemed possible 
to  ignore them for the purposes of this  report. 
Likewise,  the  possibility  of  using  part of  the  output capacity  of  some  yards  for 
ship-repairing was not taken into account. 
The  study  of  the  future  development  of  world  shipbuilding  capacity  will  be 
restricted to  the medium  term.  The period  considered  was  1969-75,  in  order  to 
allow comparison with estimated  requirements  over  the  same  period. 
14 In fact,  it did not seem possible  to  make  a  direct forecast  of capacity  up  to the 
year 1980. In the field  of technical equipment, demand controls the development 
of the market and, in the long term, capacity must be adapted to needs. 
However,  in the medium  term,  the theoretical  capacity  of  world  shipyards  may 
develop  independently  of  requirements.  This  possibility  must  not be  ignored  at 
a  time  when the technological  evolution  of  shipbuilding  depends  on increasingly 
costly equipment, requiring long-term planning and the spreading of capital outlay 
over prolonged periods.  Therefore,  our  main  concern in  the  second  half  of  this 
report  shall  be  to  make  a  comparative  study  between,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
accumulative requirements for newbuildings  up to the year 197  5,  as  estimated in 
the first part, and on the  other, the total  potential deliveries of the world's  ship-
yards  in  the  light  of  the  foreseeable  trend  of  their  theoretical  output  capacity 
during the same period. 
15 PART ONE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEWBUILDING DEMAND 
CHAPTER  I 
METHOD ADOPTED 
In  this  first  part  of  the  report,  the  medium  and  long  term  trends  of  demand 
for  newbuildings  will  be  estimated.  As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  since  the 
period concerned is spread over several years to come, these trends can be deduced 
from  the  development  of  world  merchant  fleet  requirements  as  regards  tonnage 
for replacement as well as additional tonnage. 
1.  General conditions for  establishing forecasts 
The needs for additional tonnage can be determined only by trying to know what 
will  be  the  capacity  required  for  the  world  merchant  fleet  in  1980,  as  well  as 
in  1975,  which  is  the  key  year  chosen  as  the  limit  of  the  medium  term  study. 
These forecasts  can be based  only,  on  the  corresponding  forecasts  for  the  level 
expected  to  be reached at that time  by sea-borne trade. 
To follow a logical order, Chapter II will be devoted to working out these forecasts 
on trade and Chapter III to estimating the fleet necessary in  197 5 and in 19 80 to 
achieve the planned sea-borne level  of trade. 
Forecasts  for  newbuilding  requirements  will  be  dealt with  in  Chapter  IV.  These 
forecasts will, in the long term, concern deliveries to be made from 1 January 1969, 
the  starting point adopted for  this  study,  to  1 July  1980,  both  to  replace  ships 
lost  or  scrapped  and  to  meet  the  quantitative  and  qualitative  alterations  in  sea-
borne trade. In the medium term, the fraction of this tonnage to be delivered before 
1 July 1975 will form the subject of  a separate estimate. 
Thus, by hypothesis,  outstanding demand, at the end of the period, for  deliveries 
to be made after the limit date selected  will  be excluded  from  calculations.  This 
elimination  does  not  affect  much  the  long  term study.  On the  contrary,  in  the 
medium term, demand may seem to be underestimated. 
Consequently,  it must  be  pointed  out,  at  this  stage,  that  by  adopting  the  two 
periods,  limited  by  1  July  1975,  in  the  analysis,  an  artificial  division  will  be 
introduced.  This date,  of course,  does  not correspond to  any foreseeable  change 
17 in the trend of future demand for newbuilding.  Simply,  a limit had to be  adopted 
for the medium term study and had to be placed towards  the middle  of  the long 
term period considered; as  to the choice of this limit of the middle of one year,  it 
is  explained by the convenience of following  the practice of  the  Lloyd's Register 
of  Shipping,  whose  statistics  on world  fleet  tonnage  are  made  each  year  as  at 
1 July. 
To assess  the  potential demand more  exactly,  at the  beginning  of  the  period,  it 
has seemed necessary to introduce  the  notion of tonnage  not ordered until  after 
the  starting date of the  present study,  namely  1  January  1969.  This  tonnage  is 
obtained by substracting the ships on order at that date from the total requirement 
for  newbuilding. 
It must  be  made  clear  that  it  is  only  with  tonnage  still  to  be  ordered  from 
1  January  1969  onwards,  for  delivery  before  1  July  1980,  that  the  long  term 
forecast is  concerned. In the medium term, only the fraction of this tonnage to be 
delivered before  1 July  1975, is  taken into account. 
However,  there is  every reason to believe  that part of the  demand  which  should 
normally  have  appeared in the  first  years  of the  period  1969-7  5  has  been  anti-
cipated by shipowners  during  the  18  months  which  followed  the  second  closure 
of  the  Suez  Canal.  Consequently,  the  medium  term  demand  may  also  seem 
artificially reduced. This is  why, at the end of the last chapter, this tonnage already 
ordered will  be  reintroduced  so  as  to  be  able  to  determine  the  average  annual 
needs  for  new  ships  to  be  delivered  during both periods  considered. 
2.  Method applied for  formulating  forecasts 
Logically,  the estimate of future  needs  for  newbuildings  should  have  been based 
on  a  very  detailed  study  of  the  foreseeable  trend  of  the  various  sectors  of  the 
world merchant fleet,  classified according to type  and size  of ships.  Nevertheless, 
the  shortcomings of available  statistical material have led us  to  adopt a  different 
method  for  this  report.  Two  independent  studies  have  been  carried  out  simul-
taneously.  The first one represents an "overall approach" to  the  problem and has 
considered  only  the  most  general  quantities:  total  volume  of  international  sea-
borne trade, world merchant fleet,  total needs  for  newbuildings.  The second one 
has  consisted  of  a  "sectorial  analysis"  designed  to  place  into  categories  all  the 
types of ships which are required in  relation to the development of the transporta-
tion  by sea  of certain  commodities  or  groups  of  commodities  for  which  special 
forecasts could be made. 
These two  preliminary studies  have been carried  out independently one  from  the 
other;  the  Working  Group  was  of  the  opinion  that  two  sources  of  information 
would thus be available for  this essential part of the report, the conclusions being 
checked against  each  other. 
Therefore,  the first  part of the  report will  present comments  upon  and  compare 
the conclusions of these two  studies  on the three fronts  adopted  as  the  basis  for 
our forecasts :  tonnage  of  international  sea-borne  trade  merchant  fleet  capacity 
and finally  newbuildings  required. 
18 CHAPTER  II 
FORESEEABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VOLUME 
OF INTERNATIONAL  SEA-BORNE  TRADE 
A.  Overall  approach 
1.  The role of sea-borne  trade  in  world  transportation 
a)  Though  shipping  is  only  one  of  the  means  of  transportation  available  to  the 
world's economy, it is certainly foremost among those used by international trade. 
Unfortunately,  no  comparative  statistics  are  available  to  assess  its  share  of  the 
world market since general statistics on international trade are expressed in value, 
whilst  those  of  its  sea-borne  fraction  are  calculated  in  volume. 
Nevertheless,  the  prime  importance  of  maritime  transport  in  international  com-
merce  is  self  -evident. 
b)  In the case of transport between economically developed areas which are close-
to each other on the same continent, shipping generally plays  a  minor part only. 
It remains  geographically  on the  fringe  whereas  other  means  of  transportation, 
such  as  road,  rail,  river  craft,  pipelines,  air  routes,  form  a  closely-knit  network 
in  inland  areas. 
But most of the non-maritime traffic transported by these other means is  internal, 
and only in North America  and  continental Western  Europe  do  large  quantities 
of goods cross land frontiers. 
c)  On the  contrary,  in  the  field  of  transportation  between  distant  areas  of  the 
same  continent,  and  evidently  between  the continents  themselves,  the  only  com-
petition to shipping is  from  aviation. 
This competition, successful for  passenger transport, has had only a  slight impact 
on the  carriage  of  cargo  up to  now,  as  its  cost  strictly  limits  its  application  to 
urgent, fragile  or perishable freight of substantial value and low  tonnage. 
d)  Thus  at  present,  shipping,  which  generally  plays  quite  a  secondary  part  in 
domestic  transport,  is  on  the  contrary  the  main  means  of  transport  in  inter-
national trade, in tonnage terms and even more in ton/miles. 
Though international statistics  do  not provide  precise  details  of  the  total  annual 
volume  of  world  trade,  UNO  publishes  "indices  of  quantum"  from  which  its 
annual variations can be followed. 
Table  I  compares  the  development  of  world  import  figures  and  that  of  inter-
national  shipping,  both  being  presented  in  index  form,  with  1958  being  the 
starting point represented by the figure  100. 
19 TABLE  I 
Comparison of the  development of world trade  (imports)  and international shipping 
Index Base 100 = 1958 
Imports 
International sea  Comparative 
I 
borne trade  development 
World total.  Developed countries 
Year 
I  I  I  I  I 
(l)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  {6)  {7)  (8) 
Index of 
I 
% ·=ual I 
Index of 
I 
%annual  Index of 
I 
%annual.  % 
I 
% 
quantum  growth  quantum  growth  volume  growth  {l) I  (5)  (3) I  (5) 
1959  109  I 
111  105  103.8  105.7 
10  8.1  12.4 
1960  120  123  118  101.7  104.2 
5  6.5  6.7 
1961  126  131  126  100  104 
7.1  7.6  7.9 
1962  135  141  136  99.3  103.7 
7.4  9.2  8.1 
1963  145  154  147  98.6  104.7 
9.7  9.7  12.2 
1964  159  169  165  96.4  102.4 
7.5  9.5  7.8 
1965  171  185  178  96.1  103.9 
8.2  8.1  6.7 
1966  185  200  190  97.4  105.2 
I 
5.9  6  5.8 
1967  196  212  201  97.5  105.5 
The comparison of the developments of the Index of sea-borne trade with that of 
world import shows a strong correlation:  nevertheless, over the last ten years, the 
former has had a growth rate slightly  higher,  on average,  than the latter.  On the 
other hand,  the  ratio between  sea-borne  trade  and  developed  countries'  imports 
has remained almost steady since  1959. 
The fact  that the  growth  of  the developed  countries'  foreign  trade  has  played  a 
major part in  the increase  of  international  sea-borne  transport is  not surprising, 
but its statistical confirmation is  significant to the body of this  study. 
2.  Correlation  between  sea-borne  trade  and the  economic growth  of developed countries 
a)  Various recent studies such as  those by B.R.T. Emery "The relation of Export 
and  Economic  Growth"(1)  or  of  W.M.  Mennes  "A  World  Trade  Model  for 
1970"(2)  have  stressed  the  close  relation  between  growth  of  the  Gross  National 
Product  and  increase  in  exports.  Now,  the  exports  of  a  country  are  another 
(1)  Kyklos 20.  No.  2,  p.  470 and following. 
(2)  W eltwirtsclzaftliches Archiv 99.  No. 2, p.  225  and following. 
20 country's imports  and international  trade can be  measured  either  by  one  or the 
other total. 
b)  It was thus necessary to try to find if,  in the past, a correlation existed between 
the development of the total Gross National Product (GNP) of developed countries 
and sea-borne trade figures,  since  the latter have conformed  to  the  same  pattern 
of behaviour as the foreign trade figures of those countries over the past ten years. 
Besides, this correlation is extremely close as shown by Table II and Figure A. 
The table and figure give a comparison of the evolution of two  s~eries of annual figu-
res since 1957. The first-that of Y  -indicates the variations of the annual volume 
of international sea-borne trade in million metric tons, according to UNO statistics; 
the second series-that of X-corresponds to the annual total GNP's of the OECD 
member  countries,  calculated in million US$  at the  prices  and rates  of  exchange 
of  1958 published by that organization. 
c)  It thus  appears that,  during the last decade,  international  sea-borne  trade  has 
varied  in relation to the  GNP of  the  OECD member  countries  according  to  the 
equation of regression  Y  =  2.26019 X-917.17 which  is  shown  at the foot  of 
Table II. 
In other words, on average over the last ten years, an increase of 1 billion in the 
total  GNP  of  the  OECD  member  countries,  i.e.  approximately  the  developed 
countries,  has  resulted  in  a  corresponding  increase  of  2.26  million  tons  in  the 
volume of sea-borne trade. 
In order to have a means for forecasting future needs for  sea-borne trade, it must 
be  assumed  that the  correlation  noted  for  the  past will  be  valid  for  the  future, 
during the period under consideration, and a probable growth rate for  the GNP of 
the OECD countries must be projected. 
3.  General prospects for the future of sea-borne trade 
a)  For the  future,  it can be assumed  that the  position  of  sea  transport in  inter-
national trade will remain almost stable and the correlations noted during the last 
decade, will be valid for the next one. 
b) Com petition from aviation 
Air  freight  will  certainly  record  a  strong  growth  during  the  ten  coming  years. 
The tonnage  of  air-borne  cargoes  will  reach  2m.  tons  in  1975  according  to  the 
latest forecasts.  But,  as  will  be seen later on,  total  tonnage  carried by  ships  will 
then reach the vicinity of  3000m. tons.  Thus,  in  a foreseeable  future,  planes will 
not  compete  with  ships  for  dry  or  liquid  bulk  cargoes  which  now  represent 
over 3 I 4 of the sea-borne trade. 
So  far as  general cargoes  are concerned,  the forthcoming  extension of the use  of 
containers for sea-borne transports will improve the competitive position of ships. 
Indeed,  containerisation  eliminates  most  of  the  sources  of  complications,  delays 
and losses  which now cause some shippers to  prefer to  transport urgent consign-
ments and fragile objects by air rather than by sea. Containerisation, by introducing 
door-to-door  transportation,  will  mean  not  only  time-saving  but also  a  propor-
tionately greater cut in costs for  ships than for  planes. 
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23 c)  Other  competition 
Let us  mention,  as  a  reminder,  the future  competition  of sea  tunnels  or bridges: 
projects as  the Channel tunnel could certainly compete with  coast trade between 
the  United  Kingdom,  France and the Benelux  countries,  from  1978  on,  but the 
fraction of world sea-borne traffic in ton/miles lost this way will  be marginal. 
As regards pipelines, they rather appear as the complement and not the competitor 
of ships,  at least for  crude oil  which  constitutes  a  growing  part of hydrocarbons 
shipped  on tankers. 
4.  Stability, in the future,  of the correlation noted between the growth of the developed coun-
tries'  GNP and expansion of international  sea-borne  transport 
a)  Such  a close  correlation calculated over a long  period  as  that indicated under 
paragraph  II - A. 2,  can  reasonably  be  expected  to  be  maintained  in  the  next 
decade, i.e. over a period equal to the one chosen as a reference as  it is unlikely to 
deteriorate suddenly in the future. 
b) The closeness of this correlation is not due to chance; the comparisons, made in 
Tables I and II, only express an evident truth: sea-borne transport is  a dependent 
variable  of international trade.  The latter is  becoming increasingly  dependent  on 
the  economic growth of the more developed countries,  as  is  shown by Table III, 
which  is  based  on  statistics  on  international  trade  established  by  the  United 
Nations. It shows the trend every 3 years, during the last decade, of the exchanges 
between the three major socio-economic areas into which the world is  divided. 
Table  III first  stresses  the  rapid  growth  in  value  of  world  trade,  calculated  in 
terms of exports, which has  almost doubled, in US$, over the last decade. Taking 
into  account the  rise  in prices,  the increase  in  volume  has  certainly been lower. 
However, as  the distribution of overall figures  of the four years studied was made 
in  percentages,  the  influence  of  variations  of  prices  can  be  neglected  in  the 
assessment of the relative parts played in the development of world trade by the 
three  groups  into  which  the  various  countries  whose  statistics  are  published  by 
the UNO are classified. 
c)  Generally speaking, since  1958, the share of the economically developed coun-
tries  (OECD  members,  plus  Australia,  New  Zealand  and  South  Africa)  has 
increased regularly, rising from 65.8% to 69.7% in 1967, whereas that of socialist 
countries varied little and the percentage of developing countries decreased. 
When  considering the  trend  of exports  according  to  destination,  it  appears  that 
exchanges between developed countries, which in 1958, already represented 44.5% 
of world exports, have further increased and reached 52.4 %. This preponderance 
confirms that these countries play the leading part in world trade. 
On the  other hand, exchanges  within  each group  have  decreased  for  developing 
and socialist countries. 
Moreover, the developed countries have absorbed a growing share of the socialist 
countries'  exports  and  still  receive  almost  3  I 4  of  those  from  the  developing 
countries.  Exchanges  between  socialist  and  developing  countries  are  indeed 
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 increasing, particularly exports from the former to the latter. Nevertheless, in 196  7, 
they still represented less  than 2%  of world  trade. 
d) Under these conditions,  it can be deemed that, during the  next decade,  world 
trade  will  still  be  influenced  mainly  by  the  present  developed  countries,  even  if 
the growth of their share of world trade will probably slacken and eventually stop. 
The potential  foreign  trade  of socialist  and  developing  countries  is  indeed  con-
siderable  but it will  materialize  only  when  the  growth  rate  of  the  GNP  exceeds 
that of the  population,  i.e.  when  the  national  income  rises  rapidly  in  relation to 
the population. 
The increase in individual countries' income is  expressed, in terms of consumption, 
by  a  relative  drop  in  the  demand  for  essential  foodstuffs  in  favour  of  more 
luxurious  and varied  goods. 
At this  stage,  self-sufficiency  is  no longer  possible  and  imports  are  assuming  a 
growing  part, which will  shortly bring about a  parallel  increase  in  exports. 
In  fact,  among  socialist  countries,  only  the  USSR  and  some  East  European 
countries  seem  able  to  reach  this  level  of  development  during  the  period  con-
sidered; their economic system,  however,  still  restricts the  growth of their  foreign 
trade. 
As  regards  developing countries,  only  some  Latin American  areas  seem  able  to 
"take off" in the ten coming years as well as some privileged but sparsely populated 
countries in North Africa and the Middle  East. 
In fact,  the latest long-range  demographic forecasts  as  those of Wilhelm Fuchs(1) 
or  Gordon  and  Helmer(2)  indicate  an  average  growth  rate  of  3%  up  to  the 
year  2000 for  the  population of developing  countries  as  against  1 %  for  all  the 
developed ones; such a growth rate for  the populations will  absorb the rise of the 
developing  nations'  GNP for  many  years  and  will  maintain  world  disparities  of 
national revenue in relation to population in favour of the developed ones beyond 
the period considered in this report. 
5.  Determination of a  future  growth  rate  for  the  OECD  countries' GNP 
a)  Once it is  admitted that the increase in international trade-and therefore sea-
borne trade-will depend closely on the rise of the OECD member countries' GNP, 
one or several economic growth rates must be chosen for the periods and countries 
considered, to establish forecasts for the volume of shipping in  1975 and 1980, by 
taking the equation of regression,  calculated in Table II, as  a  matrix. 
b)  During the ten years under study in this table,  the average  annual growth rate 
of the OECD countries' GNP amounted to 4.3%. But if  we  consider the shorter 
period of  1960-66, which  eliminates  the  slight  recession  of  1957-58,  the  rate is 
noticeably higher and reaches 5.1. Figures for 1967 and 1968 are not yet published, 
but taking into account the diminution of this  growth  rate recorded  in developed 
countries in 1967 and the advance experienced in 1968, the average annual growth 
of the last ten years will  probably be about 5% . 
(1)  "Formel zur  Macht".  Stuttgart  1966. 
(2)  "Report on a Long Range Forecasting Study". Randlord, 1964. 
26 c) Can such a rate be accepted as  a forecast for the period  1970-80? 
The present  boom  in  the  economic  growth  of  the  major  industrial  countries  is 
accompanied by all  the markings  of international inflation  which will  have  to be 
countered by measures  of restraint,  whose severity will  depend on  how late they 
are applied. 
Consequently,  a  certain  slackening  in  the  growth  rate  of  these  countries'  GNP 
can be anticipated for  the  coming  years.  It seems  thus  reasonable  to  choose  an 
annual rate of 4.5% as  a working hypothesis. 
Besides, this  is  the rate, according to economists, which  allows,  without inflation, 
sufficient  expansion  without  progress  in  productivity  resulting  in  a  deterioration 
in  the  employment situation. 
This  is  why  this  rate  is  now  the  one  adopted  for  most  medium-range  plans  or 
forecasts  concerning  developed  countries  and  it seems  reasonable  to  take  it  for 
the first period covered by the present study.  However we  must underline the fact 
that 4.5% p.a. is  a rather moderate rate.(l) 
For the period  1976-80, the choice  of a  probable growth  rate for  the developed 
countries' GNP is  of course more difficult. 
Indeed, the general picture in the developed countries covers quite different situa-
tions owing to the level  of development reached.  The average annual growth rate 
of 5.1  noted for the OECD member countries' GNP for  the period 1960-66 is  an 
average representing various  stages  of evolution.  The  average  annual growth rate 
of  the  United  States  and  of  the  European countries  ranges  between  4  and  5% 
whereas in Japan it exceeds 9.5%. 
The growth rate of developed countries of longer standing is  of course lower than 
that of economically younger countries, which is mainly explained by less flexibility 
of labour resources. 
If  the  membership  of  the  "club"  of  industrially  developed  countries  remained 
unchanged,  it would  be necessary  to  take into  account  its  economic  ageing  and 
forecast  a growth rate of the GNP slightly lower for  the  second  half of the next 
decade than the one adopted for the first one. 
However,  as  we  have  seen  at  the  end  of  the  preceding  paragraph,  some  other 
countries will be able to "take off" economically .during the period considered. 
Moreover, the fact that the rate of expansion of the United States in recent years 
was  slightly higher than that of the  European OECD member countries  leads  to 
the  assumption  that  quite  a  substantial  margin  of expansion  is  still  available  in 
these  countries  which  is  not likely  to  be  entirely  absorbed  by  the  progress  of 
productivity before the date of  1980. 
This is why it has seemed reasonable to retain, for the period 197 5-80, the average 
growth  rate  of  4.5%  for  the  annual  GNP of  the  group  of  developed  countries, 
the list of which will  probably grow  in the meantime. 
(1)  In  a  recent  Japanese  study,  the  author,  Mr  Onozuka,  Managing  Director  of  Hitachi 
Shipyard, has accounted for an annual growth rate of 4.8%  plus or minus 0.2%  for the GNP 
of the same group of countries up to 1980. 
27 o.  Forecast of the  volume of international sea-borne  transport  in  1975  and 1980 
a)  Table IV presents the conclusions of the overall approach as regards the level to 
be reached in 1975 and 1980 by the volume of sea-borne cargoes on the basis of 
the  maintenance,  in coming  years,  of  the  almost  perfect  interdependence  noted 
between  the  total  amount  of  the  developed  countries'  GNP  and  the  volume  of 
sea-borne trade according to the equation of regression Y  =  2.26019X-917.17 
and  on  the  assumption  that  the  average  annual  growth  rate  of  the  GNP  will 
be  4.5%. 
To put the  position  into  perspective,  additional  hypotheses  of  slower  or  quicker 
economic growth rates have also been calculated:  average annual rate of 3.5  and 
5.5%  for  the  whole  period  and  successive  rates  of  4%  up to  1975  and 3.5% 
afterwards. 
Nevertheless, the figures  to be adopted for  international sea-borne trade according 
to  the overall forecasts  presented above,  correspond to  an annual growth rate of 
the GNP of 4.5%, i.e.  3 068 million metric tons in 197  5 and 4 049 million metric 
tons in 1980. 
b) These figures  imply an average  annual growth rate of sea-borne trade slightly 
above 6% up to  1975  and of about 5.7%  between  1975  and  1980. 
A regular growth rate of the developed countries' GNP thus  corresponds,  in this 
overall  approach,  to  a  growth  rate of  sea-borne trade which  is  at a  higher level, 
but shows a slight decrease.  This result is  certainly due to the form  of equation of 
regression  selected,  but  it  is  interesting  to  note  at  this  stage  that  the  sectorial 
analysis presented hereafter also  suggests  a slight slackening in the rate of growth 
of maritime transport during the second  half of  the next decade. 
B.  Sectorial  analysis 
1.  Sections of maritime transport  under study 
The sectorial analysis of maritime transport has distinguished three major catego-
ries  of  cargo:  oil,  including  refined  products,  dry  bulk  cargoes  and  other  dry 
cargoes. 
These cargoes are shipped on tankers, bulk carriers and cargo-vessels, either liners 
or tramps. 
For dry cargoes, the sectorial  analysis,  like  the  overall  approach,  refers  to inter-
national  sea-borne  trade;  on  the  other  hand,  as  regards  oil,  available  statistics 
include  national  traffic. 
2.  Estimated future development of shipping of crude oil and petroleum products 
a)  S o u r c e s  o f  f o r e c a s t s  o n  c o n s u m p t i o n 
This part of the sectorial study is  mainly based upon the forecasts  on petroleum 
products consumption published in  1966 in an important OECD study,  "Energy 
policy".  This  study  predicts  the  future  increase  of  overall  energy  requirements 
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 of the member-countries of that organization until 1980 and estimates the propor-
tion of these needs to be covered by petroleum products. It thus provides estimates 
of  the future demand for  petroleum products in the  main industrial  areas  of the 
world:  North America,  Western  Europe and Japan. 
For the rest of the world,  it was  necessary to make a separate estimate based on 
the  past trend of petroleum product consumption per capita.  This  trend was  cal-
culated  for  the  period  1957-67,  through  a  comparison  between  the  population 
statistics published by the United Nations year-book and those  on the  petroleum 
consumption  of  the  various  countries  concerned  supplied  by  "B.P.'s  Statistical 
Review  of  the  World  Oil  Industry".  Forecasts  of  the  Keyzer  report  were  also 
used  (1965  Netherlands  Shipbuilding  Commission  Report). 
Finally,  interviews  with  executives  of  oil  companies  have  enabled  us  to  check 
and improve the estimates adopted for  the  future  trend of consumption over  the 
period  1970-80. 
b)  Basis  of  the  estimate  of  sea-borne  oil  imports 
The  same  sources  were  used  for  assessing  the  volume  to  be  reached  in  197  5 
and  1980 by imports  to  the various  areas considered  as  regards  sea-borne crude 
oil and petroleum product movements from other regions of the world.  This trade 
is known as "inter-regional", and is carried out by long-haul tankers. The genuinely 
"regional" trade will  be dealt with later, under paragraph II-B.2e. 
c)  Fore  c as t s  f o r  "i n t e r - r e g ion a 1"  o i 1  s h i p m e n t 
Table V presents the forecasts  adopted for  the volume of inter-regional sea-borne 
oil  shipment in  1975  and  1980, in relation  to  the  expected  consumption  in  the 
various areas into which the world has been split up. 
According  to  the  information  obtained  from  the  sources  mentioned  above,  the 
annual growth rates which it has seemed reasonable to adopt for world petroleum 
product consumption, are 7.3% up to 1975, then 6.3% in the period 1976-80. This 
diminution  takes  into  account  the  probable  development  of  other  sources  of 
energy.  The  corresponding  rates  for  sea-borne  oil  imports  are  9%  and  7.7% 
respectively,  for  the two successive  periods. 
It has  appeared unnecessary  to  formulate  several  growth  hypotheses,  in  view  of 
the great steadiness of the growth rates of oil consumption and sea-borne transport 
noted in the past. 
The problems being encountered today in the development of atomic power stations, 
capable of producing electricity at a price able to compete with that of solid fuel, 
have  led to  the  conclusion  that the  use  of atomic  energy  is  unlikely  to  develop 
rapidly during the  next ten years  to  an extent that would  justify  any  hypothesis 
based on a greater deceleration of the growth rate of the consumption of petroleum 
products than the one adopted. 
For the future,  only power production supplied by nuclear plants, at a lower cost 
than thermal plants fed  with  fuel,  could entail a  slackening in the  growing  share 
of hydrocarbons in  world  energy consumption.  But this  possibility now  seems  to 
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 go  beyond the limits of the present study,  at the time when breeder reactors, still 
to be perfected, are operating. 
On  the  basis  of  these  hypotheses,  inter-regional  sea-borne  oil  transport  should 
reach a total of  1 750m. tons in 1975 and 2 535m. in 1980. If compared with the 
1966 figure,  which was  823m.  tons, these forecasts  imply that the volume carried 
should double by 1975  and  treble  by  1980. 
d)  W e s t e r n  E u r o p e  a n d  J a p a n ,  m a i n  c I i en t s  f o r  o i 1  t r an  s p o r t 
At the regional analysis level, imports by Western Europe are of prime importance: 
in 1967, these imports already represented half the total long distance tonnage and 
their  percentage  should  keep  increasing  until  1975  and  decrease  very  slightly 
afterwards. 
Nevertheless,  the  strongest  relative  increase  during  the  period  considered  is  that 
of imports into Japan. From 14% in 1967, they should rise to 20% in 1975, then 
go  on increasing, though at a slower rate, reaching 22%  in  1980. 
Therefore, in 1980, Western European and Japanese requirements for energy will 
represent 3 I 4 of the demand for shipping of hydrocarbons as  against 2/3 in 1966. 
Unlike North America and the rest of the world, these two  geographic areas have 
little or no oil resources of their own.  This fact explains the increase in the share 
of  sea-borne  imports  in  world  oil  consumption;  it amounted  to  40%  in  19 57, 
reached 50% in 1967 and should exceed  60%  in 1980. 
Moreover,  the  growing  part played  by Western Europe  and  Japan in  sea-borne 
oil trade means that one can expect to see a continuation of the trend noted since 
the end of the Second World war as regards the ratio between crude oil and refined 
products among cargoes shipped on tank vessels.  Whereas, is  1950, 51%  of these 
cargoes were  still  composed of refined products,  this  percentage rapidly  dropped 
to 42%  in  1957 and 22%  in  1967. 
This decline should continue,  as  it is  in Western Europe and Japan's interests to 
import petroleum products in their crude state.  These  savings  are  obtained from 
the  cut in transport costs  due  to  the  use  of  ever  larger  tank-vessels  and  to  the 
concentration  of  traffic  on  a  few  well  equipped  terminals.  Besides,  this  system 
avoids  additional  expenditure  of  foreign  currency  that  the  purchase  of  refined 
products from the producing countries would represent. 
For the  same  reasons,  refineries  will  be  built in  other  countries  without  hydro-
carbon resources,  as  soon  as  the home consumption  of  petroleum products  justi-
fies  it. 
However, oil producing countries are concerned with maximising their exports and 
they will put growing pressure on oil companies and importing countries to develop 
their own refining capacity. It can thus be predicted that the relative  decrease  of 
refined oil tonnage will continue, but at a slower rate than the one recorded during 
recent decades. 
The forecasts  for  1975  and  1980 which  appear  at  the  foot  of  Table  V  fix  the 
share of refined oil out of total oil shipping at 16%  and  13% respectively. 
32 In absolute  terms,  inter-regional  shipping  of  refined  oil  is  still  growing:  dealing 
with  145m.  tons  in  1957,  it  reached  196m.  in  1967  and  should  attain  280m. 
in 1975, then 330m. in 1980. The tonnages concerned are thus very substantial and 
all  the  more  interesting  for  shipping  in  that  they  are  carried  on  tankers  much 
smaller but also  more sophisticated  than those designed  for  crude transport. 
e)  Forecasts  for  reg i on a I  o i I  transport 
Apart from long-haul inter-regional trade, oil is  also shipped on a "regional" basis 
by  the  domestic  coastal  trade  or  international  transport  between  neighbouring 
countries. 
Among domestic  coastal trades,  the  most substantial is  that of the  United  States. 
However,  the  tonnage  carried  has remained  for  ten  years  between  80  and  90m. 
tons  (85m.  in 1966); this  stability means that its  relative importance in  the ship-
ping of oil  has decreased. 
In the  future,  the  development  of  pipe-lines  in  the  United  States  will  probably 
reduce the tonnage carried along the Eastern and Southern coasts of this country. 
However,  the  future  of  this  traffic  is  difficult  to  foresee  due  to  the  rich  fields 
recently discovered in North Alaska. The conditions for exploiting and transporting 
these  deposits  are  not yet  fully  determined  but it  seems  probable  that maritime 
shipment will  be chosen for  part or all  of the route. 
If such  is  the  case,  it  shall  be  considered  legally  as  a  US  domestic  trade,  but 
geographically  and  economically  this  transport  will  be  related  to  inter-regional 
trade as  it will  concern huge  quantities  of crude oil  likely  to  be carried on ships 
very  much larger than those  now  operating along  the  US  coasts.  The lengths  of 
haul will  be  about the  same  as  those  between  Venezuela  and  the  United  States 
and it can be deemed that this  trade, if  it increases  during the  next  decade,  will 
take the place of inter-regional shipments which were accounted for in the estimates 
indicated above. 
As  for  short-sea  international  routes,  the  most  important,  at  present,  concerns 
Venezuelan crude oil bound for  refineries located in the Lesser Antilles:  Cura~ao, 
Trinidad and Tobago. This route carried 53m. tons in 1966. It does not seem that 
this trade can develop much in the future, since these refineries  sell their products 
on the international market which, as regards refined oil, has only limited potential 
for expansion, which is  likely to be absorbed by the oil-producing countries. 
As for the other regional routes, national as  well as  international, which,  according 
to the  study on shipping published by the OECD, carried a  total of 67m.  tons in 
1966,  it is  difficult  to  establish  forecasts  because  of  the  problems  of  obtaining 
accurate records of small  tonnages  of miscellaneous  commodities  from  which  no 
clear pattern emerges. 
The  general  expansion  foreseen  for  inter-regional  oil  transport  can  be  deemed, 
however, to have a bearing on regional transport,  even if it is  only for  transship-
ment between oil terminals and refineries. But in other cases, pipe-lines will replace 
coastal shipping as  soon as  the tonnages concerned justify their construction. 
Taking into account a certain diminution of trade along the United States coastline 
(excluding  Alaska),  the  quasi-stagnation  of  trade  between  Venezuela  and  the 
33 Lesser  Antilles,  and  a  moderate  expansion  of  trade  on other  routes,  it  may  be 
foreseen  that the  tonnage  of  sea-borne  oil  products  within  the  various  regions 
will  reach 250m. tons in 1975 and 300m. tons in  1980. 
All  things  considered,  the following  forecasts  can be  established  for  the  volume 
of  sea-borne  oil  transport. 
TABLE  VI 
Expected  tonnage  of oil  sea-borne  trade  in  1975 and  1980 
Tonnage in 1966 
Inter-regional routes  823 
Regional routes  215 
All routes  1 038 
3.  Forecasts for dry  bulk cargoes 
a)  Six  main  bulk  commodities 
Forecasts 
1975 
I 750 
250 
2 000 
(in  millio~U of tons) 
Forecasts 
1980 
2 535 
300 
2 835 
For this  part of the sectorial analysis,  the six  main bulk commodities  carried by 
sea were first considered.  Their trade forms  the subject of statistics  published for 
several years by the Norwegian Ship Brokers, Fearnley & Eagers Chartering Co, in 
their  annual reports "Trade of World Bulk Carriers". 
These  six  commodities  are:  iron  ore,  coal,  grain,  manganese  ore,  bauxite  and 
alumina, finally phosphates. 
Although this was  not done in the case of hydrocarbons, it has seemed necessary 
to formulate  two  hypothetical growth rates for  each period considered. 
Not only  are the forecasts  of world  consumption for  most of these  commodities 
more open to error than those concerning energy, because of variations of special 
circumstances  in the  various  consumer  industries,  but  also  the  shipped  tonnage 
of  these  products is  not as  directly  related  to  foreseeable  consumption  as  in the 
case  of oil products. 
This is  obvious for  grain, the exchanges of which are subject to weather hazards, 
but it also applies to coal and iron ore, the maritime shipment of which will grow 
more  or less  rapidly,  according  to  the  rate  at which  West  European  countries 
choose to reduce the tonnage extracted from  their own pits. 
This  reduction  seems  inevitable  as  local  production  is  burdened  with  operating 
costs which prevent it from  meeting the competition of fuels  or ore imported on 
large  bulk-carriers  but social  considerations  will  certainly  prove  the  findings  of 
forecasts  based on criteria of profitability alone  to  be inaccurate. 
34 Besides,  in the  past,  the growth rates  noted for  these  commodities,  according  to 
Fearnley  and  Eagers'  statistics  have  fluctuated  greatly  and  even  been  negative 
from  one year  to  another. 
This is  why it is  not surprising to find  wide differences in  the forecasts published. 
Sources of such forecasts are few.  Apart from the Keyzer report, mentioned above, 
this part of the sectorial analysis has used various studies published by the British 
firm Westinform, which has specialized in forecasts on sea-borne trade and which 
has given growth estimates up to  1970 or 1975 for iron ore, coal and phosphates. 
Table VII presents  the forecasts  indicated  for  the  volume  of  the  six  main  bulk 
commodities to be carried by sea in  1975 and  1980. 
b)  Explanation  of  the  annual  growth  rates  adopted 
These  forecasts  call  for  the following  explanatory comments:  generally  speaking, 
the  maximum  growth  rates  adopted  for  both  periods  considered  are  noticeably 
more reduced than the  single  rates  previously retained for  hydrocarbons.  This  is 
particularly true of coal and grain which,  in  1967, represented  over  3  7%  of the 
total shipments  of  the six commodities under study. 
i)  Coal 
World  coal  production  has  been  static  for  some  years  and  it  seems  logical  to 
think  that it will  even  decrease  during  the next decade.  The progress  in  mining 
expected in developing or socialist countries will  be more than offset by the rapid 
fall  in production in the traditional coal fields  of North Western Europe. 
The role of solid fuels  in meeting world energy requirements is  declining  steadily 
and it is  obvious  that sea-borne coal  transport cannot increase  at the  same  rate 
as  that of oil products. 
However, it is considered that this trade will keep growing,  at least slightly, during 
the  next decade,  particularly in  view  of the needs  of the  steel industry for  coke, 
especially in Japan, but also in Western Europe where new plants are built within 
easy access  of the sea to  benefit from  lower costs of raw materials brought from 
overseas  by giant ships. 
Furthermore,  coal  mining  in  Western  Europe  may  be  run  down  more  rapidly 
than the fall-off of demand for solid fuel, which has caused us to adopt a relatively 
high maximum rate for the period up to 1975. 
ii)  Grain 
Forecasts are much more difficult  because  of weather hazards  and the  influence 
of the Common Market agricultural policy on this  trade. 
It is probable that, as in the past, series of bad harvests will  occur in India, China, 
USSR, or other areas of the world. However, thanks to the progress of agricultural 
techniques, countries which, not long ago, were the main importers, should, on the 
whole, during the next decade, reach a better balance between their food production 
and  needs,  despite  the foreseeable  increase in population. 
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 This is  why the growth  rates retained for  grain  have  been  the lowest  of  the  six 
main commodities for  the period up to  1975. For the second half of the decade, 
the rates, which show a further reduction, are the same as  those adopted for coal. 
iii)  Ores 
For iron ore, manganese and bauxite, the growth rates adopted which are between 
4 and 6% up to 1975 and between 3 and 6% from  1976 to 1980, seem to comply 
with  the  expected  development  of  the  metal  using  industries  involved  in  steel 
and  aluminium  production. 
World  needs  will  certainly  continue  to  grow,  but  the  present  rate  will  not  be 
maintained  for  long.  Furthermore,  the  competition  of  plastic  materials  is  bound 
to  be felt in the next decade,  at least in the case of ordinary steel. 
iv)  Phosphates 
The demand for fertilizers  should develop considerably in the coming decade, but 
phosphate  fertilizers  are  not  the  only  ones  and  the  recent  trends  have  favoured 
nitrates.  Besides,  maritime  shipment  of  hard  phosphate  rock  is  no  longer  the 
only  solution  for  supplying  fertilizer  plants,  as  shipment  of  phosphoric  acid  or 
even  liquid  phosphorus  on special  tankers  has  recently  been  introduced. 
c)  0 the r  b u I k  co m modi ties 
Apart from  the main trade in "dry bulk cargoes",  the  estimated  development  of 
which  has  been  examined  above,  a  substantial  tonnage  of  extremely  diverse 
products is now carried in bulk on specialised ships or in the holds of cargo-vessels, 
mainly tramps. 
Among these  cargoes,  some  would  deserve  separate  studies,  like  the  main  com-
modities  previously  considered.  Such  is  the  case,  for  instance,  of  wood  and  its 
by-products, sugar, dry chemicals and fertilizers.  Unfortunately, for the past trade 
of these commodities, no series s,imilar  to those of Fearnley & Eagers are available 
and forecasts  on these  products  are  few. 
Wood  and  its  by-products,  however,  were  the  subject  of  a  recent  Westinform 
forecast,  but loads  are estimated in  "cu.m. of roundwood equivalent"  and not in 
tons,  which  is  logical,  as  it  generally  deals  with  low  density  commodities,  but 
makes  comparisons  difficult.  According  to  this  study,  the  international  trade 
in  1965  of sawn timber,  wood-pulp  and paper was  equivalent  to  120m.  cu.m.  of 
roundwood.  In  1975,  the  corresponding  volume  should  reach  about  225m.  i.e. 
an average annual growth rate of 6.5% over 10 years. 
This lack of statistics for  bulk commodities  other than the  six  main  ones  studied 
by  Fearnley &  Eagers even makes  it difficult-though it is  necessary-to distin-
guish  between  general  cargoes  and  "other  bulk  commodities"  among  shipped 
cargoes. 
d)  E s tim ate  d  s e a- b o r n e  "o the r  b u I k  c a r go"  t on n age  i n  1 9 6 6 
In order to estimate, by indirect means, the tonnage of "other bulk commodities" 
carried by sea in  a  year recent enough  to  be used as  basis  for  a  forecast,  it has 
been necessary to combine various estimates,  distinguishing the two  types  of ship 
transporting dry  bulk cargoes:  tramps  and  specialized  bulk-carriers. 
37 i)  Tramps 
A  Westinform study estimated that 3 520 "standard tramps"  of  15,300 tdw was 
the fleet necessary for  all  dry bulk  transport in  1966.  This would  correspond  to 
a  total  fleet  of 53.3m.  tdw.  When  deducting  from  this  figure  the  deadweight  of 
specialized  bulk  -carriers  above  10 000 tdw  which  reached,  in  mid  1966,  30. 8m. 
tons, the remaining total is 22.5m. tdw for the other ships. 
As the other ships  are mainly tramps, the efficiency calculated for  this  section of 
the fleet in chapter III-B for the year  1966 suggests  an estimate of  178m. tons at 
most and 160m. tons at least of the total bulk tonnage carried that year on cargo-
vessels. 
Now,  out of this  total,  somewhat more than 80%  is  attributable to the six  main 
commodities,  which  leaves  29  to  33m.  tons  for  the  "other  bulk  commodities" 
shipped on tramps in 1966. 
ii)  Specialized bulk carriers 
In the same year, large bulk carriers over  10 000 tdw which were  accounted for 
by Fearnley &  Eagers, carried 46m. tons of "other bulk commodities". 
Consequently,  all  the  "other  bulk  commodities"  represented  about  75  to  79m. 
tons in 1966. 
e)  Estimated  trend  of  sea-borne  "other  b u 1 k  commodity"  trans-
port 
It should  be  noted  that,  in  the  future,  "other  bulk  cargoes"  should  include  a 
substantial  amount  of  new  types  of  cargo.  These  will  be  products  previously 
handled as  packaged goods,  but for which the increasing demand for transport by 
sea has made it necessary to adopt bulk-carriage. Their growth rates will be high, 
therefore. 
As  the  growth  rate foreseen  up  to  1975  for  the  transport of wood  and  its  by-
products,  which  are certainly  the most important of  the  traditional  commodities 
of this group, is  also important, it has seemed possible to allow for higher annual 
rates  of expansion for  the whole  of "other bulk cargoes"  than for  the  six  main 
commodities. The range adopted has been 5 to 7% up to 1975 and 4 to 6% for 
the  period  197 6-80. 
Table  VIII,  summarizes  the  forecasts  for  1975  and  1980  as  regards  the  total 
tonnage of sea-borne dry bulk cargoes. 
4.  Forecasts  for other dry  cargoes 
a)  E s t i m a t e d  s e a - b o r n e  t r an s p o r t  i n  1 9 6 6  f o r  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  o f 
cargo 
With  this  category  "other  dry  cargoes"  the  sectorial  analysis  tackles  a  part  of 
sea-borne  trade  for  which  forecasts  are  particularly  unreliable,  because  of  the 
heterogeneous products in this  category, whose limits  are ill-defined.(1) 
The OECD Maritime  Transport Committee has started a  pilot study  to  examine 
the possibility of improving the statistical information in the field  of dry cargoes. 
38 TABLE  VIII 
Forecasts  for  dry  bulk  cargo  shipments  m  1975 and  1980 
(million  toru) 
1975  1980 
Low estimate  I 
High estimate  Low estimate  I 
High estimate 
6 main commodities  468  552  532  687 
Other dry bulk 
commodities  115  145  141  194 
Total  583  I 
697  673  881 
For the  year  1966  being  used  as  a  reference,  the  sea-borne  "other dry cargo" 
trade was about 360 to 364m. tons. 
This range is  obtained from  the difference between the total amount of sea-borne 
dry  cargoes  that year-800m.  tons  according  to  UNO  statistics-on one  hand, 
and all  the sea-borne bulk trades  which  aggregated about 435  to  440m.  tons  on 
the  other. 
b)  "Genera  1  cargoes"  shipped  on  cargo  -1 in e r s 
To formulate forecasts  in  this indefinite  and  intricate field  of maritime  transport, 
first the freight carried by long-haul cargo-liners has to be assessed:  this  category 
will be called hereafter "general cargoes". 
For lack of basic statistical data on quantities shipped and on the tonnage of this 
section of the  merchant fleet,  it has first  been necessary  to  make  an  estimate  of 
the world deadweight of cargo-liners operating in 1966 and, after a rough exami-
nation, the tonnage has been estimated at about 43m. tdw. 
The estimates  of  productivity  for  this  section  of  the  world  fleet,  which  will  be 
further explained in the following chapter, have fixed  a ratio between tons carried 
per year and deadweight tons,  of 4.4 to 5.1  for  cargo-liners. 
The  range  of  this  ratio  leads  to  a  corresponding  range  for  estimating  general 
cargo trade which, in 1966, averaged between  190 and 220m.  tons.  This explains 
why  forecasts  had to  be established on two  basic  hypotheses  as  can be  seen  on 
Table IX. 
In this  table, forecasts for  1975 and 1980 were determined on the basis of maxi-
mum annual growth rates of 6.5% up to  1975 and 5.5% for the period 1976-80. 
For the low estimate,  a  rate one point lower has  been adopted up to  1975,  the 
difference being reduced to half a point only for  the second period. 
These high growth rates have been adopted considering there may still  exist,  for 
general  cargoes,  an  important potential  for  trade  which  should  appear  as  con-
39 TABLE  IX 
Forecasts for  1975 and  1980 on  general  cargo  maritime  shipment 
(million Ions) 
I 
Forecasts 
Estimated volume carried 
in  1966 
Annual growth  1975  1980 
rates foreseen 
Minimum 
I 
Maximum  Low 
I 
High  Low 
I 
High 
estimate  estimate  estimate  estimate 
190  I)  Up to 1975  295  335  375  440 
5.5 to 6.5% 
2)  For the period 
220  1976-80  340  390  435  510 
5 to 5.5% 
tainerisation  develops  and  tariff-barriers  and  other  practices  restricting  inter-
national trade are reduced. 
Despite  the  slight  difference  between  the  maximum  and  minimum  growth  rates, 
the  range of forecasts  is  wide  because of the uncertainty as  to the level  at which 
the volume of trade carried in the basic year  1966 must be  fixed. 
c)  M is c e 11 an e o u s  car go e s 
Apart from  bulk commodities  and  general  cargoes  shipped  on  cargo-liners,  dry 
cargoes  also  include  so-called  miscellaneous  cargoes.  In  1966,  they  represented 
quite a substantial tonnage which ranged between 152 and 186m. tons, considering 
the high and low estimates previously made for  "other bulk cargoes" and "general 
cargoes". 
As  regards  the  future  of  this  sector  of  sea-borne  trade,  it  is  not  possible  to 
establish  direct growth  forecasts,  for  lack of precise  knowledge  of the  nature  of 
the  commodities  concerned. 
Under these conditions,  the problem can be  tackled only indirectly,  by taking,  as 
a basis,  the  past rate of expansion  of the  total tonnage  of  sea-borne dry cargoes 
and by formulating forecasts on the future annual growth rate of this very general 
category. 
Between  1959 and 1966, the average annual expansion rate of dry cargoes noted 
in  the  UNO maritime  shipment statistics was  5.1%  per year. 
It seems possible to predict, up to  1975, a minimum average rate or" 4%  per year 
and a maximum rate of  6%. 
For the following  period, up to 1980, the corresponding rates would  be 4%  and 
5%. Taking into account the forecasts  previously formulated  for  other groups  of 
dry cargoes (bulk and general cargoes), the foreseeable volume of other sea-borne 
dry cargoes can be calculated for  1975  and  1980. 
These  calculations  are presented in  Table  X. 
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 C.  Comparison of the conclusions of the  two  methods for  estimating the  volume 
of sea-borne  trade 
1.  The sectorial analysis at first  sight more optimistic than  the  overall approach 
Table  XI compares  the  sum  of  pessimistic  and  optimistic  forecasts  established 
for  the  various  trades  adopted  in  the  sectorial  analysis  with  the  single  forecast 
formulated by the overall approach as  regards the levels  that the total volume of 
international sea-borne trade should reach in 1975 and 1980. 
This volume is  estimated by the overall  approach, for  1975, at a level very near 
that  of  the  pessimistic  forecast  of  the  sectorial  analysis,  which  results  from  the 
addition of the low estimates adopted by this  study for dry cargoes  and from  the 
single  estimate  formulated  for  oil  products.  The  overall  approach  is  51m.  tons 
or  1. 6%  lower than this  pessimistic  forecast.  The  difference  with  the  optimistic 
forecast is,  of course,  greater, being 322m. tons  or 9.5%. 
For 1980, the differences are more pronounced at 4%  and  12.4%. 
2.  Significance  of domestic  oil  transport 
It must be noted, however, that the overall approach only relates  to international 
sea-borne trade,  whereas  the  sectorial  analysis  under the heading  of regional  oil 
shipment includes figures for tonnage handled within individual countries. 
The  sectorial  analysis  must  thus  be  corrected,  by  deducting  the  anticipated 
domestic  oil transport tonnages for  197 5  and  19 80  from  the forecasts. 
A  very  rough  estimate  can be attempted  by referring  to  BP's  statistics  used  by 
OECD in its study on maritime transport in  1967. 
According  to  these  figures,  in  1966,  the  total  regional  transport  of  petroleum 
products amounted to  215m.  tons. 
Out of this  total,  85m.  tons which  correspond to  the  coastal trade of the United 
States  are  obviously  national,  and  53m.  attributable  to  the  Venezuela/Lesser 
Antilles coastal trade are obviously international. This leaves 77m. tons of regional 
transport to  be  distributed  between national  and  international trades.  As  precise 
statistics  are not available,  it may be taken that half this  figure  corresponded  to 
trade between ports of the same country. 
The whole  of national  oil  trades  adopted  by  the  sectorial  analysis  for  the  basic 
year  1966 can therefore be estimated at 123m.  tons, which corresponds to some-
what over 57% of the whole of regional transport. If it is  assumed that this pro-
portion  will  be  maintained  in  1975  and  1980,  the  conclusions  of  the  sectorial 
analysis should be corrected, that is, reduced by 143m. tons in 1975 and by 172m. 
tons  in  1980,  to  obtain  valid  estimates  for  international  transport,  consequently 
more likely to be directly comparable to the forecasts of the overall approach. 
Once this correction has been made, the overall forecasts  for  1975  and  1980 are 
situated between the pessimistic  and optimistic estimates of the sectorial analysis. 
They are, however, nearer the pessimistic ones in 1975 and are almost level with 
them for  1980. 
42 TABLE  XI 
Comparison  of the  volume of international sea-borne  trade  in 1975 and  1980 
as  forecast  by  the  sectorial  analysis  and  the  overall  approach 
(million  tons) 
Estimates  Forecasts for 1975  Forecasts for 1980 
A)  Sectorial analysis 
1)  Oil products (Table VI)  2 000  2 835 
2)  Dry cargoes  Low  High  Low  High 
a)  Dry bulk cargoes (Table VIII)  583  697  673  881 
b)  General cargoes (Table IX)  295  390  375  510 
c)  Other dry cargoes (Table X)  240  305  335  395 
Total dry cargoes  1 119  1 390  1 383  1 786 
Total sectorial analysis  3 119  3 390  4 218  4 621 
B)  Overall approach 
International shipping  3 068  4 049 
Difference in favour of the 
sectorial approach  +  51  +322  +169  +572 
C)  Sectorial analysis (corrected) 
(National oil shipment excluded)  2 976  3 257  4 045  4 448 
Difference with overall approach  -92  +189  - 4  +399 
3.  Compatibility of the  two  studies 
Too much importance must not be given  to  the differences in figures,  which  can 
be noted in Table XI, between the results of the two studies, but one must rather 
take into consideration the medium  and long  range trends  revealed  by the fore-
casts about the volume of sea-borne transport. 
These  trends  are,  on the  whole,  quite  compatible,  which  is  worth  emphasizing, 
as calculations were made independently one from the other, by two  members of 
the Working Group, in two different countries. It can be noticed, however, that the 
sectorial analysis is  on average more optimistic than the overall approach and this 
tendency is clearer at the end of the period considered than in the middle. 
43 This  fact  is  to  be  linked  with  the  use  of  a  moderate  growth  rate in the  overall 
approach as  regards the developed countries' GNP. 
Besides,  the  difference  between  the  optimistic  and  pessimistic  forecasts  of  the 
sectorial  analysis  grows wider  during  the period considered,  despite  the  fact  that 
the high  and low hypotheses  retained for  dry  cargo  trade  only have  slightly  dif-
ferent growth rates. In 1980, the difference exceeds 400m. tons in absolute figures, 
but in relative value it only represents 10% of the pessimistic forecast which, once 
corrected, comes  to the same  as  the  overall  estimate. 
Figure  B  presents,  in  graphic  form,  the  comparison  of  the  various  estimates, 
represented by curves. 
The  intermediate  points  on  the  curves  leading  up  to  197 5  and  between  197 5 
and  1980 are not intended as  forecasts  for  the corresponding years.  They merely 
represent the trends on which the long and medium term forecasts in this chapter 
have been based. in billion tons 
1750 
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45 CHAPTER Ill 
ESTIMATED  DEVELOPMENT  OF WORLD  SHIPPING  TONNAGE 
A.  Overall approach 
1.  Projection  into the  future  of the  trends revealed in  the past 
This approach is  based on the premise that future  medium  and  long  term  trends 
can be deduced from past achievements, provided a long enough period is  covered, 
so  that the influence of short term fluctuations  is  eliminated. 
This implies that it is  assumed that during the period considered no basic change, 
which  would  compromise  the  structure  of  the  model  itself,  will  occur  in  the 
parameters studied. 
To establish  forecasts  on the tonnage  of world  shipping  to  be reached  by  1975 
and 1980, in relation to those previously indicated for  the volume of international 
sea-borne  transport  by  the  same  years,  research  was  first  made  into  whether 
there  was  a  correlation between  the  development  of  both  quantities  in  the  past. 
This  approach  is  a  logical  progression  from  that,  in  the  previous  chapter,  of 
bringing out the very close correlation between the development of the volume of 
international sea-borne trade and of the GNP of  the  OECD countries  (Table II 
and diagram  A). 
2.  Past  correlation  between  world  merchant  fleet  tonnage  and  international  sea-borne  trade 
volume 
This investigation, detailed in Table XII and diagram C,  has dealt with  the years 
1950 to  1968. 
The series  considered are:  on one hand,  the  annual  volume  of international  sea-
borne  trade,  in million  tons,  as  calculated  by  the  UNO  statistical  departments, 
and, on the other hand, the tonnage of the world merchant fleet in gross registered 
tons,  published  in  Lloyd's  Register  of  Shipping  Statistical  Tables.  In  the  first 
series, however, referred to as  "Y", as in Table II of the first Chapter, the figures 
for  1967  and  1968  are  estimates based on the  earlier  hypotheses  on the  growth 
of sea-borne trade. The second series,  referred to as "Z", includes the US  reserve 
fleet  in  the  figures  for  the  world  shipping  tonnage,  but  excludes  the  US  and 
Canadian  Great Lakes  fleet. 
During  the  period  studied,  the  world  fleet  has  more  than  doubled  whereas  the 
volume  of  maritime  transport  has  nearly  quadrupled.  The  annual  growth  rates 
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COMPARATIVE  DEVELOPMENT OF  THE  WORLD  MERCHANT  FLEET AND 
INTERNATIONAL  SEA-BORNE  FREIGHT 
DIAGRAM  OF DISPERSION  FOR  THE  PERIOD  1950  - 1968 
World merchant fleet 
(m  mtllion grt) 
z  =  0.0727235 y  + 42 83 
• 
FIGUREC 
I 
•  1968 
1967-1968: Esttmate of mternational sea-borne fretght 
Y  .  International sea-borne fretght (in  mtllton tons) 
600  800  1000  1200  1400  1600  1800  2000 (which  appear  in  Table XIII)  have  varied  considerably  without  direct  relations 
with  each other. 
For this  reason,  Figure  C  shows  a  greater  dispersion  of  the  points  plotted  each 
year  for  the  co-ordinates  "Z" and "Y" than that seen  in  Figure  A.  It is  normal 
that  there  should  be  greater  disparity  between  the  annual  growth  rates  of  the 
merchant fleet and the maritime transport than between the latter and the GNP of 
the OECD countries. 
However,  the length of the period considered eliminates the effects  of short term 
fluctuations,  and  in  the  calculations  appearing  at  the  foot  of  Table  XII,  the 
correlation between the two series is  very near parity. 
Furthermore,  the  "cloud"  of  the  points  of  diagram  C  has  an  axis  which  may 
be  looked  on  as  a  straight  line  corresponding  to  the  equation  of  regression 
Z  =  0.07272235 Y  + 42.83. This means that, on average, in the past, additional 
tonnage  needs  for  72 700  gross  registered  tons  corresponded  to  an  increase  of 
1m.  tons  in  international  maritime  cargoes.  The  absolute  factor  of  the  for-
mula,  + 42.83, shows that, in the past, the carrying capacity, per gross  ton, had 
a  slight  upward  tendency. 
This point is  clearly illustrated by Table XIII which compares the development of 
the  world  fleet  and  international  sea-borne  trade  from  1950  to  1966,  showing, 
for  each series,  the  annual growth rate,  as  well  as  the annual trend of the ratio : 
metric tons carried per year 
gross  registered  tons 
This  ratio which  measures  the  mean productivity of  the world  fleet,  rose  during 
the  period considered, from  6.43  in 1950 to  10.43  in  1966. 
3.  Overall forecasts  for merchant fleet  tonnage in  1975  and 1980 
If it is  admitted  that  the  correlation,  noted  in  the  past,  between  the  volume  of 
sea-borne  trade  and  gross  tonnage  of  the  world  merchant  fleet  will  be  closely 
maintained in the future, the straight line on diagram "C" representing the equation 
of regression calculated at the foot  of Table XII may be continued. 
As  forecasts have been established for the volume of international sea-borne trade 
in  the  years  197 5  and  19 80,  corresponding forecasts  for  merchant fleet  tonnage 
can be established by using the equation of regression. 
Table XIV presents these forecasts which-let us remember-are related, through 
the double correlation established, to an average annual growth rate of the OECD 
countries'  GNP equal  to  4.5%  during the  period considered  (ref.  Chapter I-A.). 
It has  also  seemed  appropriate  to  show,  in  table  XIV,  what  would  be  the 
alternative  tonnages  for  the  merchant  fleet  which  would  be  deduced  from  the 
other annual  growth  rates  of  the  GNP;  the  effects  of  these  other  rates  on sea-
borne trade have been calculated,  as  examples,  in Table IV.  However,  we  recall 
that, for  this  overall approach, the single  economic growth rate retained was  that 
of 4.5% per year. Consequently, within these terms of reference, the only estimate 
50 TABLE  XIII 
Comparison  of the  development  of the  fleet  of world  sea-borne  cargoes 
and  trend  of the  fleet  productivity  between  1950  and  1966 
Productivity of 
World merchant fleet (1)  International sea borne trade  the fleet: 
sea-borne trade 
Million 
I 
Annual  Million 
I 
Annual  Fleet  grt  grt  growth  rate  tons  growth rate 
%  % 
1950  81.6  2.5  525  - 6.4 
1951  84.2  3.2  615  17  7.3 
1952  87.0  3.3  635  3  7.3 
1953  90.1  3.6  655  3  7.3 
1954  94.1  4.4  710  8  7.5 
1955  97.1  3.2  800  13  8.2 
1956  101.8  4.8  880  10  8.6 
1957  106.8  4.9  930  6  8.7 
1958  114.6  7.3  920  -1  8 
1959  121.4  5.9  970  5  8 
1960  126.2  4.0  1 080  11  8.5 
1961  132.4  4.9  1 150  6  8.7 
1962  136.5  3.0  1 250  9  9.1 
1963  142.4  4.3  1 350  8  9.5 
1964  149.7  5.1  1 510  12  10.1 
1965  157.2  5.0  1 640  9  10.4 
1966  167.8  6.7  1 750  7  10.4 
( 1)  Ships over 100 grt excluding the Great Lakes fleet but including the US reserve fleet. 
to  be  considered  is  the  figure  of  266m.  gross  tons  for  the  world  merchant fleet 
in  1975, and that of 337.3m. in  1980. 
B.  Sectorial  analysis 
1.  Method of estimation 
In order to estimate the tonnage of the merchant fleet in  1975  and then in 1980, 
the  sectorial  analysis  had  to  assess,  for  each  group  of  cargoes  considered  in 
Chapter  II-B,  what will  be the  total  deadweight  of  shipping  necessary  to  carry 
the  anticipated cargoes. 
Various  methods  of  estimation  had  to  be  adopted  for  each  group  according  to 
the  type  of  data  available. 
In the case of bulk cargoes, the concept adopted was that of "coefficient of utiliza-
tion" of the corresponding section of the fleet,  i.e.  the foreseeable ratio-for both 
years studied-between sea-borne traffics in terms of ton/miles and the theoretical 
capacity of the fleet,  which  is  the product of  the  average  daily  distance  covered 
and the total of cargo deadweight. 
On the other hand, for the other groups, it has been either possible or compulsory 
to pass directly from the volume to be carried to  the necessary deadweight of the 
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 corresponding  section  of  the  fleet,  by  directly  assessing  the  fleet's  productivity 
through  a  coefficient  expressing  the  ratio  between  its  total  deadweight  and  the 
annual  volume  of  cargoes  shipped. 
2.  Forecasts for the tanker fleet 
a)  D e fin i t ion  of  this  section  of  the  w or  1 d  merchant  f 1 e e t 
This section of the world merchant fleet comprises tankers of more than 2 000 tdw 
normally designed for  crude oil  or refined product transportation. 
Although in the past, some tankers of more than 2 000 tdw were  used for  trades 
other  than  that  of  liquid  hydrocarbons,  especially  grain,  there  existed  and  still 
exists  an  extremely  close  relation  between  the  world  tanker  fleet  tonnage  and 
crude  oil  and refined  products  shipping  requirements. 
At present,  however,  ore/bulk/oil carriers  are  growing  in  number  and  most  of 
those commissioned during the last two years have been used for  crude oil  trans-
portation, because of the increased need for tonnage following  the closure  of the 
Suez  Canal. 
By contrast, in 1966, only 45% of the tonnage of these OBO's was used for crude 
oil  shipment. 
Versatility being the main characteristic of this  section of the world  fleet,  it was 
not considered possible to make separate forecasts of its tonnage. 
In other words,  in  the  present section  as  well  as  in  the  following  one  on bulk-
carriers, no assessment has been made as to how the tonnage considered necessary 
for  1975  and  1980  would  be  distributed  between  fully  specialized  ships  and 
combined vessels. 
But  the  latter  will  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration  in  Chapter  IV  in  the 
assessment of newbuilding requirements. 
b)  Importance  of  the  tanker  fleet 
At 1 July 1968 the tanker fleet represented 35.6% of the total of world merchant 
fleet  expressed  in  gross  tonnage.  The  corresponding  percentage,  in  deadweight 
tonnage,  is  not known  exactly  (at  the same  date),  but it already  exceeded  45% 
at  the  beginning  of  1968  according  to  an  estimate  published  by  the  American 
Bureau of Shipping in  its  annual report. 
The share of petroleum products  in  the  volume  of  international  sea-borne  trade 
was 53% in 1966, according to UNO statistics. It must have continued to increase 
since  then. 
From the relation between these percentages, it can be deduced not only that the 
tanker fleet is  by far the most important section of the world merchant fleet,  but 
also that its productivity is  considerably above average. 
c)  Tanker  f 1  e e t  e ff  i c i en  c y  and  prospects  of  de v e 1 o p men t 
For the purposes of this study, productivity is defined in terms of the ratio between 
the annual volume of a given sea-borne trade and the deadweight of the shipping 
53 used.  Such ratio can also  be considered  as  the  annual  average  of roundtrips  fdr 
the type of ship considered. 
This  concept is  valid  for  a  fairly  homogeneous fleet  as  in  the case  of  the  world 
tanker fleet.  · 
Table  XV  shows  the  trend  of  this  productivity  coefficient  in  recent  years  'l.S 
regards  the world  tanker fleet  in service. 
Year 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
TABLE  XV 
Productivity  of the  tanker fleet 
Inter-regional  oil  trade  World tanker fleet in service 
(million tons)  (million tdw) 
666  75 
745  81.6 
812  90.1 
890  99 
963  107.9 
Productivity  coefficient: 
tons/year 
Fleet deadweight 
9.2 
9.5 
9.5 
9.45 
9.3 
Therefore, since 1965, the productivity of the world tanker fleet can be said to have 
decreased.  This  result,  surprising  at first  sight,  is  explained  by the  fact  that  the 
average distances covered have increased. 
In 1966, about 20m.  tons of crude oil  were brought to Western Europe from the 
Persian Gulf round the Cape of Good Hope, which has resulted in a slight fall  in 
the productivity rating that year. 
The more pronounced decline in  1967 is  of course the direct consequence of the 
Suez  Canal  closure  which  made  the  detour  round  the  Cape  necessary  for  both 
outward and homeward voyages. This event happened in June and its consequences 
were felt only during the second half of 1967. The effect of the Suez Canal closure 
for  a full  year will  certainly be much stronger,  but the  1968 figures  are  not yet 
known. 
It seems  reasonable  to  anticipate  that the  productivity  coefficient  will  remain  at 
the level of 9 to 9.2 until 1970. 
For the medium and long term future,  an upward trend in the coefficient can be 
anticipated because of various technical or geographical factors,  but the  speed  of 
this recovery will depend on when the Suez Canal is  reopened to traffic. 
Indeed,  it may be said  that the longer  the  Canal  is  closed  to  shipping,  the  less 
effect  its  reopening  will  have  on  oil  transportation,  because  of  the  acceleration 
that its closing has given to the building of supertankers. 
The  general  uncertainty  over  this  matter  has  led  us  to  adopt  two  alternative 
productivity coefficients  for  1975  and  1980.  According  to  the low  estimate,  this 
54 coefficient should remain at 9 until  197 5 and increase afterwards very  slightly to 
reach 9.1  in 1980.  According to  the high estimate,  the coefficient  should  rise  to 
9.3 in 1975 and 9.4 in 1980. 
d)  Expected  tanker  fleet  deadweight  tonnage  in  1 9 7 5  and  1 9 8 0 
When  applying  these  productivity coefficients  to  the volume  of inter-regional  oil 
transport foreseen for  1975  and  1980, two  estimates  can be made,  a  high  and  a 
low one, as  regards the tonnage which will be necessary to carry this cargo. 
However, these productivity coefficients, calculated for long distance inter-regional 
trade  routes,  cannot  be  applied  directly  to  the  volumes  of  regional  oil  cargoes 
carried over distances which are only two f<ifths  as  long on average. 
Because  of  the uncertainties,  already  stressed,  over  statistics  concerning  regional 
oil transport, it was not possible to establish a specific productivity coefficient for 
this  section.  It has  thus  been  necessary,  in  order  to  make  the  overall  estimate 
of  the  total  deadweight  of  the  world  tanker  fleet  in  1975  and  1980,  to  adjust 
the  figures  for  the  total  volume  of  sea-borne  petroleum  products,  calculated  in 
Chapter  II-B. 2.  The  coefficient  of  compensation  chosen  is  1  for  inter-regional 
transportation  and  0.4  for  regional  transportation,  which  makes  it  possible  to 
calculate  the  volume  of  trade  in  tonnage  of  "inter-regional  equivalent".  The 
elements and results of this calculation are presented in Table XVI. 
The forecasts  adopted  are of  the  order  of  a  world  tanker  fleet  which  will  reach 
at least  199m.  tdw  and at most 205.6m.  tdw in  1975.  The corresponding figures 
for 1980 are 282.4 and 290.7m. tons deadweight. 
3.  Expected  bulk-carrier  and  tramp  fleet 
a)  D is t r i but ion  of  b u I k  cargo  t r an sports  be tween  s p e cia  1 i zed 
ships  and  tramps 
Whilst there is  a very close  relationship  between the  size  of  the  tanker fleet  and 
of  sea-borne  hydrocarbon  cargoes,  the  parallel  between  bulk-carrier  fleet  and 
sea-borne dry bulk cargoes  is  far  from  being  as  close  at present.  In fact,  many 
bulk  cargoes  are  still  shipped  not  only  on  specialized  single-deck  carriers,  but 
also  on twin-deck  cargo-vessels,  mainly  tramps. 
This can be explained by the fact that the large bulk-carrier (over  10 000 tdw in 
Fearnley and Eagers'  statistics)  is  a  relatively  recent type  of  ship  which  has  not 
entirely replaced the  traditional  tramp,  the  disappearance  of which was  probably 
slowed  down in the last decade by the mass  of Liberty-ships built between 1942 
and  1945.  This  is  why  it has  been  necessary  to  deal  with  the  forecasts  for  the 
development of the tonnage of the bulk-carrier fleet and tramps together,  as  both 
types of ship are concerned with the same category of commodities. 
b)  Expected  six  main  bulk  cargo  traffics  in  ton/miles 
Table XVII summarizes  the forecasts  for traffics,  in ton/miles, for  the six main 
bulk  commodities,  according  to  the  expected  sea-borne  trade  volumes  adopted 
in Chapter II-B. 3 and the estimated average lengths of haul between ports in the 
years  1975  and 1980. 
55 TABLE  XVI 
Forecasts for  the  tanker fleet  deadweight  tonnage  in  1975 and  1980 
A)  Foreseen  volume of 
oil shipmant 
1975  1980 
! 
Routes I  interregional  regional  total  interregional  regional  total 
1)  Annual volume of 
petroleum products 
shipped (million tons)  1 750  250  2 000  2 535  300  2 835 
2)  Average length ofhaul 
(nautical miles)  4 400  1 820  4 080  4 340  l  670  4 020 
3)  Sea-borne oil cargo 
(1000 m. tons/miles)  7 700  455  8  155  10 900  500  11  400 
4)  Annual total adjusted 
volume of oil shipment 
(in million tons of 
"interregional 
equivalent")  1 750  100  1 850  2 535  120  2 655 
B)  Provisional  calculation of the  1975  1980 
corresponding fleet  tonnage 
Productivity estimates  High  Low  High  Low 
Productivity coefficient: number of 
tons of the "total volume" (A-4) 
carried annually for each tdw 
of the fleet  9.3  9  9.4  9.1 
Estimates of  tonnage needs  Low  High  Low  High 
Total deadweight of the expected 
tanker fleet (in million tons)  199  205.6  282.4  290.7 
The estimated  average  lengths  of  haul have  taken into  account  the  forecasts  for 
the needs of the main consumer regions  and the distribution of sources  of supply, 
between old  and  new producing areas.  As  the new  producing areas  are  generally 
further  away from consumer regions  than the old ones,  it has  been foreseen  that 
the  average load transport distances would increase  quite strongly until  1975  and 
more  slowly  between  1975  and  1980.  The  only  exception  to  this  general  trend 
concerns grain for  which  stability of distances  covered has  been anticipated  until 
1975  and  a  slight  reduction  thereafter,  and  manganese  for  which  a  very  slight 
reduction of distances has also been predicted for  197 5 and  1980. 
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2
 The most significant increase of average distances occurs in the case of coal, due 
to  the increasing importance of Japan as  an importer of  this  product.  Japan will 
import coal partly from  Australia  and  partly from  the  East Coast of  the United 
States. 
c)  Bulk-carriers'  increasing  share  of  main  cargoes 
The share of these cargoes that the  single-deck bulk carriers will  absorb also had 
to be estimated. 
For iron ore,  for  instance,  these single-deck units were already  by 1967 carrying 
87%  of  this  traffic  expressed  in  ton/miles.  Considering  the  growing  volume  of 
sea-borne  iron  ore  transportation  and  the  tendency  towards  a  concentration  of 
trade  between  relatively  few  loading  and  unloading  ports,  the  use  of  giant  ore 
carriers proper (including oil/ore carriers)  can only become  more  general  in the 
future. 
It has  thus  been foreseen  that the share of bulk-carriers in the transportation of 
iron ore would reach 95% in 1975 and 97% in 19RO. 
For the  five  other main commodities,  the  domin~tion of bulk-carriers  proper is 
not yet as marked, but it is  already in evidence and  will  certainly be strengthened 
in  the future. 
Table XVIII shows the trend foreseen for  each case. 
TABLE  XVIII 
Traffics  of bulk  cargoes  carried  by  bulk  carriers  proper 
( 1000  m.  ton/miles) 
1975  1980 
Commodities  Share of  Estimate  Share of  Estimate 
bulk carriers  bulk carriers 
in total 
I 
in total 
I 
traffic  Low  High  traffic  Low  High 
Iron ore 
I 
95  906  1 030  97  1 140  I 450 
Coal  90  316  401  93  363  503 
Grain  75  336  391  85  387  487 
Manganese  60  27  29  75  40  50 
Bauxite/  Alumina  80  87  102  90  130  170 
Phosphate  65  98  115  80  152  186 
Total  86  1 770  2 068  92  2 212  2 846 
58 d)  Expected  bulk-carrier  fleet  deadweight  necessary  for  trans-
porting  the  main  commodities  in  1975  and  1980 
To  calculate  the  deadweight  of  the  bulk-carrier  fleet  which  will  be  necessary 
in 197  5 and 19 80 to carry its share of the six main commodities as  defined above, 
the  concept of  "utilization coefficient"  has  been  adopted. 
This coefficient is  derived  from  the ratio between the theoretical  annual carrying 
capacity  of  the  fleet  and  the  actual  sea-borne  cargo  transported.  It has  been 
calculated, in the past, on the basis of Fearnley and Eagers' statistical data on the 
total activity of the bulk-carrier fleet, including all "other bulk commodity" trades. 
However, smaller ships (10 000 to 14 000 tdw) have not been taken into account. 
The result of this  analysis  is  shown  in Table XIX. 
TABLE  XIX 
Performance  of the  world bulk-carrier fleet  in  recent years  calculated  biennially 
Data  used  I Scheme of calculation  I  1961  1963  1965  1967 
Average speed of the fleet 
in knots (V)  13.8  14.1  14.4  14.7 
Theoretical annual 
mileage (A)  (A)= v X  24 h.  115  920  118 440  120 960  123 500 
X  350 d. 
World fleet of bulk carriers 
of more than 14 000 tdw 
(in million tdw)  (B)  8.18  15.52  22.79  38.71 
Theoretical annual carrying 
capacity (in 1000 m. 
ton/miles)  (C)  (C)= A X  B  948  1 837  2 758  4 780 
Actual hauls 
(in 1000 m.  ton/miles (T)  304  522  833  1 378 
T 
Performance coefficient (U)  (U) =- 0.321  0.284  0.302  0.288 
c 
It appears that the "utilization coefficient" calculated in Table XIX has deteriorated 
in the past, falling from 0.321 in 1961 to 0.288 in 1967. 
In  fact,  its  upward  and  downward  fluctuations  during  the  period  under  study 
have remained within relatively narrow limits,  and these variations may be attri-
buted to short term fluctuations in the demand for  sea-borne bulk cargo transport. 
For the future, the tendency towards the concentration of traffic between harbours 
which  are  sufficiently  deep  to  accommodate  large  ships  should  entail  a  slow 
improvement ,in  the utilization coefficient, these harbours being well equipped with 
quick, efficient handling resources. 
59 By  assuming  that this  coefficient will  recover  i~ 1961  level,  i.e.  0.32  by  1975, 
and  will  then  increase  slightly  to  0.34  by  1980,  the  deadweight  of  the  world 
bulk  -carrier fleet theoretically necessary for carrying in 197  5 and 19 80 the main cargo 
trades foreseen in Table XVIII can be calculated. 
This calculation is presented in Table XX. 
In  1975,  a  bulk-carrier  fleet,  with  a  total  deadweight  of  42  to  50m.  tons,  is 
deemed  to  be  sufficient  to carry  the  world's  cargoes  of  the  six  main  commo-
dities.  The  corresponding  tonnage  for  1980  would  be  at  least  48m.  tdw  and 
at most 63m.  tdw. 
TABLE  XX 
World  bulk-carrier  deadweight  tonnage  corresponding  to  expected  traffic  of the  six main 
commodities in 1975 and 1980 
Scheme of calculation 
(T)  Expected traffic 
(in billion tons/miles) 
(U)  Anticipated performance 
coefficient 
T  Theoretical carrying 
(C)  =  - capacity 
U  (in 1000 m. ton/miles) 
(V)  Expected average speed of the 
bulk-carrier fleet, in knots 
(A)  Theoretical annual mileage 
(A)  (V) x 24 x 350 days 
(B)  Bulk-carrier fleet required 
(in tons deadweight) 
c 
(B) 
A 
1975 
Low estimate  High estimate 
1 770  2 068 
0.32 
5 531  6 463 
15.5 
130 200 
42.5  49.6 
1980 
Low estimate  High estimate 
2 212  2846 
0.34 
6 506  8 371 
16 
134 400 
48.4  62.3 
e)  Addition  a I  b u I k  carriers  r e q u ired  for  "other  b u I k  cargoes" 
As  regards other bulk commodities, the share of cargoes shipped on these  single-
deck vessels  was  46m.  tons  in  1966,  namely  62  to  65%  of  the  total  volume  of 
these cargoes which were estimated at 75  to 19m. tons  at that time. 
In the  future,  the  single-deck  bulk  carriers  wiH  certainly  increase  their  share  in 
the  transport  of  "other bulk  cargoes"  but,  in  this  sector,  tramps  will  hold  their 
60 position better, because of the multiplicity  of low  tonnage  shipments  and  of the 
great number of routes on which this category of goods is  carried. 
Therefore it has been foreseen  that bulk carriers will  carry 81%  of these  "other 
bulk cargoes" in 1975  and  88%  in  1980. 
When assuming that the bulk carriers used for  these cargoes will  have a  produc-
tivity  rating  similar  to  the  one  calculated  for  those  carrying  the  six  main  bulk 
commodities,  it  is  possible  to  increase  the  deadweight  tonnages,  calculated  in 
Table XX, in proportion to the additional sea-borne volumes  transported. 
Table XXI shows  the deadweight tonnage  expected  to  be reached  by the  world 
bulk-carrier  fleet  in  1975  and  1980,  taking  into  account  the  proportion of  the 
various cargoes that these vessels  will  be carrying by then. 
TABLE  XXI 
Forecast  deadweight  tonnage of the  world bulk-carrier fleet  in 1975 and 1980 
1975  forecasts  1980  forecasts 
Low estimate  High estimate  Low estimate  High estimate 
Cargoes shipped on bulk carriers 
(million tons) 
1)  Six main commodities  402  475  489  632 
2)  "Other commodities"  93  117  124  171 
3)  All bulk commodities  495  592  613  803 
Share of other commodities  18.8%  19.8%  20.2%  21.3% 
Ratio 
Other commodities 
0.2313  0.2463  0.2536  0.2706 
6 main commodities 
Corresponding fleet  (million tdw) 
1)  For the six main commodities  42.5  49.6  48.4  62.3 
2)  For the other commodities  9.7  12.5  12.2  16.9 
3)  For all the bulk commodities  52.2  62.1  60.6  79.2 
Theoretically, 52.2m. tdw in  1975 should be sufficient to carry the bulk tonnages 
anticipated  by the  low  estimates  and 62.1m.  tdw if the  high  estimates  of  trade 
are realised. 
In early 1969, the world fleet was already 57.6m. tdw. 10.2 of which admittedly are 
OBO's at present mainly used for transporting oil. 
The present fleet,  if  it were entirely used for  dry bulk cargoes,  would be  almost 
sufficient  to carry the cargoes forecast  for  1980 in  the  low  estimate.  Therefore, 
only the  high  estimate suggests  a  noticeable  growth  of this  section  of  the  world 
fleet,  which would then reach nearly 80m.  tdw. 
61 f)  Prospects  of  the  development  of  tramp  deadweight  tonnage 
There  remains  the  study  of  the  prospects  of  the  development  of  the  twin-deck 
tramp fleet which, together with single-deck bulk carriers, carries out the sea-borne 
carriage of dry bulk cargoes. 
This fleet deadweight has been estimated previously in Chapter II (B.3d) at 22.5m. 
tons for the reference year  1966. 
Table XXII  compares  the average  efficiency of this  fleet  with that  of bulk-
carriers  proper.  The data used in  this  table are derived from  Fearnley and 
Eagers'  statistics  published in  the brochure "Trades of World Bulk  Carriers 
in 1966". 
TABLE  XXII 
Comparison  between  the  average  efficiency  of the  bulk  carrier fleet  and  the  tramp fleet  in  1966 
I  Method of  calculation I  Bulk carriers  Tramps 
1)  Average data 
a)  Speed (knots)  14.5  12.5 
b)  Roundvoyage distance (miles)  8 400  7 300 
c)  Days in port per roundtrip  8.5  17 
b 
d)  Days at sea per roundtrip  --- 24  24.5 
(24  X  a) 
e)  Roundvoyage duration (days)  (c +d)  33  42 
f)  Loaded trips per year 
(350) 
10.6  8.3  --
c 
2)  Capacity of the world fleet 
(in million tdw) 
g)  Total deadweight  30.8  22.5 
h)  Corresponding cargo deadweight  (0.96  X  g)  27.9  21.4 
3)  Annual carrying capacity 
(in million tons) 
i)  Theoretical  (h  X  f)  296  178 
j)  Actual  (0.90  X  i)  266  160 
This  table,  however,  stresses  the  fact  that  the  tramp  fleet  has  a  much  lower 
efficiency  than  bulk  carriers  (-22%  ).  This  is  explained  by  their  lower  opera-
tional  speed  and,  above  all,  by  the  time  spent in  harbours,  almost  twice  that of 
bulk carriers. 
This is  of course related to the fact that bulk-carriers proper take the best trade 
and,  leave the  less  regular  business,  the  smaller  shipments  and the most difficult 
harbours to  the  tramps. 
62 In the future,  it seems inevitable that tramps will be eliminated by the big single-
deck ships  from substantial and long  distance bulk trade; consequently they will 
be  used more and more on the most difficult routes. 
It has thus been assumed that, up to  1975, the average length of haul covered by 
tramps would  tend to  shorten but that,  despite this  diminution,  the  average  effi-
ciency  of  the  fleet  would  not  change  as  compared  with  1966.  This  led  to  the 
prediction that the present rate of efficiency,  i.e.  8.3  loaded trips per year, would 
be maintained. On the other hand, for the period 1975-80, the current moderniza-
tion of this  sector of the world fleet  suggests  an increase in the rate,  which  may 
reach 9.7  by  1980. 
By  evaluating  these  estimates  and  the  share  of  bulk  cargoes  shipped  in  1975 
and 1980 which will not be absorbed by specialized single-deck ships, table XXIII 
makes it possible to estimate the total deadweight of the tramp fleet that will  still 
be  in service  at the end of both periods considered. 
Therefore, the tramp fleet should already be reduced to  a deadweight of between 
14 and 17.3m. tons by 1975. The diminution of the fleet will continue from 1975 
to  1980, and,  for  this  last year,  a fleet  of between 8.8m.  and  11.7m.  tdw  can be 
foreseen. 
TABLE  XXIII 
Forecasts  on  total deadweight  tonnage  of tramps in  1975 and 1980 
Growth  estimates  1975  1980 
Low  I 
High  Low  I 
High 
I.  6 main commodity trade carried by tramps 
(1000 m. ton/miles)  280  350  191  256 
II.  Average cargo-carrying distance  3 200  3 000 
III.  Quantities shipped (million tons) 
a)  .  d"  .  (I)  88  109  64  85  Mam commo  1t1es --
(II) 
b)  Other bulk commodities  22  28  17  23 
c)  All bulk commodities  110  137  81  108 
IV.  Efficiency rate  8.3  9.7 
v.  Corresponding fleet (in million tons) 
a)  Cargo dw (III  c)  13.3  16.5  8.4  11.1 
(IV) 
b)  Deadweight tonnage 
(cargo dw X  1.05)  14  17.3  8.8  11.7 
63 4.  Expected deadweight of the cargo-liner fleet,  including container ships, in  1975  and 1980 
a)  E f f e c t s  o f  c o n t a i n e r i s a t i o n  on s e a - b o r n e  g e n e r a 1 c a r g o  t r an s -
port 
The forecasts  of the future  tonnage  of this  section  of  the  sectorial  analysis  cor-
respond to the  assessments  made in Chapter II (B-3)  about the  development  of 
the volume of sea-borne general cargoes up to 1975 and 1980. 
Until  recently,  the  fleet  of  cargo  liners  of  more  than  4 000  grt  corresponded 
almost  exactly  to  this  section  of  maritime  transport,  which  was  defined  in  the 
preceding chapter according to the types of ship which carry it. 
Today, the progress of containerisation and the appearance of a new type of ship 
which  specializes  in  this  transport,  make it necessary for  this  prospective  study, 
to divide the fleet into two sections and to establish which trade will  be given to 
container ships out of what is left to conventional cargo liners. In fact, the expected 
efficiency of container ships is much superior to the one estimated for cargo liners. 
b)  Forecasts  for  the  rate  of  co ntainerisation 
For the reference year  1966, various studies suggest that, out of a  general cargo 
volume  previously  estimated  at  190 to 220m.  tons,  50m.  could  have been con-
tainerized. 
For the future, the forecasts for the expected growth rate of this theoretical volume 
as  well  as  the percentage which will  be effectively containerized,  are summarized 
in Table XXIV, which also shows the volume of other general cargoes which will 
still  be  shipped  on conventional  cargo  liners.  This  volume  is  derived  from  the 
forecasts  previously  made  in  Chapter  II  (B-3)  about  the  overall  general  cargo 
trade in  1975  and  1980. 
The minimum and maximum estimates for  transport by conventional cargo liners 
correspond  to  the  uncertainty  over  the  exact volume  of general  cargoes  carried 
in the reference year 1966. 
c)  Estimated  trend  of  the  efficiency rating of cargo-liners and 
container  ships 
In order to calculate the deadweight tonnage of the world fleet of container ships 
and cargo liners in 1975 and 1980 required to meet the estimated transport needs 
in both categories of cargoes, it is  first necessary to estimate the efficiency ratings 
to be expected for both types of ship.  These estimates are shown in Table XXV. 
i)  Cargo liners position in 1968 
It has not been possible to estimate the efficiency of container ships, in 1968, the 
way it has been done with  cargo liners.  Intercontinental container  services  were 
still at an experimental stage. On the other hand, the figures  available for conven-
tional cargo liners have provided an estimated range of the efficiency of the world 
fleet  operating at present. 
This range depends, in fact,  on the estimated time  spent in port by ships  of this 
category; this time is  particularly long now because of the high number of stop-over 
calls made on most regular lines. The operating cargo-liner fleet has been estimated 
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Forecasts  concerning  the  volume  of  general  cargoes  to  be  shipped  on  container  ships 
and  conventional  cargo  liners  in  1975 and  1980 
1975  1980 
Low  High  Low  High  Growilimt< I 
1966/75  estimate  I 
estimate 
Gmwduato I 
1975/80  estimate  I 
estimate 
Theoretical volume  6%  85  6%  113 
available for container  to  to 
ization (million tons)  8%  100  7%  147 
Containerization rate  50%  75% 
Effectively containerized  42  84 
volume (million tons)  50  113 
---
Volume of general 
cargoes left to conven-
tiona! cargo liners 
1)  Minimum estimate  253  285  291  327 
2)  Maximum estimate  298  340  351  397 
at 46.5m. tons deadweight, for  1967, on the basis of a survey of the various types 
of cargo vessels in about twenty countries or regions. This figure should be reduced 
to  43m. tons deadweight for the reference year 1966. 
ii)  Development  of container  ships  efficiency 
For the  future,  it  has  been  assumed  that  the  development  of  the  operation  of 
container ships  will  have levelled off by 1975.  In particular, the reduction of port 
time--the main  source  of  the  increased  efficiency  expected  from  this  means  of 
shipment-will have been achieved.  The duration  of  calls  should  be  reduced  by 
about 3.5 times by 1975  as  against those of today's conventional cargo liners. 
Nevertheless, through this reduction seems to be assured, its scope cannot be deter-
mined because the organization of container ship lines is dependent on the number 
of ports which will  be equipped for  this  traffic. 
This is why two separate estimates of efficiency have been formulated, considering 
an  average port time  of  8  days  minimum  and  12  days  maximum. 
On the basis of a higher average speed, but a lower load factor, container-ship fleet 
efficiency, in 1975, should be superior by about one third to  that of  the  present 
cargo-liner  fleet. 
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Estimated  development  of the  efficiency  rating  of cargo  liners  and  container  ships 
1968  1975  I 
1980 
Average data 
Cargo liners  Container ships 
a)  Average speed in knots  17.5  20  22 
b)  Average roundvoyage distance (miles)  14 000  14 000  14 000 
c)  Roundvoyage duration, in days  63-73  37-41  34.5-38.5 
of which 
days in port  30-40  8-12  8-12 
days at sea ( 24 ~ a)  33  29  26.5 
d)  Number ofloaded trip' per year ( 
3~
0 
)  5.6-4.8  9.5-8.5  10.1-9.1 
e)  Load factor  2x45 = 90%  2 x35 = 70%  2x35 = 70% 
f)  Rate of efficiency (  d x e)  5.5-4.4  6.7-5.9  7.1-6.4 
Cargo  liners 
Expected growth in the efficiency of cargo liners  1968 to 1975  1975 to 1980 
between the dates 
(as a  %  of the efficiency calculated at the beginning 
15%  5%  of the period) 
Corresponding rate of efficiency at the end of the period  5.9-5.1  6.2-5.4 
Between  1975  and  1980,  further,  more  modest  progress  (about  6  to  8%) has 
been  anticipated.  This  is  entirely  attributable  to  the  foreseeable  increase  in  the 
average  speed,  in  knots,  of  this  fleet,  which  would  rise  from  20  to  22  knots 
between  1975  and  1980, according  to  the tendency  already  noted  in the  recent 
orders for  ships  of this  type. 
iii)  Improvement of cargo-liners' efficiency 
As  regards  cargo  liners  still  serving  regular  routes  without  container  handling 
equipment at both ends,  and carrying general cargoes which cannot be container-
ized,  considerable improvements in productivity are expected by  1975. 
An increase of 15%  may appear considerable in the light of the past experience. 
However,  the latest ship  and those  on  order have  much  higher  speeds  than the 
average of 17.5 knots calculated for the fleet now operating, which is relatively old, 
but is undergoing rapid renovation. 
Besides, with the incentive of the competition from containers, shippers, shipowners 
and  port  authorities  are  trying  to  improve  the  handling  of  non-containerized 
66 cargoes by using other means of rationalisation, such as  palletization, the roll-on/ 
roll-off system, etc. 
Between  1975 and 1980,  further  more modest progress  (about 5%) is  expected 
from  more advanced  rationalization  in  maritime  transport. 
For cargo liners as well as for  container ships, two alternatives of efficiency have 
been foreseen:  "high" and "low" in 1975 as  well as in  1980. 
d)  Expected tot  a 1  deadweight of the f 1 e e t  of container ships and 
cargo  liners  in  1975  and  1980 
Table XXVI shows  the  forecasts  of the level  to  be reached  in  197  5  and  then 
in  1980, by the total deadweight of the world fleets  of container ships  and cargo 
liners.  They are derived from  the forecasts  previously formulated  as  regards,  on 
one hand, the distribution of general cargo trade between these two types of ship 
and, on the other hand, the development of the efficiency rating of each fleet. 
The combination of these various estimates leads to four alternatives for container 
ships.  As  regards  cargo  liners,  the  range  allowed  in  the  estimations  of  trade 
in  1966, which has been used as  a basic reference, makes the problem still more 
intricate and could lead to  eight different  alternatives.  However, it has been con-
sidered  that the  combinations  "Maximum  basis/low  efficiency"  and  "Minimum 
basis/high efficiency" were not probable and should be eliminated as  the minimum 
estimate corresponds  to  a  low  efficiency  of  the  present fleet  and the  maximum 
estimate  to  a  high  efficiency.  This  leads  to  the  adoption  of  a  range  of  49.6  to 
57.6m. tons deadweight for  1975, and 53.9m. to 64m.  tdw for  1980. 
For container ships,  the extreme figures  of forecasts  will  be retained,  i.e.  6.3  to 
8.5m.  tdw for  1975  and 11.8 to  17.7m. tdw for  1980. 
TABLE  XXVI 
Forecasts for the container-ship fleet and the cargo liner-fleet deadweight tonnage in 19  7  5 and 1980 
(million  tdw) 
\ 
1975  1980 
Traffic growth hypothesis  I 
Low  I 
High  Low  I 
High 
Estimates  I 
Type of ships  of 
I 
efficiency 
1)  Container ships  High  6.3  7.5  11.8  15.9 
Low  7.1  8.5  13.1  17.7 
----------------
Volume estimates 
for  1966 
a)  Maximum  High  50.5  57.6  56.6  64 
2)  Cargoliners 
b)  Minimum  Low  49.6  55.9  53.9  60.6 
67 5.  Expected deadweight  tonnage of the  uother cargo  vessels" 
a)  E s t i m a t e d  t on n a g e  of  this  s e c t i o n  of  the  w or  1  d  fleet  in 
1966 
The  sectorial  analysis  has,  in  general,  been  concerned  with  merchant  ships  in 
service  of  over  1 000 grt excluding  passenger  vessels  and  the  Great Lakes fleet. 
The year taken as  a basis for  the whole  study has been  1966. 
Therefore  the  fleet  of "other  cargo  vessels"  of  over  1 000  grt in  1966  must  be 
estimated  by  deducting  the  categories  previously  studied  from  the  total.  This 
category  of  "other  cargo  vessels"  is  a  residual  category  which  corresponds, 
on the whole,  to  short haul  traders  of very different  types,  of  small  dimensions, 
intended for the carriage of dry cargoes which are neither bulk commodities given 
to  large specialized ships  or tramps nor "general cargoes"  carried by ocean-going 
cargo liners. 
Table XXVII shows  the method of calculating the basic tonnage  of the category 
of  "other cargo  vessels". 
TABLE  XXVII 
Classification  of the  world merchant fleet  of ships  over  1 000 grt.  in  mid 1966 
I 
Million grt  Milliontdw 
World fleet ( >  1 000 grt at 1.1.1966) 
(Lloyd's Register)  163.25 
of which:  US reserve fleet  8 
other laid-up ships  0.85 
Great Lakes fleet  3.36 
-12.21 
Remaining operating sea-going fleet  151.04 
of which:  tankers  62.05 
passenger vessels  (estimate)  4.60 
-66.65 
I 
Remaining dry cargo vessels  84.39 equivalent to 119.8 
of which:  bulk carriers  30.8 
tramps  22.5 
cacgo liners  43 
-96.3 
Remaining "other cargo vessels"  23.5 
68 To calculate the deadweight tonnage of the "other cargo-vessel" fleet  in 1966, it 
has  been necessary to  start from  the gross  tonnage of  the world fleet  of ships  of 
over  1 000 grt as calculated by the statistical tables of Lloyd's Register.  Available 
statistics  being  heterogeneous,  it  has  been  necessary  to  begin  the  series  in gross 
tonnage and end it in deadweight.  The conversion has been made at the level  of 
the dry cargo vessel fleet,  by applying a coefficient of 1.42 tdw for  1 grt which is 
a suitable estimate for  such a group of ships of relatively small dimensions. 
The  total  deadweight  tonnage  of  "other  cargo  vessels"  amounts  thus  to  23.5m. 
tons.  This figure  corresponds  fairly  well  to  the  Lloyd's  Register  statistics  which 
indicated,  at 1 July  1966,  16m.  grt  for  cargo  vessels  of less  than 4 000 grt but 
more  than  1 000 grt.  These  16m.  grt  are  equivalent to  about 22.7m.  tdw,  con-
sequently  a  figure  slightly  lower  than  the  one  resulting  from  the  calculations 
presented in Table XXVII. This difference can be explained by the fact that the 
latter estimate includes all dry cargo ships not previously studied, including some 
specialized  units  of  over  4 000  grt,  for  instance  large  fully-refrigerated  cargo 
vessels.  On the other hand, cargo liners of under 4 000 grt are excluded from  the 
estimate  in  Table  XXVII. 
b)  Efficiency  of  this  section  of  the  merchant  fleet 
"Other cargo vessel"  trade corresponds roughly to  the carriage of "miscellaneous 
cargoes"  studied under Chapter II (B-4c)  the volume  of  which  was  estimated  at 
between 152 and 186m. tons in 1966. 
This range, of about 20% as regards the volume carried, due to the lack of precise 
statistics, gives  rise to  difficulty in calculating the efficiency  of the corresponding 
fleet,  for  the basic year,  1966. 
Although the actual efficiency rate is  not known,  it should be calculable.  This  is 
why an attempt has been made to restrict the ranges of forecasts for the future,  as 
regards  the expected efficiency  in  1975  and  1980. 
At all  events,  a  strong rise in the  efficiency  of this  section  of  the  fleet  is  to  be 
anticipated,  because  its  units  are  mainly employed on short-haul trade  and there 
will  be  a  noticeable  increase  in  the  number  of  roundtrips  due  to  a  significant 
reduction in port time.  This reduction will be consequent on the more general use 
of modern cargo-handling equipment in Europe and North America.  Cargoes will 
be increasingly carried in unit loads: containers, pallets, half-trailers, often handled 
according to the roll-on/roll-off method. 
Actually, most "miscellaneous cargoes" are similar in nature to general cargoes and 
many transports made by the "other cargo vessels" will  be transhipments  to and 
from large terminals for  container ships  and other fast long-haul  cargo liners. 
On the whole,  it has thus seemed possible to foresee,  for  197  5,  efficiency rates of 
between 7. 7 and 8.3%. For 1980 both estimates of efficiency are by 5%  higher 
than those calculated for  1975. 
It was  assessed that, in this category of ships,  the expected effects  of the present 
revolution in port equipment and  handling facilities  would  mainly  be  felt  in  the 
next few  years. 
69 c)  Expected  deadweight  of  the  fleet  of  "other  cargo  ships"  in 
1975  and  1980 
On the basis  of these  estimates  and of the earlier forecasts  as  to  the volume  of 
miscellaneous  cargoes  shipped  in  1975  and  1980  Table  XXVIII shows  the  cor-
responding forecasts for  the total deadweight of the merchant fleet of "other cargo 
vessels" at the end of both periods considered. 
TABLE  XXVIII 
Forecast  deadweight  tonnage  of the  world  "other  cargo  vessel" fleet  in  1975 and  1980 
(million tons deadweight) 
1975  1980 
Estimates of growth  Low 
I 
High  Low 
I 
High 
Millions tons of: other dry cargoes"  240 
I 
305  335 
I 
395 
Estimated efficiency ratings  7.7 to 8.3  8.1  to 8.7 
Million tons deadweight of 
''other cargo vessels" 
1.  High efficiency 
I 
28.9  36.7  38.5  45.4 
2.  Low efficiency  31.2  39.6  41.4  48.8 
The tonnages required to carry the cargoes  anticipated will thus total 29 to  40m. 
tons deadweight in 1975 and 38 to 49m.  tons deadweight in 1980. 
C.  Comparison between the  forecasts  formulated  by the overall approach and the 
sectorial  analysis  on  world  merchant  fleet  tonnage  in  1975  and  1980 
1.  Choice of gross  registered tonnage  which  will enable  this comparison  to  be  made 
As  the  tonnage  of  the  world  fleet  is  traditionally  expressed  in  gross  registered 
tons,  this  unit has been chosen for  comparing the results  of both studies, making 
it  necessary  to  convert  the  forecasts  of  the  sectorial  analysis  estimated  in  tons 
deadweight.  The ratio for  conversion  adopted is  1.6 tdw  for  1  grt in  1975  and 
1.65 in 1980; this increase takes into  account the foreseeable increase of the size 
of the average vessels,  the largest ships of today already reaching a ratio of 2. 
Table XXIX shows the sum of the forecasts  of the sectorial analysis  for  each of 
the low  and high estimates and compares the findings  for  1975, as  well  as  1980, 
converted into gross  registered tons, with the conclusions of the overall  approach 
presented in Table XIV. 
70 TABLE  XXIX 
Comparison  of world  tonnage  in  1975 and  1980  as foreseen  by  the  sectorial  ana[vsis 
and  the  overall  approach 
1975  1980 
Low estimate  I High estimate  Low estimate  I High estimate 
A)  Sectorial analysis (million tdw)  I  Tank vessels  199  205.6  282.4  290.7 
Bulk carriers  52.2  62.1  60.6  79.2 
Tramps  14  17.3  8.8  11.7 
Cargo liners  49.6  57.6  53.9  64 
Container ships  6.3  8.5  11.8  17.7 
Other cargo vessels  28.9  39.6  38.5  48.8 
All types studied  350  390.7  456  512.1 
Conversion factor 
deadweight/gross tonnage  1.6  1.65 
Corresponding gross tonnage (million grt)  218.8 
I 
244.2  276.4 
I 
310.4 
B)  Overall approach  266  337 
of which (estimate) 
Passenger vessels  4.6  4.6 
US reserve fleet  5  4 
Ships of between 100 and 1 000 tdw  13  16 
C)  Adjusted overall forecast  243.4  312.4 
Low  High  Low  High 
D)  Comparison 
Difference between the adjusted 
overall forecast and the sectorial 
analysis estimate: 
- in million grt  +24.6  - 0.8  +  36  +  2 
-as  a percentage  +  11.2%  - 0.3%  +  13%  +  0.6% 
2.  Necessary  adjustment  to  the  overall approach 
For the two years studied, the sum of optimistic forecasts of the sectorial approach 
is  lower than the single forecast of the  overall approach, but the difference-less 
than 10%-is mainly due to  the fact that the two  studies do not cover quite the 
same fields. 
71 Indeed, it must be stressed that the sectorial analysis did not deal with passenger 
vessels and that ships of under 1 000 grt were outside its terms of reference. 
Besides, it deals with the operational fleet only, which excludes, on one hand, the 
US reserve fleet and, on the other, the Great Lakes vessels. These latter units were 
left out of the overall approach but all other merchant ships of more than 100 grt 
are included, even those which will  not be in service during the two  years under 
study. 
Therefore,  the  overall  approach  needs  to  be  adjusted  in  order  to  allow  a  valid 
comparison. This adjustment consists in subtracting from the forecast  formulated, 
the  sum of estimates likely to be made for  the tonnage  that,  in  1975  and  1980, 
the US reserve fleet, passenger vessels, and units between 100 and  1 000 grt might 
represent. 
Allowance  has been made for  a  decrease  in  the US  reserve  fleet  due  to  super-
annuation,  a  stability  in  passenger-vessel  tonnage  on  the  assumption  that  the 
boom  in  cruises  will  offset  the  decline  of  regular  lines  and  finally  quite  a 
fairly  considerable  increase  in  the  tonnage  of  small  ships,  which  is  still  on  the 
increase,  despite  the  rapid  trend  towards  large  units,  since  the  tonnage  of  this 
group has grown by 12% between 1962 and 1966, i.e.  a percentage hardly lower 
than that of shipping as  a whole (13.6% ). 
3.  General compatibility of the  forecasts  established by the  two studies 
Adjusted  in  this  way,  the  overall  approach  gives  the  same  forecast  for  1975  as 
the high estimate of the sectorial analysis, it remains superior by 11% to the low 
estimate.  Despite the  different procedures,  the two  studies  give  compatible,  even 
similar results. For 1980, the differences become slightly wider, but the correlation 
between the single  forecast  of the overall  approach and the  high  estimate  of the 
sectorial analysis remains very good. 
On the  whole,  however,  the  overall  approach  appears  to  be  more  "optimistic" 
than  the  sectorial  analysis,  as  regards  the  tonnage  of  the  world  fleet  because, 
in 197 5, the former foresees  a figure reaching the higher level of the range of the 
latter and, in 1980, it even exceeds this level. 
4.  Differences  in  standpoints  between  estimates  of  future  sea-borne  tonnages  and  carrying 
capacities 
Is  it to be inferred from  this  that the high  estimate  of  the sectorial  approach  is 
to be taken into consideration rather than the low estimate? In fact, the first point 
to recall is that, in contrast with what we have just seen in the assessment of future 
merchant fleet tonnage, the best correlation between both studies, as  regards fore-
casts on the volume of sea-borne trade, was found at the level of the low estimate 
of the  sectorial  analysis. 
This change in the overall  approach which,  after  seeming pessimistic  at the  first 
stage of the study,  suddenly appears optimistic  at the  second one,  calls  for  some 
explanation. 
At first,  one  may  think  that,  as  the  sectorial  analysis  was  unable  to  enter  into 
details  sufficiently,  it overlooked  some  of  the  potential  for  growth  of  the  fleet, 
represented  by  very  specialized  types  of  traffic.  It would,  indeed,  have  been 
72 desirable  to  study,  for  instance, the  possible  trend  of the  fleet  of gas  tankers  or 
refrigerated  cargo  vessels.  In  fact,  these  specialized  ships  are  included  in  the 
sectorial analysis, but in more general categories, in particular in the "other cargo 
vessels". 
Furthermore,  these  categories  represent  only  a  relatively  marginal  tonnage.  For 
instance, the sea-borne trade of natural liquefied gas will  show a strong expansion 
in  the  future,  but  during  the  period  studied,  the  LNG  carrier  fleet  cannot  be 
expected to reach any substantial tonnage:  methane carriers operating in 1975  are 
already almost all commissioned, under construction, on order or under considera-
tion.  There  will  be  about twenty  at  most,  representing  a  total  carrying  capacity 
of 900 000 to 1 000 000 cu.m, i.e.  a total deadweight of around 0.6 to 0.7m. tons, 
which  is  a negligible  figure  in  compar~ison with  that of the  estimated level  of the 
world  fleet.  Even if  this  figure  trebled  between  197  5 and  19 80,  this  fleet  would 
attain about 2m.  tdw only, which is  much lower than the margin of error allowed 
by each forecast in the sectorial analysis. Let us also stress that a rise quicker than 
scheduled, in sea-borne methane trade, would result in a slackening in the expan-
sion rate adopted for cargoes of other fuels  either liquid or solid. 
On the other hand, it is  certain that, during the next decade, completely new types 
of ship will  appear,  carrying commodities  not yet known or marketed.  However, 
past experience  shows  that the  effect  of  new  trades  remains  marginal  for  many 
years.  Without  reverting  to the  example  of  methane  carriers,  mentioned  above, 
but keeping to the field  of LPG tankers, let us  note that the remarkable increase 
of this fleet over about twenty years has only added the equivalent of one million 
tons  deadweight to the world's merchant fleet. 
Finally, the building of these new types of ship, should correlate to new additional 
traffic.  The sectorial  analysis  is  indeed already more optimistic in this  field  than 
the overall approach. 
5.  Future efficiency of the  fleet  differently assessed by the  two studies 
It thus appears that the explanation of the difference in standpoints we  have seen 
between the two studies is  to be found in the ratio that each establishes between 
the volume  of sea-borne  cargoes  and the  size  of  the world  fleet  at each  period 
considered. 
In other words, the two  studies have made different estimates  of the future trend 
of  the  efficiency  of  merchant ships.  Table XXX illustrates  this. 
To simplify the comparison, the sectorial analysis  has  been reduced  to  the mean 
average  between  the  low  and  high  estimates.  Despite  the  fact  that  the  figures 
concerning world fleet  and sea-borne  trade  are  not fully  comparable in the two 
studies, the difference in standpoints between them is shown clearly by the Table: the 
sectorial analysis has allowed for a far greater improvement in efficiency than the 
overall  approach, between  1966 and  197 5,  and the  difference  grows  even  wider 
between  1975  and  1980. 
In other words,  the  sectorial analysis  has anticipated-as regards world fleet  effi-
ciency-early results  from  the  technological  revolution  which  is  taking  place  in 
the  shipping  industry  today.  In fact,  as  only  a  modest  increase  in  efficiency  is 
estimated  for  tankers,  bulk  carriers  and  tramps,  the  "optimism"  of  the  sectorial 
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 approach is  mainly explained by the improvement in efficiency of ships  designed 
to  carry general  and miscellaneous  cargoes,  expected from  the  more  general  use 
of modern handling systems and from the increase in service speeds. 
On the  other  hand,  the  overall  approach,  according  to  the  general  thinking  on 
which  it is  based,  and because of  the methods  adopted,  must assume  that world 
fleet  efficiency will  not grow faster  in the future  than in  the past,  i.e.  that there 
will  be no sudden jump in the long-term trend of sea-borne trade. 
At  this  stage,  it has  not  seemed  possible  to  choose  between  the  two  premises 
without compromising the basic  thinking behind one  of  them. 
Besides,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  following  chapter,  this  difference  in  standpoints 
tends to reduce at the level of estimated needs for newbuilding, as  a rapid improve-
ment in the  average  efficiency  of the  world  fleet-or a  section of it-implies its 
renovation  and  consequently  the  acceleration  of  the  scrapping  of  superannuated 
ships. 
By the same token, if a large proportion of superannuated, less  efficient,  tonnage 
is  kept in service, progress towards increased productivity is  slowed  down. 
To meet an additional demand for sea transport, which is  assumed to be the same 
in both cases, it is  necessary, according to the first standpoint, to build more ships 
to  meet  replacement  requirements;  according  to  the  second,  the  pace  of  new-
building must be raised to meet the need to expand the fleet. 
75 CHAPTER  IV 
ESTIMATED NEWBUILDING NEEDS OF THE WORLD 
MERCHANT FLEET UP TO  1975  AND FROM  1975  TO  1980 
A.  Overall  approach 
1.  Newbuilding requirements  based on  the  expected expansion  of the  fleet 
From the forecast of the overall tonnage that the world merchant fleet should reach 
in  1975 and  1980, it is  easy to deduce by means  of a comparison with the  1968 
figure,  the tonnage which must be built up to  1975, then up to  1980, to meet the 
expected expansion of sea-borne trade. 
With  a  laid  up  tonnage  of  around  half  a  million  grt  in  1968,  representing  a 
negligible  percentage  of the  total  (0.3% ),  the  merchant fleet  can  be  deemed  to 
have been used, that year, if not at its full  theoretical capacity, at least to the best 
of its  potential, considering the  operational conditions. 
At the time of writing this report, the latest available data on world merchant fleet 
gross tonnage referred to 1 July 1968, and were taken from the Lloyd's Register of 
Shipping Statistical Tables. 
At that date, the world's merchant fleet amounted to 190.7m. grt. It has appeared 
useful,  in order to work from  a basis closer to  the time of writing this  report, to 
estimate the fleet at 1 January 1969, by assessing the variations of tonnage recorded 
during the last half year.  These variations  include,  added deliveries  of  new ships; 
deducted: losses and scrappings. 
The first figure was taken from the Lloyd's Register of Shipping quarterly statistics 
on shipbuilding. It amounted to 8.6m. grt. The second figure was not yet published 
by  the Lloyd's Register at the time of writing this report, and has been estimated 
at 2.2m. grt. 
Therefore,  the world  fleet  must have increased  by 6.4m.  grt during the last half 
year of 1968, and the round figure of 197m. grt can be taken as the basic tonnage 
as  at 1 January 1969. 
The overall estimates made earlier for world fleet tonnage, in 1975 and 1980, are 
assumed  to  date from  the middle  of  each  year,  as  they  have  been  derived  from 
the  series of  annual figures  of the Lloyd's Register of Shipping,  always  calculated 
at 1 July.  Therefore,  the forecast of a fleet  of  266m.  grt,  at 1 July 1975  implies 
that the  expansion needs  of the world  fleet,  as  from  1 January  1969,  would be 
met by deliveries reaching 69m. grt. 
Between  1 July  1970,  and  1 July  1980, when  the fleet  should  reach  337m.  grt, 
the additional demand would be 71m. grt. 
77 The conclusion drawn from  the overall approach is  that between now and  1980, 
140m.  grt in all  will  have to be built to  meet the foreseeable  expansion  of the 
world fleet. 
2.  N ewbuilding requirements  based  on  the  need for  replacement of the  fleet  in  service 
However, the expansion of the fleet is  only one of the two sources of the demand 
for  newbuildings;  the  other  corresponds  to  the  demand  for  replacement  of  the 
tonnage in service, resulting from losses  and scrappings. 
Forecasting in this field is particularly difficult because no very clear trend emerges, 
as can be seen from  Table XXXI, which shows how,  over the last  15  years,  the 
tonnages lost or scrapped have fluctuated  in absolute figures  as  well  as  in terms 
of the percentage of the world fleet. 
TABLE  XXXI 
Scrapped  or  lost  tonnage  in grt and  as  a percentage  of the  total fleet (1) 
Year 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
Scrapped 
grt 
1 136 454 
1 505 377 
920 426 
528 322 
729 939 
1 451  832 
3 124 571 
3 285 099 
3 726 618 
3 036 221 
3 292  491 
2 480 704 
2 522  538 
2 578 457 
3 865 393 
3 747 052 
% 
1.22 
1.54 
0.92 
0.50 
0.66 
1.23 
2.50 
2.53 
2.74 
2.17 
2.26 
1.62 
1.57 
1.51 
2.12 
1.93 
Lost 
grt 
322 222 
262  369 
254 658 
248 535 
270 963 
347 546 
281  523 
358 180 
471  097 
481  098 
496 805 
558 200 
739 047 
822  538 
832 803 
770 447 
Ol 
/0 
0.35 
0.27 
0.25 
0.24 
0.25 
0.29 
0.23 
0.28 
0.35 
0.34 
0.34 
0.36 
0.46 
0.48 
0.46 
0.40 
I 
Total grt  I 
(million grt) 
1 459 
1 767 
1 175 
777 
1 000 
1 799 
3 406 
3 643 
4 198 
3 517 
3 789 
3 039 
3 362 
3 401 
4 698 
4 518 
{I)  Source:  Lloyd's Register, Statistical Tables, Table 15, annual average of civil year. 
% 
1.57 
1.81 
1.17 
0.74 
0.91 
1.52 
2.73 
2.81 
3.09 
2.51 
2.60 
1.98 
2.03 
1.99 
2.58 
2.33 
Fleet in 
million grt 
93  352 
97 422 
100 569 
105 200 
110 246 
118 034 
124 935 
129 770 
135 916 
139 980 
145 863 
153 000 
160 392 
171  130 
182  100 
194  152 
The figure  for  annual losses  tends to increase faster  than world  tonnage,  but the 
inconsistency from one year to another is  such that no valid estimate of the trend 
for the future appears possible. 
The figure for scrapped tonnage develops in an even more erratic way because each 
year it depends not only on the age  structure of the  world  fleet,  but even more 
on the prevailing situation in the freight market. 
For instance,  at the  time  the  Suez  Canal was  first  closed,  there  was  very  little 
scrapping,  but  the  average  age  of  the  world  fleet  was  low,  because  post-war 
reconstruction  was  hardly finished. 
78 In 1967, on the other hand, there was substantial scrapping as  the  average age of 
the  fleet  was  higher,  owing to  the amount of  tonnage  built at the  end  of World 
War II, "Liberty ships" being the best known type.  But it can also  be noted that 
the  second closing of the  Suez  Canal did  not have  as  marked  an impact on the 
level of freight as the first one.  The incentive to keep technically obsolete ships in 
service has been less  strong than ten years  ago,  therefore. 
3.  Difficulties in  forecasting  needs  for  replacement 
It seems impossible, therefore, to foresee how the various factors which determine 
the elimination of ships in service will  develop  during each year up  to  1980. 
Furthermore, more generally, one may wonder whether the "technical revolutions" 
which  have  been  occurring  in  many  fields  of maritime  transport over  the  years 
will influence the very structure of the process of renovating the fleet.  In addition 
to physical factors:  shipwrecks, wear and corrosion, and economic factors:  level of 
freight,  prices of scrap, a concept of technical  obsolescence  which practically did 
not exist in the past must be borne in mind. 
The search for  increased efficiency,  which  is  a  feature  of the recent evolution of 
maritime  economy,  makes  it probable  that  this  new  factor  will  emerge,  but the 
scope of its  influence is  extremely difficult to determine,  as  only few  ships  spend 
their  whole  working  life  in  the  fleet  of  the  shipowner  who  ordered  them.  The 
contractor-owner is  most  often  a  national  of  a  developed  country  and when  he 
thinks  that  a  unit  of  his  fleet  is  no  longer  economically  profitable,  because  of 
technical  developments  in  his  sphere  of  activity,  he  replaces  it by  a  new  more 
suitable vessel,  but the  obsolete ship  is  not scrapped.  In fact,  there will  be other 
shipowners  in  the  world  who  are  of  the  opinion  that the  ship  can  still  be  run 
economically  in  the light  of  her purchase price,  operating costs  and  the  state  of 
the market in which they intend to use  her.  Consequently,  the  second-hand value 
of a ship remains much higher than her scrap value for  a very long time. 
For this reason, in the overall approach, based on the projection of past experience 
into  the  future,  only  foreseeable  alterations  in  the  age  structure  of  the  world's 
merchant fleet  could  usefully  be  considered  for  the  purposes  of  forecasting. 
4.  Pattern of elimination of the tonnage in  service 
The past rate of the elimination of tonnage in service can be calculated from  the 
Lloyd's Register of Shipping Statistical Tables, which, each year, at 1 July, classify 
the world fleet in five-year  age  groups. 
Table XXXII shows  the  results  of this  calculation  for  the  last  10  years,  taken 
from  1959, which,  each year, compares the total amount of each age-group  with 
that of the younger age-group  as  estimated 5 years before.  Thus, the comparison 
for  1959 is made with 1954 and so on. 
It has not been possible,  in this  calculation,  to  consider  the elimination  of ships 
less  than 10 years  old.  In fact,  the total amount of  the  vessel  age-group  of 5  to 
9 years is  regularly bigger than that of ships of 0  to 4 years,  5 years before. 
This  paradoxical  fact  can  probably  be  explained  by  the  difficulty  of  obtaining 
accurate data on the number and tonnage of the latest ships. 
79 TABLE  XXXII 
Rate of withdrawal of ships  in  service  over  the  last  ten years 
{%  withdrawn  in  relation  to  the  tonnage  of the  lower  group  of ships five years earlier) 
Age group as per 1 July 
1)  of the year considered 
2)  of the reference year 
Years compared 
Year considered  I  Reference year 
1959  1954 
1960  1955 
1961  1956 
1962  1957 
1963  1858 
1964  1959 
1965  1960 
1966  1961 
1967  1962 
1968  1963 
Average withdrawal rate of 
each five-year age-group, 
over a five-year period 
10-14 
5-9 
1.07 
0 
1.42 
2.34 
2.58 
0.93 
1.29 
1.15 
0.67 
0 
1.14 
15-19 
10-14 
3.01 
6.14 
9.44 
11.67 
11.07 
10.81 
10 
8.29 
7.19 
6.88 
8.45 
20-24 
15-19 
8.77 
11.48 
16.92 
22.94 
24.12 
22.70 
21.73 
22.22 
21.62 
20.75 
19.32 
> 25 
> 20 
26.34 
36.05 
39.90 
42.43 
45.51 
45.81 
38.67 
35.26 
37.88 
39.51 
38.74 
In the  same way,  gaps in the  statistics for  the  oldest ships have complicated cal-
culations further.  To calculate the  elimination rate  of ships  over  20  years  old,  it 
has  been  necessary  to  create  an  additional  group  to  show,  for  each  year  con-
sidered, the sum of the tonnages of the age-groups "20 to 24 years" and "25 years 
and over".(1)  This group has provided the bases  of comparison,  with  the tonnage 
of the vessel-group "25  years and over" noted after five  years. 
The  difference  between  the  tonnage  of  the  year  considered  and  that  of  the 
reference year measures  the elimination of ships  aged  over twenty years. 
It has been considered useful to set up a  theoretical model for  the elimination of 
successive  age-groups  in  the  form  of  a  curve  shown  in  Fig.  D,  which  plots  the 
relationship  between  the  initial  tonnage  and its  duration in years.  The points  of 
the  curve have been placed in the middle of each five-year  period and calculated 
as  a percentage of the initial tonnage by successively applying the rates of elimina-
tion (calculated in Table XXXII) to the remaining tonnages.  Beyond twenty years, 
it has been assumed,  in order to  continue the curve,  that the rate,  calculated for 
all  ships  exceeding  that  age,  would  be  applicable  during  the  following  period. 
This,  of course,  gives  an  unrealistic  picture,  as  every  ship  disappears  eventually. 
Though the theoretical model, set up in this way,  cannot give  an accurate account 
of the elimination of the longest surviving ships,  it does provide an  estimate very 
close to the average rate of elimination of obsolete vessels,  noted  during the last 
ten years:  in particular, it shows that, over this decade, the withdrawal of tonnage 
takes place at a very advanced average age:  it has taken about 27 years to eliminate 
only half the initial tonnage of an age-group. 
(1)  The  Lloyd's  Register  of  Shipping  has  introduced  an  age-group  "25  to  29  years"  in  its 
statistical  tables  since  1964  only. 
80 5.  Use of this model for  forecasting future needs for replacement 
For the future,  the observation of past rates of elimination gives  a basis for fore-
casting,  in successive five-year  periods,  the replacement needs  of the world fleet. 
By  applying the  average rates of elimination,  calculated in Table XXXII, to  the 
initial tonnage of each age-group observed or calculated at the beginning of each 
period,  the  probable  tonnage  of  the  higher  age-group  at the  end  of  the  period 
can be obtained. 
The sum of the difference  between  the  probable tonnage  and the  initial  tonnage 
of  each  age-group  corresponds  to  the  total  replacement  needs  of  the  period. 
Table XXXIII shows  this calculation for  the five-year  periods ending at 30 June 
of the years  1970, 1975 and  1980. 
According  to  the  estimate  made  in  this  way,  the  total  demand  for  replacement 
from  1 July 1965  to  30 June 1970, would amount to 20.6m. grt.  When deducting 
from  this  total 14m. grt which represent the tonnage lost or dismantled during the 
second half of  1965,  and the years  1966,  1967 and  1968, there remains demand 
for replacement for 6.6m. grt for the period from 1 January 1969 to 30 June 1970. 
This figure  is  to  be  added  to  the  21.5 m.  grt foreseen  for  the  period  1970-7  5,  to 
calculate the replacement needs of the world fleet from the beginning of 1969 until 
mid  1975, which thus amount to 28.lm. grt. 
TABLE  XXXIII 
Estimated  replacement  needs  of the  world fleet  for  the  three  five-year 
periods  ending  in  1970,  1975 and  1980 
(in  million  grt) 
Position at the  Total 
end of  the  Age-group (years)  10-14  15-19  20-24  >  25 years  replacement 
periods  needs 
1.7.1965  Initial tonnage  41  22.9  12  41 
30.6.1970  Probable tonnage  40.5  21  9.7  25.1 
Difference 
(replacement needs)  0.5  1.9  2.3  15.9  20.6 
1.7.1970  Initial tonnage  43.5  40.5  21  35.2 
30.6.1975  Probable tonnage  43  37.1  16.9  21.7 
Difference 
(Replacement needs)  0.5  3.4  4.1  13.5  21.5 
1.6.1975  Initial tonnage  78.6  43  37.1  40.7 
30.6.1980  Probable tonnage  77.7  39.4  29.9  24.9 
----
Difference 
(Replacement needs)  0.9  3.6  7.2  15.8  27.5 
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 By  further  adding  27.5m.  grt  for  the  period  1975-80  to  that  figure  an  overall 
forecast  of  55.6m.  grt for  the  demand  for  replacement  during  the  whole  period 
considered is  obtained. 
6.  Overall estimate of newbuilding requirements in  the  long  and  medium term 
The  conclusions  of  the  overall  approach  as  regards  the  total  for  newbuilding 
needed to provide the expected expansion and replacement of the world merchant 
fleet,  are grouped in  Table XXXIV. 
TABLE  XXXIV 
Overall  estimate  of new  tonnage  requirements for  the  periods  1969-75 and  1975-80 
{in  million  grt) 
Periods  1.1.1969  to  1.7.1975  to  Total 
30.7.1975  1.7.1980  (1.1.1969 to 1.7.1980) 
Needs:  1.  Expansion  69  71  140 
2.  Renewal  28.1  27.5  55.6 
3.  Total  97.1  98.5  195.6 
Tonnage already on order as at 1.1.1969  49.2  - 49.2 
Balance to be ordered for delivery before 
end of the period  47.9  98.5  146.4 
This  theoretical demand,  calculated in terms  of  these  two  needs,  should  thus  be 
met by average  annual deliveries of new ships representing a tonnage of  17m.  grt 
for  the whole  period of  eleven  and a  half years  under review,  but if  this  period 
is  divided  at  1 July  1975,  the  annual  averages· drop  to  14.94m.  grt  before  that 
date, and rise to  19.7m. grt afterwards. 
Of course, there will be no sudden fall-off in mid-1975  and these  annual averages 
do not constitute forecasts;  they  are  only intended  as  an  illustration  of  the  fact 
that the amount of newbuildings required will  be relatively less  substantial during 
the first six  and a half year period, than during the second five  years  one. 
It is  worth mentioning here that there is  cause for concern in the fact  that,  at the 
beginning of this first period of six and a half years, over half the total requirement 
is  already covered by orders. 
83 B.  Sectorial  analysis 
1.  Tanker fleet needs for newbuildings 
a)  E x p a n s i o n  n e e d s 
The world fleet of tankers of over 2 000 tdw in service at 1 January 1969, aggre-
gated  119.5m.  tdw;  the needs  for  newbuilding  to  supply  the  expansion  of  the 
fleet expected by 1980 (ref. Chaper III-B.l) thus correspond to the high efficiency 
estimate,  at  162.9m.  tdw  (of  which  79.5m.  tdw  are  to  be  delivered  by  1975). 
According  to  the  low  efficiency  estimate,  the  corresponding  needs  amount  to 
171.2m. tdw (of which 86.lm. tdw are to be delivered by 1975). 
b)  Replacement needs 
As  regards  the needs  corresponding to  the renewal  of  the fleet  in service,  it  has 
been assumed that losses due to accidents would, on average, represent 3%  of the 
fleet  deadweight,  each year,  up to  1980.  This  percentage has taken into  account 
the last five  years' percentages which varied between  1.5  and 4.5%. 
For the ships to be scrapped during the period considered, various estimates have 
been made  according to  the  age  distribution  of  the  fleet  in service  at  1 January 
1969. The alternatives adopted are as  follows:(1) 
Alternative I: gradual withdrawal of obsolete ships. 
Alternative II: systematic withdrawal of ships aged 20 years and older. 
Table  XXXV shows  the  impact of  these  two  alternatives  in  1975  and  1980 on 
the fleet in service as  at 1 January 1969. 
It has appeared useful to also present the foreseeable situation towards  1971-72 so 
as  to  give  a better account of the anticipated process  of elimination of old ships. 
This  process  is  detailed  as  regards  Alternative I.  On the other hand,  as  regards 
Alternative II, Table XXXV only mentions the additional withdrawals implied by 
the  quicker  rate  of  replacement  adopted for  this  estimate,  and  the  total  corres-
ponding needs. 
Finally, the demand for  replacement is  derived from  a comparison of the tonnage 
in service at 1 January 1969, with the remaining tonnage of this fleet still operating 
in  1975  and  1980.  This demand amounts to  39.6m.  tons deadweight up to  1980 
(of  which  16.3m.  tdw  between  1969  and  1975)  for  Alternative  I  (as  shown  in 
Table XXXV). 
Alternative  II suggests  an  additional  demand  for  replacement  of  14. 8m.  tdw,  of 
which 11m. by 1975. Alternative II, thus, implies a renewal proportionately much 
more marked in the first  five  year period of the  next decade  than in the  second 
one.  This  is  of  course  related  to  the  present  age  structure  of this  section  of  the 
world  tanker fleet. 
c)  Total  deliveries  of  tankers  needed  and  corresponding  orders 
to  be  placed 
Table XXXVI provides  a  basis  for  assessing  the  total need for  new  tonnage for 
the tanker fleet during the period under consideration in this report. 
(1)  See  footnote  to table XXXV. 
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 On  the  whole,  when  combining  the  low  efficiency  estimate,  which  implies  the 
strongest  need  for  expansion,  with  Alternative  II of ship-breaking which  means 
the most substantial need for  replacement,  we  attain a  total  demand for  225.6m. 
tdw, which constitutes the "optimistic" estimate.  On the contrary, when combining 
the  alternative  of  high  efficiency,  which  implies  the  lowest  need  for  expansion, 
with  Alternative  I  of  scrapping,  which  constitutes  the  lowest  estimate  of  the 
replacement  demand,  we  obtain  a  "pessimistic"  estimate  of  202.5m.  tdw  to  be 
built between 1969 and 1980. However, the tonnage already on order at 1 January 
1969, namely 52.6m.  tdw  must be deducted,  to find  the figures  corresponding to 
the  tonnage  still  to  be ordered at that date,  which  thus  amounts  to  a  maximum 
of  173m.  tdw  and  a  minimum  of  150m.  tdw,  for  units  to  be  delivered  before 
mid  1980. 
For the  first  period,  the  range  of  tonnage  to  be  delivered  before  1  July  1975, 
comes  to  between  95.8  and  113.4m.  tdw  and  what  remains  to  be  ordered  after 
1 January 1969, represents only 82%  to  115% of current tonnage on order. 
Now,  it  must  be  noted  that 90%  of  this  tonnage  will  be  delivered  by  the  end 
of 1971  and about 7m.  tons of OBO's should be added,  which will  not easily be 
employed in bulk shipping,  as  will  be shown in  the following  section. 
Despite  the  expected  strong  increase  for  this  section  of  the  world  fleet,  there  is 
thus a risk of surplus capacity during the first years of the next decade. 
2.  Bulk-carrier fleet  needs for  newbuildings 
a)  E x p a n s i o n  n e e d s 
In  1980, the required  bulk-carrier fleet  would be a  ma~imum tonnage  of 79.2m. 
tdw to meet the high estimate of growth of the various trades.  In the  case of the 
low  estimate,  this  tonnage  is  reduced  to  a  minimum  of  60.6m.  tdw.  Now  at 
1 January  1969,  the  tonnage  in  service  had  already  reached  57.6m.  tdw,  which 
suggests,  for  this  sector of the world fleet,  expansion needs  proportionately much 
lower  than for  tankers.  Out of  the tonnage  in  service  in early  1969,  there were 
indeed  1  0.2m.  tdw  of OBO's,  three  quarters  of  which  at least  were  used  for  oil 
transport. However, the tonnage of these units must be included in the bulk-carrier 
fleet,  for  statistical reasons. 
Therefore the expected expansion of the tonnage of this  fleet,  having regard only 
to  the  foreseeable  increase  in  dry  bulk  trades,  implies  the  delivery  of  3m.  tdw 
according  to  the  low  estimate  and  21.6m.  tdw  according  to  the  high  estimate 
between the present day and the end of the next decade. 
In the medium term, the inclusion, in the fleet capacity at 1 January 1969, of the 
whole  deadweight  of  OBO's has  of course  a  more  misleading  effect  than in  the 
long term. 
In fact, whereas the high estimate of growth in trade leads to a possible expansion 
of 4.5m.  tdw,  the pessimistic estimate implies  that the necessary tonnage is  lower 
than the one operating in early  1969. 
Nevertheless, if it is  assumed that, at that date, 7.7m. tdw of OBO's were, in fact, 
being used for  oil transportation, there would remain, even in the low  estimate of 
87 growth in trade, a remaining need for expansion by about 2.3m.  tdw for dry cargo 
bulk-carriers proper, to be commissioned up to  1 July 1975. 
b)  Replacement needs 
At first sight, these needs seem unlikely to  be considerable.  The bulk-carrier fleet 
is very recent, as we have already stressed in the preceding chapter, and this family 
of ships constitutes the youngest group within  the world  merchant fleet. 
At 1 July 1968, 84%  of the world bulk carriers were less  than ten years old and 
units of five  years of age  and less  represented  58.7%. 
Therefore, the fraction of the fleet  in service at the beginning of  1969  which  will 
reach  or  exceed  the  age  of  twenty  years  will  be  only  4.9m.  tdw  in  1975  and 
11.7m. tdw in 1980. 
c)  U n c e r taint  i e s  res  u 1 tin  g  from  t h e  i n c I u s i o n  o f  0  B 0  ' s  i n  t h e 
bulk-carrier  fleet 
World orders for bulk-carriers, including OBO's, reached 19.3m. tdw at 1 January 
1969. This figure  seems very high when compared with the foreseeable  needs for 
new  buildings to be delivered before  1 July  197  5. 
This  statement stresses  the difficulties  of forecasting  in  the field  of  bulk-carriers, 
because of the multipurpose design  of OBO's. 
The fact that statistics assimilate OBO's with  other dry cargo bulk carriers can be 
traced back to the origins of this  type of ship,  which were  created as  a  result of 
the idea of employing the side-tanks of ore-carriers to  transport oil  as  homeward 
freight.  The economic profitability of these units was consequently improved,  but 
their carrying capacity in liquid cargo was  lower than their  iron-ore  cargo  dead-
weight. 
Today, techniques have evolved and the latest OBO's are genuinely multipurpose 
for  their  whole  carrying capacity;  therefore it is  no  longer  possible  to  determine 
a priori what will be their main assignment during their working lives. 
At all  events,  this  type  of  ship  is  capable  of  maintaining  a  higher  performance 
coefficient  than  a  vessel  of same  capacity  used  exclusively  for  either  oil  or  dry 
bulk cargoes. 
Consequently, its competitive position on the freight  market is  better than that of 
a completely specialized vessel,  which  makes  it popular with  owners  who,  when 
ordering, cannot be sure of long-term charter contracts. 
This  is  why  very  substantial  orders  for  OBO's  have  been  placed  in  the  world 
since  1966,  especially  during  the  year  1968  when  contracts  reached  the  peak 
figure of 5.2m. tdw. 
This  trend  has  continued  and  most  "bulk-carriers"  ordered  in  1969  are  in fact 
OBO's. 
Taking into  account the expected  growth  in dry bulk  cargo  traffic,  it cannot be 
assumed  that the capacity of the OBO fleet  in service  or on order at 1 January 
1969,  the  reference  date  of  the  present  survey,  will  be  used  entirely  for  these 
cargoes  during the  period under review. 
88 Such  a  use  of  this  tonnage  would  entail  too  serious  a  lack  of balance  between 
transport  capacity  supply  and  demand.  Under  the  circumstances,  it  has  been 
assumed for this prospective survey that only a quarter of this fleet,  in service and 
on order, at the referenoe date,  would actually,  on average,  be used for dry bulk 
carriage. 
This implies the corollary that 7 5% of the capacity of this fleet will be used-still 
on average-for oil transportation until 1980. 
This estimate amounts to a transfer of 12. 8m. tdw to the tanker fleet, which reduces 
the newbuilding needs estimated for this section of the world fleet by an equivalent 
amount. 
Despite  this  transfer,  the  risk  of  a  lack  of  balance  mentioned  above  is  not 
completely discounted and during the coming years temporary excess tonnage may 
appear as  the bulk-carriers and OBO's now on order are delivered. 
In fact,  when taking a quarter of the deadweight of the present OBO carrier fleet 
into  consideration,  the world  fleet  of ships  engaged  in the  transport of  dry bulk 
cargoes can be estimated at about 60m.  tdw at the beginning of  1969. 
If the high  estimate  of  growth  in trades  is  adopted,  the  need  for  expansion until 
1975  would  reach  12.1m.  tdw.  This  need,  however,  will  be  revealed  only  pro-
gressively  during the  6  1/2 year  period  under  review.  Replacement  needs  must 
also be spread over the whole period. 
At 1 January 1969, orders for ore carriers and bulk carriers proper, together with 
one  fourth  of  the  OBO  tonnage  on  order,  totalled  14.1m.  tdw,  most  of  which 
tonnage corresponds to ships which are to be delivered in 1969 and 1970. 
Up to date, the expansion of sea-borne trade has facilitated the use of the new ships 
commissioned,  but  this  situation  may  perhaps  not  carry  on  for  many  months. 
Consequently,  temporary excess  tonnage  may appear during  the  first  half of  the 
next decade  and this  will  have  to  be corrected by the laying  up of  a  fraction  of 
the fleet,  in theory equal to the surplus noted. 
If this  situation lasts long enough,  the  least profitable  ships,  generally  the oldest 
ones,  will  perhaps  be  scrapped.  From  this  standpoint,  for  this  section  of  the 
fleet,  two  alternatives  of scrapping more drastic  than that for  tankers,  have  been 
adopted  with  reference  to  be  replacement  needs  appearing  in  table  XXXVII: 
alternative I  corresponds to the systematic scrapping of  all  ships  of  20 years  and 
over, alternative II to the gradual elimination of vessels  of  15  years  and over. 
d)  Total  newbuilding  needs  for  bulk-carriers 
Despite these  hypotheses  of particularly early scrapping,  the figures  presented in 
table  XXXVII  only  reveal  poor prospects  as  regards  the  newbuilding  needs  of 
this  sector of the world merchant fleet  and,  consequently,  new  orders  for  vessels 
only intended for  dry bulk cargo trades are also likely to be limited. 
In fact,  statistically, the whole  10.2m.  tdw representing  OBO's  must be included 
in the bulk-carrier fleet in service at 1 January 1969, as  they have not been classi-
fied  elsewhere. 
Consequently,  the total need  for  newbuildings  ranges  between  15  and  42m.  tdw 
for the long term period.  In the medium term,  only  the combination of the high 
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 estimate of growth with the high alternative of scrapping would allow a forecast of 
delivery requirements amounting to  12.5m. tdw up to  1 July  1975. 
As regards new orders to be placed after 1 January 1969, the amount of tonnage 
already on order at that date, for  bulk-carriers proper as  well  as  OBO's,  reduces 
the needs still to be met.  These needs, on the other hand, will  be increased by the 
fact that, during the period considered, a capacity corresponding to three quarters 
of  the  deadweight  of  OBO's  in  service  or  on  order  at  the  reference  date,  will 
probably be used for oil transportation. 
According to  this  assumption, and  to the  most favourable  combination of expan-· 
sion and replacement demand, additional orders for  bulk carriers corresponding to 
the dry bulk-cargo trade only, should total 35m. tdw, to be delivered before mid-
1980, out of which  6m.  tdw should be commissioned before  1 July  1975. 
e)  The  recent  acceleration  in  the  rate  of  orders  for  OBO's 
increases  the  uncertainties  of  forecasting 
This forecast, concerning the maximum level of orders to be placed in the medium 
term, seems to be contradicted by the fact  that particularly substantial orders for 
bulk  carriers were  recorded  during  the  first  two  quarters  of  1969.  According to 
Fearnley  &  Egers,  world  orders  amounted  to  25m.  tdw  at  1  July  1969.  This 
increase as  against the beginning of the year, which occurred despite very substan-
tial  deliveries,  is  explained  by  the  placing of  new  orders for  19m.  tdw  since  the 
index date adopted for this study. 
All  these orders concern ships to be delivered before  197  5. 
One cannot simply  conclude that 3m.  at least of these new  orders  are in  excess. 
In fact,  more than half,  namely  4.6m.  tdw,  are for  OBO's with  a deadweight  of 
100 000 tons  or  more.  Units  of  this  type  represent  around  12m.  tdw  of  world 
orders  at  1  July  1969,  a  fact  which  stresses  the  prominent  part played  by  the 
growing number of ships of this type in the future development of the world fleet. 
It must be emphasized again that the ordering of OBO's has less  and less connec-
tion  with  the  foreseeable  needs  for  transportation  of  dry  bulk  commodities.  At 
present, these units are most often used by owners for the crude oil trade. However, 
shipowners  fear  the  competition  of  tankers  of  200 000  tdw  and  over;  this  is 
why  they  choose  multi-purpose  units  designed  to  give  better  profitability  than 
tankers proper of same tonnage. 
Under  these  circumstances,  OBO's  will  tend  to  replace  tankers  of  50 000  to 
120 000 tdw for carrying oil cargoes which cannot be given to bigger ships. 
The versatility of a  rapidly increasing section of the world fleet  tends to increase 
its  efficiency  but  this  phenomenon  considerably  increases  the  uncertainties  as 
regards  the future  balance between supply  and  demand  in  the  field  of  sea-borne 
transport capacity. 
In fact, one might be tempted to attribute all these additional orders for  OBO's to 
the  new  building  needs  of  the  tanker  fleet.  However,  once  commissioned,  these 
units will also influence the market of the sea-borne transport of dry bulk cargoes. 
The importance of this impact will depend basically on the future development of 
oil transportation, a sector on which unforeseeable variations in the world political 
and economic situation have a strong influence. 
91 Therefore, in the medium term, durable excesses of tonnage may appear as regards 
either the fleet likely to carry bulk cargoes, or the tanker fleet. 
If this  happened,  the  oldest  ships  now  in  service  would  become  obsolete  more 
rapidly, and would be laid up, and then probably scrapped. 
Consequently, the size of recent orders would tend to make the high alternative of 
scrapping foreseen for  this section of the world fleet the more probable one. 
3.  Newbuilding requirements for  the  world cargo-vessel fleet 
a)  T y p e s  o f  s h i p  c o v e r e d  b y  t h e  p r e s e n t  s e c t i on 
Under  this  section  are  grouped  all  foreseeable  needs  for  merchant  ships  over 
1 000 grt which are neither tankers nor bulk carriers; namely,  in general,  twin or 
multi-deck cargo-vessels,  including cargo-passenger vessels,  but excluding passen-
gerliners  and ferry-boats  mainly used  for  passenger  transportation.  Consequently, 
expansion  needs  for  each  section  of  the  world  fleet  will  be  assessed  as  follows: 
tramps, ocean-going cargo-liners, container ships and "other cargo vessels". It has 
appeared necessary, when dealing with forecasts for these expansion requirements, 
to  consider these various types  of cargo-vessels as  a whole; in fact,  limits between 
the  various  categories  are  not  very  definite  and  their  future  development  will 
certainly be interconnected. Furthermore, the statistical data available necessitated 
a re-grouping of this type for  the purposes of estimating replacement needs. 
b)  Expansion  needs 
Table  XXXVIII  compares  the  sums  of  the  various  forecasts  formulated  in 
Chapter III-B, for  these  types  of ships  with  the corresponding fleet  in  service  as 
at 1 July 1968, which was taken from the Lloyd's Register Statistical Tables. These 
Tables  have  permitted an estimate of the fleet,  through deduction from the other 
categories,  at  71m.  gross  tons,  which,  when applying the coefficient  of  1.4,  gives 
an estimated total deadweight of 99.4m. tons. 
This  Table also  shows  the  distribution of  the  total deadweight tonnage  according 
to types of vessel in 1966, which is  the last year with available data on the distri-
bution in tdw. 
According to  the  low estimate,  no expansion  needs  can be expected  until  1975. 
The inclusion  of  tramps  in  this  group,  for  the  reasons  mentioned  above,  has  a 
misleading  effect  on  the  calculated  needs  for  expansion.  Tramps  are,  indeed,  a 
type  of  ship  for  which  quite  a  noticeable  decrease  in  tonnage  is  due  to  occur, 
according to all  the estimates,  during the period studied.  This is  why it must be 
considered  that,  even in the hypothesis  of  lowest  growth  of the  fleet,  expansion 
needs  will  have to be satisfied until  1975, for  the  other categories.  But these,  in 
terms  of  tonnage,  will  not  exceed  the  anticipated  reduction  in  the  tramp  fleet 
deadweight. 
c)  Rep 1 ace men t  needs 
As regards the replacement needs,  the fact that the average age  of tramps is  very 
high,  has an offsetting,  effect on the behaviour of the whole group studied.  Table 
XXXIX  gives  an  estimate  of  the  replacement  demand,  according  to  the  age 
structure of this section of the fleet. 
92 TABLE  XXXVlll 
Medium  and  long  term  needs for  the  expansion  of the  world cargo-ship fleet 
(in million twd) 
Forecasts 
Types of cargo vessel  1966  1968 
1975  1980 
Estimates 
Low  I 
High  I 
Low  I 
High 
Tramps  22.5  14  17.3  8.8  11.7 
--- ------
Container ships  6.3  8.5  11.8  17.7 
------
Cargo liners (high se.a)  43.5  49.6  57.6  53.9  64 
Other cargo vessels  23.5  28.9  39.6  38.5  48.8 
------
Total  89.5  99.4  98.8  123  113  142.2 
---
N ewbuilding needs 
according to 
foreseen growth  23.6  13.6  42.8 
As regards losses, the estimate has been made according to the average percentage 
experienced in recent years. 
Concerning  tonnage  to  be  scrapped,  two  alternatives  have  been  considered  for 
cargo-vessels. Alternative I foresees the gradual scrapping of all ships over 26 yars; 
Alternative II shows the effect of elimination of ships exceeding 21  years. 
It may be assumed that, if  the  fall  in freight  rates resulting from  the  anticipated 
surplus capacity of the bulk-carrier fleet,  during the first half of the next decade, 
occurs, it will also affect the sector of tramps and perhaps the other cargo vessels. 
In addition,  in the field  of cargo liners,  the  oldest  section  of  the  fleet  will  face 
difficulties  arising  from  the  competition  of  container  ships.  This  is  why  it  has 
appeared  reasonable  to  foresee  that  the  cargo-ship  fleet  will  get  younger,  to  a 
perceptible extent under Alternative I  and considerably if  Alternative II becomes 
reality. 
Despite the difference between these two alternatives as regards the possible renewal 
of the cargo-ship fleet,  the range of the replacement needs corresponding to each 
alternative  is  not  too  wide  because  of  the  age  structure  of  the  fleet  which,  at 
1 July 1968, still had more than 15%  of ships over 25  years  old. 
The maximum replacement needs up to  1980 total 47.3m. tdw and the minimum 
needs,  44.4m.  tdw.  When  we  consider  the  medium  term  prospects,  up  to  1975, 
these needs are set at a maximum of 33.3 and a minimum of 26.3m. tdw. 
93 TABLE  XXXIX 
Long  and  medium  term  needs  for  replacement  of the  world  cargo-ship  fleet 
according  to  the  alternatives  adopted for  the  rate  of scrapping 
1.7.1968  1.7.1975 
Date built 
Age group  I 
Fleet  Age group  I 
Fleet 
A.  Alternative I - Gradual withdrawal of ships over 26 years old 
1938 and  30 years  4.54 
preceding  and over 
years 
1939-1943  25-30  10.32  32 and over  3.00 
1944-1948  20-25  13.37  27-31  5.00 
1949-1953  15-20  11.02  22-26  10.00 
1954-1958  10-15  19.40  17-21  19.40 
1959-1963  5-10  20.52  12-16  20.50 
1964-1968  0-5  20.23  7-11  20.20 
Total  99.40  78.10 
Accumulated losses  5.20 
Remaining fleet of ships in service 
at 1.7.1968  72.90 
Accumulative replacement needs  26.50 
B.  Alternative II - Gradual withdrawal of ships over 21  years old 
Additional withdrawals compared with 
Alternative I 
Accumulated replacement needs 
7 
33.50 
(in million  tdw) 
I. 7.1980 
Age group  I 
32 and over 
27-31 
22-26 
17-21 
12-16 
Fleet 
2.00 
5.00 
16.00 
20.50 
20.20 
63.70 
8.70 
55.00 
44.40 
2.9 
47.30 
d)  T o t a 1  n e w b u i 1 d i n g  n e e d s  f o r  c a r g o  v e s s e 1 s 
Table XL presents the general forecast which can be formulated  for  world cargo 
fleet  deliveries  taking place between  1 July  1968, reference date adopted for  this 
sector,  and  the  end  of  both  periods  considered:  the  long  term  needs  vary  from 
58 to 90m. tdw; the fraction to be delivered in the medium term represents 26 to 
57m.  tdw.(1) 
As  the  orders  at  1  January  1969,  are  relatively  lower,  when  compared  with 
delivery needs, than those for  tankers, and, particularly lower  than those for  bulk 
carriers,  this  sector  presents  interesting  prospects  for  the  newbuilding  market, 
especially during the first period, extending until 1975, a period during which the 
cargo-vessel fleet needs for  replacement are particularly great.  On the whole,  for 
delivery  before  1980,  there  remains  a  maximum  tonnage  of  78.2m.  tdw  to  be 
ordered,  and a  minimum  corresponding  figure  of  46m.  tdw.  The  corresponding 
figures  for  tonnage  to  be delivered  before  1975  amount to  a  maximum  of  45.2 
and a minimum of  14m. tdw. 
(1)  The needs have to be reduced by 1.8  million tdw to bring them into line with the reference 
date:  1 January  1969, which has been retained for the other sectors. 
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 C.  Comparison  between  the overall approach  and  the  sectorial  analysis 
1.  Conversion  into  gross  registered  tonnage  of  the  need  for  newbuilding,  as  calculated  in 
deadweight by  the  sectorial analysis 
For the last stage  of  this  study  of  the  prospects  of  demand  on  the  world  ship-
building  market,  the  newbuilding  deliveries  requirements,  for  each  period  con-
sidered, estimated by the overall approach, must be compared with the sum of the 
forecasts of the sectorial analysis, for both the high and low estimates. 
To make  this  comparison,  the results  of  the  sectorial  analysis  expressed in tons 
deadweight  must be converted  into  gross  registered  tons.  But,  unlike  what  was 
possible for  the comparison of the  tonnage  of the  whole  world  fleet,  it has  not 
been  possible  to  retain  a  single  coefficient  to  be  applied  to  the  results  of  the 
sectorial  approach.  Here,  we  are  dealing  with  future  ships,  whereas  the  fleet  in 
service includes a large fraction of old units, which has permitted us to foresee,  in 
the preceding chapter, a gradual increase in the traditional ratio of 1.4 tdw  I 1 grt. 
For  tankers,  which  represent  the  major  part  of  tonnage  to  be  built  in  all  the 
estimates,  it  has  seemed  necessary  to  distinguish  three  categories:  very  large 
tankers, for which a ratio of 2 has been adopted, tankers for refined products with 
a  ratio of  1.5  and all  other tank vessels  which,  generally,  transport crude oil  on 
trade routes, excluding giant units,  to which  a  ratio  of  1. 7  tdw for  1  grt can  be 
applied. 
To find one average coefficient for all tank-vessels, the orders to be placed by 1980 
have been classified  according  to  these  three  categories.  77%  of  the  total  dead-
weight  tonnage  should  be  constituted  by  very  large  tankers,  9.5%  by  refined 
product  tankers  and  consequently  13.5%  by  medium-sized  tankers.  The  com-
pensated ratio obtained is thus 1912 tdw for  1 grt or vice-versa 0.523 grt for  1 tdw. 
The  same  conversion  coefficient  cannot  be  applied  to  ships  to  be  delivered  up 
to  1975.  In fact,  among  these  orders,  the  share  of  very  large  tankers  will  be 
smaller at the beginning of the next decade than at the end of this period. In addi-
tion,  the needs for  refined product tankers will  be noticeably more  substantial in 
the coming years  than between  1975  and  1980, according to what was  predicted 
in  Chapter II-B. 
Under  these  circumstances,  the  following  distribution  has  been  adopted  for  the 
period 1969-7  5:  64%  of very large tankers,  11% of refined product tankers, and 
25%  of medium-sized ships.  On the whole,  the ratio is  established  at 1 873  tdw 
for 1 grt and vice-versa 0.534 grt for  1 tdw.  For bulk carriers, only one coefficient 
of  0.625  grt per tdw  has  been used. 
As regards cargo vessels, a compensation factor has also been applied, based upon 
a  likely  distribution  between  tramps,  cargo  liners,  reefers,  container  ships  and 
other vessels. 
A  high conversion coefficient of  0. 85  has  thus  been obtained; it reflects  the fact 
that,  except for  tramps,  the cargo vessels  recently ordered have a  relatively high 
gross tonnage as  compared with their deadweight. 
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 2.  Comparison of newbuilding needs 
Table XLI shows  the sums  of  the low  and  high estimates  made  by the sectorial 
analysis,  as  regards  the  long  and  medium  term  needs  for  new  tonnage  to  be 
delivered from 1 January 1969 onwards, to satisfy the expansion and replacement 
needs of the world fleet for tankers, bulk carriers and cargo vessels, until mid 1980, 
distinguishing the proportion which is  to be commissioned before  1 July 1975. 
For each category of ships, the deadweight tonnage,  as  previously mentioned, has 
been converted into gross tonnage, so that results may be compared with those of 
the  overall approach.  It must be pointed  out that,  as  the  relative  importance  of 
cargo vessels is much greater in the estimate expressed in grt than in that expressed 
in .tdw,  the  .wid~ range  of these  forecasts  during  the  first  period leads  to  a  high 
estimate which  Is  60%  above  the low estimate, expressed in  grt,  whereas  in tdw 
the difference is  only 50%. On the other hand, in the second period, the range is 
very narrow: 7% in tdw. 
The result of the overall approach,  at 195.6m.  grt is  in the long term, very near 
that of the average  of  the two  estimates  adopted by the  sectorial analysis,  which 
would be 19m. grt. 
As  regards  medium  term  prospects,  the  differences  are  more  marked:  the  needs 
forecast  by the low  estimate of  the sectorial  analysis  are  about 26%  lower  than 
the single overall forecast.  Between the latter and the high estimate, the difference 
is  not as  wide but is  still almost  19% . 
These  significant  differences  are  of  course  compensated  for,  between  197  5  and 
1980, as, during this period, the overall approach approximates far more closely to 
the  forecasts  of  the sectorial  analysis,  the range  of which  narrows.  This  lack  of 
balance between the two  successive periods is  to  be attributed to the divergences 
existing between both studies as regards the rate of replacement of the fleet.  These 
divergences  are of course more  noticeable  in  the  case  of  the high  alternative  of 
scrapping,  especially  during the  first  period  studied,  taking  the  age  structure  of 
the present fleet in service into account. 
However,  in  general,  if  we  look  at  the  whole  period,  the  consequences  of  the 
differences noted between both studies about the future efficiency of the merchant 
fleet happen to be self-adjusting when estimating the part of total demand derived 
from needs for replacement,  as  suggested  at the end of  Chapter IV. 
3.  Comparison  of the  needs for  replacement foreseen  by  the two studies 
Table  XLII  compares  the  very  noticeable  differences  which  result,  as  regards 
scrapping,  between the standpoint adopted by the overall approach,  according to 
which the rate of elimination of operating ships would be the same in the future, 
as  in the past,  and from  the standpoint adopted by the sectorial  analysis,  which 
adopted,  even in  the lower  alternative,  a  much  higher  rate of scrapping.  Such  a 
rate can be justified by the upsurge of new techniques in maritime tran"portation 
which  accelerate the obsolescence of ageing  ships  by strongly increasing  the  effi-
ciency of the most up-to-date tonnage. 
Apart  from  this  technical  phenomenon,  the  sectorial  analysis  suggests  that  the 
consequences of a possible freight crisis in the sector of dry cargoes may be added. 
If such a crisis occurs during the first half of the next decade, it would probably 
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 result in the laying up and scrapping of the surplus tonnage which will  correspond 
to the oldest ships. 
Thus,  the  total  needs  for  replacement  up  to  1980  as  defined  by  the  sectorial 
analysis  amount  to  a  minimum  of  69.1m.  grt  and  a  maximum  of  81.2m.  grt, 
whereas  the  overall  approach  adopts  a  tonnage  of  only 55.6m.  grt.  The  average 
foreseen  by the sectorial analysis  is  thus  about 30%  above the figure  reached by 
the  overall  approach.  This  difference  becomes  almost  4  7%  as  regards  medium 
term prospects up to 1975, because of the considerable difference-over 70%-
which exists between the overall forecast and the high sectorial alternative for  this 
period. 
4.  Complement  to  the  sectorial analysis  for  passenger  vessels  and small ships 
a)  R e 1  e vance o f  s u c h  a  c o m p 1  e me n t 
At the level of the estimate of newbuilding needs,  as  well  as  that of the forecast 
of world fleet  tonnage,  the comparison of  the  two  studies  is  somewhat  distorted 
because of the lack of sectorial forecasts for the category of passenger vessels and 
that of  small  ships  of  100 to  999  grt which  are  both  included  in the  terms  of 
reference  of  the  overall  approach.  This  is  why  a  rapid  estimate  of  delivery 
requirements,  for  these two  categories  of  ships,  will  be found  below. 
These  estimates  have  been  made  in  gross  tonnage,  which  was  obligatory  for 
passenger  vessels  and  was  also  more  normal  for  small  ships,  because  of  the 
definition in grt adopted for their tonnage limits. 
Moreover,  it has not appeared necessary to  formulate alternatives  of growth  and 
rates of scrapping as far as these two sectors are concerned. 
The forecasts  formulated hereafter are thus single. 
The  method  adopted  in  this  way  should  theoretically  have  led  to  reduce  the 
findings  of the overall approach rather than to complete the sectorial analysis, but 
it has appeared more consistent with the  aim of this  report to  cover  as  much as 
possible of the field of world demand for merchant ships. 
b)  Passenger vessels 
It has been assumed in Chapter III-C that the tonnage of this  sector of the mer-
chant fleet would remain stable during the whole period considered. 
Consequently, no need for expansion is  foreseen for  passenger vessels. 
But this  stability hides widespread transformations  due  to  the  foreseeable  altera-
tions  of  passenger  traffic:  the  regular  passenger  services  will  almost  completely 
disappear on high sea routes,  because of competition from  the  air.  On short sea 
routes, these services will continue and probably increase, but they will be provided 
more and more by units of the car-ferry type, of relatively small tonnage. 
As  regards  lage  passenger  liners,  it  can  be  stated  that  sea  cruises  will  keep 
increasing rapidly,  and this  will  enable the survival  of passenger  vessels  catering 
only for tourists. 
This  expected  transformation  of  traffic  cannot  be  achieved  only  by  converting 
operating ships,  many of  which  are  too  old to  undergo  the  necessary conversion 
sufficiently economically. 
100 It can thus be assessed that from now up to  1980, two thirds of the fleet in service, 
which  at present aggregates  4.6m.  grt,  will  be  ~eplaced. The figure  will  thus  be 
3m.  grt half of which should be delivered before  1 July  1975. 
c)  S h i p s  f r om  1 0 0  t o  9 9 9  g r t 
For small ships of less  than 1 000 grt, it has been foreseen,  in Chapter III-C that 
the  increase  of  the  fleet  should  amount  to  13m.  grt  towards  mid-1975  and 
16m. grt on 1 July 1980, as  against 8.9m. at 1 July 1968. The need for expansion 
can thus be assessed at 7.1 m.  grt for the whole period, of which 4.1  by 197 5. 
At 1 July  1968 the section  of  this fleet  consisting  of  ships  of  twenty  years  and 
over  amounted  to  2.4m.  grt.  In  1980,  those  units  would  be  over  32  years  old. 
Consequently,  despite  the  surprising  length  of  life  of  some  small  units,  it seems 
reasonable to  anticipate that,  at least,  an equivalent tonnage will  be scrapped by 
that time, which enables us  to  calculate the replacement needs.  Out of this  total, 
1.5m.  grt represent ships  of  25  years  and  over  and  will  probably be withdrawn 
before  197  5. 
Thus,  on the  whole,  the  newbuilding  demand  for  small  ships  can be estimated 
at 9.5m.  grt for  the period from  1 July 1968  to  1 July 1980. For the medium 
term, the corresponding figure is 5.6m. grt. 
The statistical tables  of Lloyd's Register do not show the  tonnage of  units under 
1 000 grt delivered  during  the  2nd  half of  1968,  nor  that of  ships  on order  at 
1 January  1969. Nevertheless,  as  regards  these  latter,  statistics  of  their  numbers 
are given in the two following tonnage classes:  100 to 499 grt and 500 to 999 grt. 
When estimating the average gross  tonnage of ships in these categories at 300 in 
the first case and 800 in the second, the tonnage on order at 1 January 1969, can 
be fixed  at about 480 000 grt.  This figure  is  probably not much above the annual 
output of ships of this size  as  delivery dates for  these very small vessels  are short. 
This thus permits an estimate of between  200 000 and 240 000 grt for  the world 
production of ships of less than 1 000 grt during the second half of  1968. 
Deliveries to be carried out from  1 January 1969 to  1 July 1980, thus amount to 
approximately  9.3m.  grt out of  which  5.4m.  grt  should  be  commissioned  before 
mid-1975. 
d)  Summing  up  of  com p 1 em en tar  y  needs 
On the whole, the high and low estimates of the sectorial analysis expressed in grt 
must be adjusted, by adding a need for passenger vessels and small ships deliveries 
of a total tonnage of 12.5m. gross  tons up to mid-1980, out of which 7.1m. gross 
tons  are required before  1 July  1975. 
5.  Possibilities for  new orders  from  early  1969 onwards 
a)  L o n g  an d  m e d i u m  t e r m  d e m an  d  f o r  n e w b u i 1 d i n g s 
The future demand on the international shipbuilding market can be more accurately 
assessed from the sectorial analysis, by an addition of the orders still to be placed 
from  1 January 1969 onwards,  and those estimated for  tank vessels,  bulk carriers 
and  other cargo  vessels  and  deducting  from  the  delivery  requirements,  for  each 
101 category, the corresponding tonnage under construction or on order at 31  Decem-
ber 1968. 
On  Table  XLIII  these  forecasts  have  been  summed  up  and  their  deadweight 
converted into gross tonnage,  according to the coefficients previously adopted. 
At this stage,  account is  taken of the hypothesis formulated under the heading of 
bulk carriers,  according to  which  12.8m.  tdw of OBO's would  be  assigned  to  oil 
trade. 
This transfer reduces by the same amount the tanker deadweight tonnage  still  to 
be ordered in the corresponding estimate. 
The  passenger  vessel  order-book  totalled,  in  January  1969,  490 000  grt  and 
previously, the small ship tonnage under construction or on order was  estimated, 
at the same date, at 480 000 grt. 
The new tonnage delivery needs for each of these categories calculated under the 
preceding paragraph, have thus been reduced by 0.5m.  grt each, on Table XLIII. 
Therefore, at the beginning of 1969, there remained between 127.5 and 183.7m. grt 
in orders still to be placed for ships to be delivered before 1 July  1980. 
When  restricting  needs  to  the  medium  term,  the  corresponding  figures  are 
respectively 34.1  and 73.9m. grt. 
In both cases,  the overall forecast:  146.7m.  grt in  the long term  and  47.9m.  grt 
in the medium term, is  situated between the minimum and maximum  alternatives 
of the sectorial analysis. As in the case of total delivery needs,  the overall forecast 
is  nearer the low estimate of the sectorial analysis. 
b)  Irregularities  in  the  rate  of  concluding  contracts  for  new-
buildings 
It seems  impossible  to  predict how  orders  still  to  be  placed will  be  spread  over 
the  future,  to meet the  foreseeable  newbuilding  needs.  In fact,  as  we  have  seen 
especially when discussing the OBO carrier problem, shipowners do  not decide to 
order ships according to these needs, but they rather consider the profits they can 
hope to achieve. 
The favourable  economic situation in shipping which  has lasted for  several  years 
has  continued  in  1969  and,  according  to Lloyd's  Register  of  Shipping  quarterly 
return, over 14m.  gross  tons  were ordered during the first  half of  1969. 
By comparison with all  the estimates of the need for  ships to  be delivered before 
1 July 1975, these orders represent a tonnage far superior to the foreseeable half-
yearly  average. 
6.  The medium and long term prospects of the newbuilding market 
In conclusion of this chapter and of the first part of this report, it must be stressed 
that,  despite  the  differences  which  have  appeared  between  both  studies  at  the 
various  stages  at which  comparisons  were  made,  the  sectorial  analysis  confirms 
the  overall  approach,  quantitatively in that its  high  and low  estimates  as  regards 
the  long  and  medium  term  prospects  of newbuilding  needs,  expressed  in  gross 
tonnage, fall either side of the figur,es arrived at by the overall approach. 
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 a)  T h e  t r e n d  t o w a r d s  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  n e w b u i 1 d i n g  n e e d s  e x p r e s s e d 
in grt is steadier in  the long term than in  the medium one 
These needs, converted into annual average deliveries  according to the calculation 
made in table XLI can be considered as  being on the low side  having  regard to 
the level of world deliveries reached in  1968. 
But medium and long term forecasts  cannot be compared with the results  of one 
year only;  the  only basis for  a valid comparison is  the  average recorder during a 
period of equal duration:  thus the annual average of newbuilding needs  to  which 
the  overall approach leads for  the long term-17m. grt-must be compared with 
that  of  deliveries  actually  registered  from  1  July  1957  to  31  December  1968, 
which  amounted  to  10.7m.  grt.  In  the  same  way,  the  medium  term  forecast  of 
15m.  grt  per  year  is  to  be  related  to  the  tonnage  actually  delivered  between 
mid-1962 and late 1968, i.e.  12.4m. grt on average per year. 
As regards the medium term, the comparison of forecasts with past results reveals 
from  one  period  to  the  other  a  growth  in  the  average  world  demand  for  new-
buildings of about 20% ; this corresponds to  an annual growth rate slightly higher 
than 3%. 
The  same  comparison  made  in  the  long  term  is  still  more  favourable,  as  the 
increase  reaches  almost  60%  between  the  averages  of  the two  periods  past and 
future and reveals a growth rate of about 4.5%  a year. It is  noteworthy that this 
rate betokens a good correlation with the average growth rate of the gross tonnage 
of the world fleet. 
Thus,  future  development  seems  steadier  if  considered  in the  long  term  than if 
restricted to  the medium term.  This difference is  explained by unavoidable incon-
sistencies in the rate at which orders are placed. As regards deliveries, these incon-
sistencies  level  off,  but less  when  the  period  is  shorter. 
In the short term, the effect of the ordering pattern is more noticeable and explains 
the fact that the gross tonnage of ships delivered during a given year can be lower 
than the corresponding figure  of the preceding one. 
b)  The  gross  ton  is  an  inadequate  unit  on  which  to  base  an 
accurate  estimate  of  the  newbuilding  demand  which  world 
shipbuilding  will  have  to  meet 
Newbuilding demand cannot, however, be considered from the quantitative aspect 
of  gross  tonnage  only.  In fact,  though  the  grt,  which  is  basically  a  measure  of 
volume,  is  still  a  valid  unit,  despite  its  shortcomings  for  estimating  in terms  of 
capacity, the newbuilding needs  of the whole world fleet,  it is  no longer the case 
when these newbuilding needs are considered as a measure of the potential demand 
on  the  international shipbuilding  market. 
The  qualitative  aspect  then  becomes  more  important  and  the  sectorial  analysis 
has shown that the future ordering pattern, i.e.  orders still to be placed from early 
1969 onwards, would  differ,  as  regards  the  distribution  of types  of  ship  between 
the long and medium terms. 
In fact, up to 1980, almost 59% of the tonnage to be ordered should be single-deck 
units  of large  size  but relatively  simple  structure,  intended  for  carrying liquid  or 
dry bulk commodities. However, this proportion is  only 43.7% for the part of this 
tonnage to be delivered  before mid 197 5. 
104 Consequently,  in  the  medium  term,  the  sectorial  analysis  suggests  that  demand 
will  mainly  concern  cargo  vessels,  passenger  vessels  and  small  ships,  these  units 
being mostly sophisticated and of high relative value. 
The  construction  of  these  specialized  ships  requires  from  shipyards  many  more 
working hours per gross  ton produced than for  tankers,  bulk carriers  and  OBO's 
which  have  provided,  in  recent  years,  the  major  part  of  the  increase,  in  gross 
tonnage,  of world  shipbuilding production. 
It was  in  order  to  obtain  a  better  assessment  of  the  effects  of  this  foreseeable 
change in the orientation of world  newbuilding  demand,  that the notion of com-
pensation  of  gross  tonnage  has  been  introduced  before  passing  on  to  the 
second part of this  survey,  which  concerns  the estimated  output potential  of the 
world's shipyards. 
This concept of compensation was introduced more than ten years ago in France, 
when the administration had found it necessary to have a unit which could measure 
the shipyards output more accurately than by gross  tonnage. 
The compensated ton is  a unit equal to  the gross  ton proper as  regards standard 
cargo  vessels  over  5 000  tdw.  For  the  other  types  of  ships,  coefficients  for 
increasing or decreasing  this  ratio were  established,  according  to  the  number  of 
hours  necessary to complete  1 grt in the various categories  of ships,  according to 
type  and size. 
On the international front,  the concept of compensated  tonnage  was  adopted by 
the  AWES  (Association  of  West  European  Shipbuilders)  in  1967  and,  more 
recently,  by the Shipbuilders' Association of Japan. 
The  compensation  coefficients  adopted  by  the  AWES  are,  however,  somewhat 
different from  the French system(1)  and were  adopted in  this  report since  we  are 
dealing with the world situation here. 
At all  events,  whatever the system  of compensation, the  estimate in  compensated 
tonnage is  a better basis  for  considering the future  supply and  demand  situation 
in  shipbuilding over  the  next few  years. 
c)  E s tim ate  d  demand  i n  com pen s a t e d  t o n n age 
Starting from  the completed sectorial  analysis,  an  attempt can be  made  to  make 
an approximate estimate of demand in cgrt. For the fraction of demand concerning 
tankers,  the  distribution  between  large,  medium  and  small  tank  vessels,  which 
served for the conversion from deadweight tonnage to gross tonnage can be taken 
as  a basis.  We  thus  have  a  distribution  from  which  to  calculate  a  compensated 
conversion rate which, applied to deadweight tons, directly gives compensated tons, 
provided that the corresponding rate for  each of the three categories is  available. 
These  particular rates  can be calculated  by  converting  the  product  of  the  ratio 
already adopted between gross  tonnage  and deadweight tonnage,  into  the AWES 
compensation  coefficient  which  is  suitable,  on  average,  to  the  category.  (This 
calculation is  shown on table XLIV.) 
(1)  For this  reason,  in  France,  the  AWES compensated  tonnage  unit  is  known  as  "tonneau 
de jauge brute pondere" (weighed grt). 
105 For refined product transportation, the coefficient is 0.80. For medium-sized ships, 
a coefficient of 0.42, which is  intermediate between that of tankers of 80 000 tdw 
to  160 000 tdw  (0.40)  and the  one foreseen  for  the  50 000 tdw class  (0.45)  but 
nearer  the first,  was  adopted.  In the  same  way,  as  regards  very  large  ships,  a 
coefficient  of  0.32  was  chosen,  closer  to  that  of  vessels  of  250 000  tdw  and 
over (0.30) than to that of 160 000 to 250 000 tdw units (0.35). 
For bulk carriers, the slack demand expected makes it possible to consider them as 
one category, without any great risk of error. The AWES coefficient chosen is 0.47, 
i.e.  between  that of  ships  of  50 000 to  100 000  tdw  (0.45)  and  that of  vessels 
of  30 000 to  50 000 tdw (0.50),  but also  nearer the  former. 
The problem, however, is  more intricate for the other merchant cargo vessels,  i.e. 
cargo  vessels  in  general,  which  already  represent  between  30  and  45%  of  the 
orders still  to be placed from  1 January  1969 onwards,  calculated in deadweight 
tons,  according to whether  the low  or high  estimate  of  the  sectorial  analysis  is 
adopted,  and  rise  from  35%  to  over  50%,  in  terms  of  the  estimate  in  gross 
tonnage,  despite  the  fact  that small  ships  and  passenger  vessels  are  covered  by 
this category. Therefore the relative importance of demand for cargo vessels  must 
become preponderant in terms of compensated tonnage,  since,  for  all these ships, 
the AWES coefficient is  equal to or above  1,  but the range is  wide  as  coefficients 
vary from  1 for  tramps to  2 for refrigerated cargo vessels. 
Under  the  circumstances,  compensation  coefficients  according  to  main  types  of 
cargo vessels have proved essential. A hypothesis made by Working Group No. III 
of the Liaison Committee,  for  the distribution  of  demand,  served  as  a  basis  for 
the estimate, in value,  of future orders; it has already been used to convert dead-
weight tonnage into gross  tonnage. 
Tt  was  therefore considered that the  demand for  "other cargo vessels"  would  be 
distributed  as  follows:  tramps  (20% ),  high-sea  cargo  liners  (60% ),  container 
ships (10%), reefers (5%), other specialized vessels and small cargo vessels (5%). 
These percentages  are applied  to  forecasts  indicated in  tons  deadweight for  both 
the low and high estimates.  All  these categories have a well defined AWES coeffi-
cient, except the last one. 
Since the category of specialized ships and small cargo vessels is not homogeneous, 
its  composition had to  be  estimated.  It was  supposed  that,  among  small  cargo 
vessels  to be ordered,  many would  be of the roll-on,  roll-off  handling  type,  and 
could  be  considered  closer  to  ferries  (coefficient  2)  than  to  cargo  vessels  under 
5 000 tdw (coefficient  1.6) whilst  others  would  be  small  container ships  used  as 
feeders, the AWES coefficient of which should be at least equal to that of high-sea 
container  ships  (1.9).  Furthermore,  this  category  includes  specialized  ships,  the 
coefficient of which is 2 or above. This is why a coefficient of 1. 9 has been adopted 
for this sector of demand. 
Table XLIV shows the results of the conversion into compensated tonnage of the 
new  orders required,  calculated  by  the  sectorial  analysis  in  deadweight  tonnage, 
for both the high and low estimates. 
Anticipated  orders  for  small  ships  and passenger  vessels  were  also  inserted  and 
their gross tonnage was directly converted into compensated tonnage. 
106 A  compensation  coefficient  of  1. 8  was  applied  to  the  category  of  small  vessels. 
It was  chosen in consideration of the  growing portion of very specialized vessels 
having a coefficient close or superior to  2,  in the orders for  ships  of this  size. 
For the whole period it did not appear unreasonable to  count half  these vessels, 
the  other half consisting  of less  specialized  ships,  with  a  coefficient  of  1.6,  like 
normal cargo vessels of less than 5 000 tdw. 
As  to passenger vessels, it was assumed that newbuilding demand might be equally 
divided  between  car  ferries  and  cruise  liners,  the  tonnage  for  the  latter  being 
possibly a little higher, since many car ferries  have been built in recent years. 
For this reason,  the  average compensation coefficient to  be applied  to  passenger 
vessels  was fixed  at 2. 7, which is  somewhat higher than the average  between the 
coefficient of passenger liners  (3)  and that of car ferries  (2). 
d)  Medium  term  demand  appears  steadier  when  converted  into 
compensated  tonnage 
The comparison between figures  given in Tables XLIII and XLIV shows that the 
long term  needs  for  new  ships  are  not very  different  according to  the  two  stan-
dards, when an overall view is taken. 
The demand estimated in compensated tonnage is,  on average,  6,2%  lower than 
the demand calculated in gross tonnage, but, as might be expected, the distribution 
according to types  of ship changes completely. 
Large single-deck vessels-tankers and bulk carriers-represent hardly more than 
25%  of  this  demand  in  compensated  tonnage  as  against  nearly  60%  in  gross 
tonnage. 
In the  orderbook  at  1  January  1969  these  same  ships,  including  OBO's  repre-
sented over 80% of the total amount in gross tonnage. 
On the whole,  delivery periods  are indeed longer or large  ships  than  for  medium 
and small sized vessels. 
This preponderance of large single-deck vessels  in  the demand of the recent past 
arises to some extent from an anticipation of requirements as  has been pointed out 
earlier. 
Consequently,  in  the  medium  term,  the  additional  orders  required  are  relatively 
low for this category of ship, the conversion coefficient of which is  well below 1, 
whereas for the other types of vessel,  the coefficient of which is  equal or superior 
to  1,  there is  some need to catch up with demand. 
The  distribution  of  future  demand  according  to  types  of  ship  is  thus  mainly 
explained by that of past demand.  But this  fact  implies  a  very  important conse-
quence for shipbuilders. 
In fact, regarding orders still to be placed after 1 January 1969 and to be delivered 
before  1 July  1975, the medium estimate  in  compensated tonnage exceeds  61m., 
i.e.  a level 22.7 higher than the one referring to the same demand in gross tonnage. 
Therefore, the medium term demand is  much steadier when expressed in compen-
sated tonnage than when estimated in gross tonnage. 
This point had to be stressed, in conclusion of the first part of the report, before 
studying the medium term prospects of newbuilding supply. 
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-PART TWO 
ESTIMATED FUTURE TREND OF  WORLD 
SHIPBUILDING SUPPLY 
CHAPTER  V 
METHOD ADOPTED 
1.  World supply in  terms of the sum of output capacities 
In the first part of this prospective survey we have tried to calculate the medium 
and long term trends of demand for newbuilding on the world shipbuilding market. 
These  trends  have  been  deduced  from  the  estimated  theoretical  needs  for  new-
buildings  which  depend  on the  foreseeable  rate of  expansion  and replacement of 
the world fleet. 
It is  therefore appropriate to study at the same time the  trends of supply.  Supply, 
at any time, results from the combined building potential of shipyards in the same 
way as  demand is,  at the same time,  the result of owners'  decisions to have new 
ships built. 
In fact,  the international market on which  construction  possibilities  and  require-
ments should be matched, is far from being perfectly open. At the level of political 
economy, many artificial factors of national origin entail distortions in competition 
and impede a work distribution, at the world level, in compliance with the theories 
of  complete  liberalism.  Also,  for  some  years,  this  world  market  has  tended  to 
be  divided,  from  the  technical  point of view,  into  sizes  and even  types  of  ships: 
supplies of and demand for  very large tankers do not interest simultaneously the 
sam~e group  of owners  and  builders  as  supply  of  and  demand  for  small  cargo 
vessels. 
These special markets, however, are not insulated from each other, and the many 
possible  substitutions between neighbouring categories  of  ships  will  contribute  to 
bind the evolution of each sector to the evolution of the whole market. 
Thus,  theoretically,  it  is  absolutely  legitimate  to  try  to  estimate  the  trends  of 
world  supply which, at any time, must be the amount of work required from  all 
the  yards  operating  on  the  international  market.  As  with  demand,  there  is  a 
difference in time between the tender and the delivery of the ship ordered, because 
of  the  time  spent  before  commencing  the  ship  and  then  needed  to  build  her. 
But  an  extremely  detailed  sectorial  analysis  would  have  been  necessary  to  take 
into account this difference in time, and it was not possible to carry it out. Conse-
109 quently  it has  been  assumed  that,  in the  future,  the  trends  of  supply  of  new-
buildings  would  vary  in  accordance  with  the  development  of  the  shipbuilding 
capacity of all the yards in the world. 
In this way, short term fluctuations, which may easily disguise  significant realities, 
are left out.  However,  with  this  procedure,  the  amount  of  supply  in  relation  to 
demand at any time will  not be exactly determined.  Nevertheless,  as  demand has 
been measured in the first part by the average tonnage required per annum, it is 
not illogical,  in the second part, to estimate the  supply according to  total annual 
output capacities. 
2.  Study of the  development of output capacities  limited in  the  medium term 
In the  field  of  supply,  it has  not seemed  necessary  to  extend  the  study  beyond 
the limit of the medium term, since it is obvious that theoretical capacity, obtained 
by estimating the future production of ships, cannot develop, in the long term, very 
distinctly  from  demand.  This  theoretical  capacity  will  tend  to  approximate  to 
actual production which,  still in the long term,  will  depend on foreseeable  needs. 
On the other hand, in this survey, it was necessary to devise a method of comparing 
the  development of world  shipbuilding  output capacity,  from  the  quantitative  as 
well  as  qualitative  point  of  view,  with  the  demand  expected  up  to  1975.  This 
capacity can be forecast according to the level reached now and present or planned 
investments, as  well as  in  the light of forecasts concerning variations of manpower 
and productivity. 
The study of these factors  denotes,  even in the  medium term,  a  great  margin  of 
uncertainty as regards both the  developments  of each and their mutual influence 
on each other. 
This  general observation has  confirmed the  working  group's  opinion  that it was 
useless to try to extend such forecasts  beyond the  197  5 limit. 
3.  The concept of output capacity in  the  shipbuilding  industry 
In  the  field  of  shipbuilding  it  is  far  more  difficult  to  determine  the  concept  of 
output capacity  than it is  in other  branches  of  activity,  in  which  so  many  tons 
per  day  are  processed  or  produced,  or  so  many  units  of  relatively  fungible  or 
homogeneous product as  oil,  steel or even cars. 
The variety  of  types  of  ships  built in the  world  is  considerable  and  it  seems  to 
have  kept  increasing  since  steel  construction  began.  Furthermore,  the  different 
types of ships are subdivided more and more into classes  of size.  The differences 
between the ships built by the various yards in  one year make it difficult to find 
a common method for estimating total output and it is even hard to determine from 
which  elements,  in  each case,  the  most  realistic  production  capacity  is  likely  to 
be  obtained. 
a)  G r o s s  t o n n a g e  a n d  c om  p e n s at e d  t o n n a g e 
The traditional standard unit measuring merchant ships  is  the gross registered ton 
(grt), which is  generally adopted to calculate the shipyards' output. Unfortunately, 
due to the diversification of technical development already mentioned above, which 
110 has marked shipbuilding since the end of World War II, the gross registered ton is 
not as  significant as originally, and is  no longer suitable for  taking all  the relevant 
factors  into  consideration,  as  shown,  for  instance, by the fact  that,  in value,  the 
gross  ton of  a  cargo-liner  is  five  times  more  expensive  than that of  a  mammoth 
tanker. 
At the  end  of  the  first  part of  this  report,  the  concept  of  compensated  gross 
registered  ton (c.grt)  has  been introduced.  This  unit is  calculated  by  applying  a 
minimizing  or  maximizing  coefficient  to  the  gross  ton  of  each  group  of  ships, 
classified  by  type  and,  if  necessary,  by size. 
This  unit corresponds  much  better  to  the  value  added  by the shipyard  than the 
conventional evaluation in  gross  tonnage. 
Up  to now,  however,  the application of compensated tonnage has  been  restricted 
to statistics made within the AWES (Association of West European Shipbuilders). 
But this  unit was  introduced  in  1967  only,  and,  with  the  exception  of  France, 
where a similar method has been used  for  about 10 years,  there are no statistics 
made  out in  this  unit  for  earlier  years. 
In  1968,  the  Japanese  shipbuilders  accepted  to  adopt  the  compensated  gross 
registered  ton  for  their  statistics  on  production,  but  those  of  Lloyd's  Register 
covering world shipbuilding, except a few  socialist countries, are still calculated in 
gross  registered tons.  Consequently, when trying  to  study the past trend of world 
shipbuilding,  only figures  in gross  tonnage are  available.  The comparison can be 
made from one year to the other, because the evolution of techniques is  not suffi-
ciently rapid to modify the average value of the gross registered ton to any great 
extent in such short period of time. But this is  not so in the case of longer periods. 
Within  the  scope  of  this  survey,  however,  world  output  since  1960  has  been 
estimated in compensated gross tonnage; the figures obtained have been compared 
to  world  production  in  gross  tonnage  as  publ,ished  by  Lloyd's  Register.  The 
c.grt/grt ratio diminished during that period, from 0.9 in 1960 to 0.8 in 1965-66, 
and further to 0.7 in 1967-68. (1) 
It can therefore  be  assessed  that the  recent  swell  in  annual  output figures  and 
orders of the world shipbuilding industry reflects to a large extent that more very 
large ships  are being built.  The actual increase in output capacity is  thus  not so 
paramount as  it seems  when only figures  in gross  tonnage  are considered. 
b)  Lack  of  uniform  interpretation  of  production  criteria 
Still  greater than the difficulties  in accurately measuring  the  actual  output of the 
world's shipyards is  the lack of precision of the concept itself of output capacity. 
Each shipyard, taken individually,  must be in  a  position to  assess  if  its  achieved 
or anticipated output corresponds more or less  to its optimum capacity, calculated 
according to its  own financial,  social and technical data.  But individual  situations 
vary considerably throughout the world, first between the various national industries 
and  then between each firm  in  any  country. 
Even in the same country, shipyards differ,  in size  and type of ships built, labour 
force  employed,  equipment  available,  working  methods  applied  and  importance 
of complementary or connected activities  (repairing,  engine-building,  etc  ... ). 
(1)  Cf. the relevant curves on Figure E  in  chapter VIII. 
Ill This is why the c.grt is  not a completely satisfactory unit, particularly when trying 
to  make forecasts.  The evaluation  of production  in  compensated  tonnage  is,  to 
a certain extent,  related to  the  types  of ship  and categories  of shipyard involved. 
4.  Fluctuations of supply  in  shipbuilding 
a)  P a s t  e x p e r i en  c e 
In the past, considerable fluctuations  were  observed in world  shipbuilding  output 
calculated in grt and the newbuilding supply had to  show great elasticity in order 
to  satisfy the rapidly growing demand,  especially in the  periods  after both world 
wars. 
In 1919, launchings  all  over  the world  reached  7m.  grt and  this  level  of  annual 
output was obtained again only in 1942. In 1943, world production was nearly twice 
as high as in the preceding year and reached almost 14m. grt for the countries 
covered then by Lloyd's Register of Shipping returns alone. 
On the other hand, during the  depression,  a very rapid decline  in the production 
rate was  noticed.  From 1930 to  1933  annual launchings fell  from  2 200 000 grt 
to  less  than 5  00 000 grt. 
Over a more recent period, i.e.  since the end of the Second World War, the level 
of  7m.  grt  was  reached  again  only  in  1957.  That  of  14m.  grt  has  been  only 
exceeded since  1966. 
In the meantime, from  1959 to  1961, world shipbuilding output suffered a period 
of decline corresponding to the fall-off in freight rates which followed the re-opening 
of the Suez Canal after its first blocking. 
Since  1962,  in  order  to  comply  with  requirements,  the  increase  of  which  has 
accelerated in  the course of  the last few  years,  most shipyards have been able to 
raise their production in grt,  despite a reduction in the labour force  employed in 
the industry in the main producing countries. 
At the  beginning  of  the  period,  this  increase  was  mainly  due  to  the  Japanese 
shipyards which succeeded in satisfying half the world  demand for  newbuildings, 
calculated in grt,  thanks to  a dynamic  policy which  has  been sustained  since  the 
Korea  war  and  openly  supported  by  the  Japanese  Government.  In  fact,  this 
Government has  seen that selling to foreign  shipowners is  a means  of developing 
exports  without coming  up  against  geographical  quota  or  tariff  walls  which  are 
limiting international expansion of other  Japanese industries. 
In recent years,  however, the West European shipyards, which had stayed on the 
defensive too long, have, in their turn, recorded a strong increase in business and 
set vast investment programs in order to hold or to recover a competitive position 
on the international scene. 
b)  Conditions  of  the  recent  increase  in  the  level  of  the  world 
shipbuilding  output 
This  increase  in  production  was  made  possible  by  different  methods:  overtime 
work, shift work, employment of labour force and equipment of other activities for 
shipbuilding, subcontracting, even of the hull of certain ships. 
112 Thus,  as  in  the  past,  shipbuilding  has  shown  great elasticity which,  even  taking 
into  account  the  growing  proportion  of  world  production,  now  building  large 
vessels,  has made it possible to raise the output, in grt,  of  many shipyards,  from 
20  to  30%, without the yards  having had  to  change  the  structure of their  pro-
duction facilities. 
However,  mainly  during recent  times,  considerable  investments  have  been  made 
and others are planned. 
With  the  accelerated  trend  towards  large  tonnages,  mammoth  building  docks, 
powerful  hoisting  devices  and  automation  of  steel  hull  production  have  been 
introduced  and  the  result  has  been  something  of  the  nature  of  a  technological 
revolution. 
Although  these  achievements  were  often  accompanied  by  the  dismantling  of  old 
installations,  they do, in most cases,  result in an increase in the potential of  pro~ 
duction  facilities  of  the  main  Japanese  shipyards  and  of  a  certain  number  of 
European  ones. 
Despite  the  mechanization  and  automation  of  production  methods,  a  bottleneck 
exists at present as to manpower, due to the world-wide tendency towards a reduc-
tion  of the labour force  in the industry,  which  has  already been mentioned.  The 
main shipyards are, however, undertaking training programmes, in order to obtain 
a skilled labour force and reach their target of increased output. 
c)  Adaptation  of  future  demand 
Under the circumstances, the comparison between the foreseeable  development of 
the  output capacity and newbuilding needs involves  two  distinct questions: 
1.  Taking  into  account  the  discrepancy,  which  will  remain  in  the  foreseeable 
future,  between  the  target  theoretical  capacity  and  the  actual  maximum  output, 
will  world  shipbuilding  be able  to  satisfy  expected  medium  term  demand  quan~ 
titatively  and  qualitatively? 
2.  What is  the proportion  of  the  actual  annual  output of  the  world's  shipyards 
which  corresponds to  the elasticity of  the newbuilding supply,  in the  short term? 
This  second  question  has  to  be  asked,  as  it does  seem  that the  demand  of  the 
recent past has noticeably anticipated future short term needs for  newbuildings. 
It would thus seem normal that a slackening in the rate of ordering should occur 
in the near future. 
This  slackening,  the  extent  and  duration  of  which  cannot  be  foreseen  because 
they basically depend on aleatory factors,  could, however,  be sufficient to  entail, 
at the level of deliveries  (the correct difference in time being taken into account), 
a  reduction in the  output of ships  completed  per  annum,  if not in  compensated 
tonnage, at least in gross tonnage. 
A  phenomenon of  this  type,  frequent in  the past,  is  not  alarming  on the  world 
scale as long as it remains within the normal limits of the elasticity of newbuilding 
supply. 
At the level of individual companies,  the problems resulting from a possible fall-
off in business  are  different  in  shipyards  which  have  increased  their  output  by 
113 basing themselves on the "labour force" factor, from those in the shipyards which 
have invested in  transforming the very structure of their production facilities. 
In fact,  to  be  able  to  base  an opinion  on valid  statistics,  it would  have  been 
necessary to clearly check what represents  a  real increase in  the  output capacity 
and what is due to the elasticity of the industry, when considering the spectacular 
increase in world shipbuilding. 
Such  an  analysis  would  make  it  possible  to  introduce  a  concept  of  "optimum 
capacity" which would correspond to the output reached by shipyards with normal 
utilisation  of their  facilities  and labour  force. 
To study this  question,  it would  be necessary  to  consider  the  main  shipbuilding 
countries individually,  and, within each one,  the different situations in each ship-
yard. 
5.  Survey  among the  shipbuilders'  associations  of the  main  countries 
It was of course impossible to obtain a reply from every shipyard in the world or 
even to take a sampling on which a survey could be based. Therefore the working 
group  decided  to  question  the  shipbuilders'  associations  of  the  main  maritime 
countries directly, asking them to fill in a questionnaire concerning the future short 
and medium-term evolution of the output capacity of their industry. 
With two  or three  exceptions,  the associations  concerned  were  quite  prepared to 
cooperate,  but  some  replies  were  contradictory  or  lacking  in  coherency.  Thus, 
this  investigation has been rather difficult to  act on; in order to make the global 
figures  meaningful, it has been necessary to fill  the blanks by extrapolating from 
answers  given  by the  same  association  to other  questions  or by  analogy,  based 
upon replies provided by other associations to the same question. 
Of the subjects dealt with in this questionnaire which included tonnage produced, 
labour force  and maximum size  of ships,  the working group  has  considered  that 
only  forecasts  of  output  capacity  expressed  in  gross  tonnage  and  compensated 
tonnage could be utilized. 
These standards, as has been mentioned above, are far from being perfect, but their 
comparison clarifies the medium term prospects of the supply and demand situation 
on the international newbuilding market. 
Considering the buoyant situation on· this market in early  1969, when this inquiry 
was  made,  it  is  not  surprising  that the  answers  reveal  outstanding  prospects  of 
growth in the output capacities of the main shipbuilding countries, calculated in grt. 
On the other hand, the difficulties of recruiting the necessary labour force in most 
major  shipbuilding  nations  may  explain  that  the  growth  forecasts  for  output 
capacities,  as  measured in c.grt,  have  been very  moderate. 
The  estimates  based  on  this  inquiry  must  therefore  be  considered  cautiously. 
They will serve to show a tendency towards a theoretical output capacity, but not 
to  foresee  the  optimum  output that might  be  achieved  by the  shipyards  in  the 
world in any given year. 
At all  events,  actual output will  be inferior  to  theoretical  capacity  because  ideal 
conditions  never  occur  everywhere  at  the  same  time,  and,  apart  from  factors 
114 Likely  to affect the possibilities  of supply itself,  the most important element is,  in 
the final  analysis,  demand,  not only from  the quantitative point of view  of total 
tonnage  to  build,  but,  even  more,  because  of  its  distribution  according  to  type 
and size of ships, on which the actual evolution of the ratio c.grt/  grt in production 
will  depend. 
115 CHAPTER  VI 
FORECAST DEVELOPMENT OF SHIPBUILDING 
PRODUCTION CAPACITY 
1.  Results of the survey among the shipbuilders' associations 
The analysis of the replies to the survey has made it possible to give  forecasts  on 
the  development  of  the  theoretical  production  capacity  of  world  shipbuilding 
between 1969 and 1975. 
The inquiry covers the expected output for the years 1969, 1970, 1971  and  1972, 
and  estimated  total  production  capacity  in  1975.  When  the  questionnaire  was 
drafted in early 1969, it was assumed that, due account being taken of the orders 
and investments in hand, the associations of the major shipbuilding countries could 
have a fairly exact idea of the production which might be actually reached in the 
first years of the coming decade. 
For  1975,  it was  more  difficult  to  ask  a  forecast  on  output.  This  is  why  the 
question  referred  to  the  maximum  expected  production  capacity,  taking  into 
account the present facilities  and the scheduled investment. 
Table XLV shows  the results  of this  inquiry,  successively  quoting:  the  Common 
Market shipbuilding countries,  the other member-countries  of the  Association  of 
West  European  Shipbuilders  (i.e.  the  United  Kingdom,  the  three  Scandinavian 
countries, Finland and Spain), Japan, the United States,  and the rest of the world. 
(Excluding USSR and People's  Republic  of China.) 
Figures concerning the  Common Market countries  and the  other West European 
countries are generally the result of aggregating the replies  provided;  however,  in 
some cases, it was necessary to fill  some blanks as  regards forecasts  on output in 
compensated  tonnage.  Figures  concerning  the  United  States  were  given  by  the 
American  Association.  On the  other hand,  the  forecasts  for  Japan appearing  in 
the  table  are  estimates,  for  lack  of  an  answer  in  due  time  from  the  Japanese 
shipbuilders  association.  (1)  In the  same  way,  forecasts  for  the rest of the  world 
are based on overall estimates. The bases of the estimates  are set out below. 
2.  Comments on the  findings  of the survey 
Once mention has been made of the uncertainties contained in the insertions which 
had  to  be  made  to  fill  the  blanks  in  the  replies  to  the  inquiry,  the  figures  in 
table XLV require some explanation. 
(1)  For  1969  and  1971,  however,  these  estimates  were  based  on  a  survey  issued  by  this 
Association. 
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 a)  D i s c r e p a n c y  b e tween  a c t u a 1  o u t p u t  and  the or e t i c a 1  cap a c i t y 
for  the  year  1969 
At the time of writing this  report, it appeared useful to  try to  estimate what level 
world  shipbuilding will  actually reach  in  1969, considering  the  output figures  of 
the first  two quarters and those of the two  preceding years.  It is  thus  possible to 
estimate  to what extent  the  forecasts  on output established  at  the  beginning  of 
the year, when the analysis of the inquiry was  made,  are likely to prove accurate. 
Table  XL  VI shows  this  estimate.  Figures  are  presented  according  to  the  same 
groups of shipbuilding countries  as  those  adopted in  table  XLV.  To indicate  the 
level  of activity  of the various  groups  in each  period  considered,  the  average  of 
ships  delivered  and  commenced  was  taken.  Deliveries  are  representative  of  the 
recent  past,  and  keels  represent  the  near future. 
This comparison was  only made in gross  tonnage, but this  unit gives  an accurate 
indication  of  the  variations  of  the  level  of  activity  of  the  various  groups  of 
countries. 
On a world scale, the distribution of ships,  according to  type  and size  in  produc-
tion,  cannot change  much in  such  a  short period  of  time  and  the  grt/  c.grt  con-
version factors will  vary only very progressively. 
It thus  seems  that  the  level  of  world  shipbuilding  will  increase  by  about  6% 
between  1968  and  1969. 
The actual figures  noted during the first two  quarters of  1968  and  1969 reveal  a 
slightly lower  increase,  but the estimates  made for  the  whole  year  1969  suggest 
that, in the last two quarters, particularly substantial deliveries and keellayings will 
be  recorded. 
In any event, an actual growth of about 6% is  relatively moderate, considering the 
increase of  14%  between  1967  and  1968, and in view  of the pressure  on world 
shipbuilding from  increasing orders,  bottlenecks  would  appear to  be having  their 
effect. 
The  forecasts  made  at  the  beginning  of  1969  in  fact  suggested  an  increase  of 
twice this  size,  of over 12%  in relation to average business in 1968, but it seems 
that only around 94%  of these forecasts  will  be  actually  achieved.  This confirms 
the fact  that these  forecasts  must be considered  as  dealing with  theoretical  capa-
cities,  targets  which  would imply,  if they  were  to  be reached,  that no disruptive 
element should intervene to slow  down the expected production rate.  These ideal 
conditions, of course, never occur in all the shipyards at the same time. 
Table XL  VI shows  that the  recent  evolution  of  the  big  groups  of  shipbuilding 
countries differs very much,  as  shown by the percentage increases in the average 
activity  of each in  1969,  as  compared with  1968. 
Too much importance must not be  attached  to  the  absolute  value  of  these  per-
centages  which  vary  strongly  in  some  cases,  according  to  whether  half  or  the 
whole year is  considered. This is inevitable because of the seasonal variations and 
of the existence of very large ships which represent a substantial part of the output 
of the main countries. 
A  tanker of  200 000 tdw  represents  about 100 000 grt  and the fact  that such  a 
substantial  tonnage  is  counted  in  one  period  or  another  can  explain  evident 
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 variations in percentage which,  in fact,  are not significant from  the point of view 
of long-term trends. 
Furthermore, the influence of the distribution according to type  and size  of ships 
delivered  and  commenced  is  more  noticeable  for  production  estimated  in  grt at 
the level of these groups than on a world scale.  The increased proportion of very 
large ships built is recent and came later in Europe than in Japan; thus, unfortuna-
tely,  the comparison cannot also  be made in compensated tonnage,  which  would 
have given a better perspective of the relative evolution of the major shipbuilding 
areas. 
Despite  these  statistical  difficulties,  some  clear  trends  emerge  from  the  recent 
development of the world's  shipbuilding  industry. 
First,  it can be noted  that the  Japanese production  will  remain  steady  in  1969. 
This fact confirms that the Japanese shipyards have reached a level close to their 
maximum theoretical capacity which would be reached at 96%  or more. 
More surprising is the fairly noticeable fall-off, in 1969, in West European countries 
outside  the  Common  Market.  It mainly  concerns  the  United  Kingdom  and  the 
Scandinavian countries. 
This  fall-off  seems  inconsistent with  the  expected  increase in theoretical capacity 
which,  according  to  statements  of  the  shipbuilders'  associations,  should  exceed 
the level  of average  activity in  1968 by 14%. 
This fact is  probably related to the difficulties encountered by the North European 
shipyards in recruiting manpower. 
On the other hand, the five  shipbuilding countries  of the  Common  Market seem 
to  be the more dynamic group,  since their level of activity in  1969 will  probably 
be  25% higher than in 1968, which was already 28%  above that of  1967. 
Theoretical capacity seems  to  have been reached in  1969; but this  is  due  to  the 
strong increase in  the  number of keels  laid,  which,  in  fact,  reflect  future  rather 
than  present capacity. 
The  relative  progress  of  the  Common  Market  in  shipbuilding  should  therefore 
continue into  1970. 
It is true that between 1960 and 1967 the European Economic Community suffered 
a  serious  setback  on  the  world  newbuilding  market.  At  the  beginning  of  that 
period,  its  share of the world  shipbuilding  market,  measured  in  launchings,  was 
equal to one third, whereas at the end it had dropped to  barely  15% . 
The increase  in the other countries'  output should also  be noted.  For the United 
States, whose building capacity is mainly utilized by the Navy, the percentages are 
not very significant, but reveal a recovery in the merchant ship  production. 
On the contrary, the "rest of the world" group shows  strongly expanding activity. 
This is  a heterogeneous group mainly composed of socialist bloc countries,  except 
the  USSR  and  China  (figures  not  available)  and  semi-developed  or  developing 
countries. 
The shipyards of this group do not find the same difficulties  as  those of the major 
shipbuilding countries in recruiting the necessary labour force  and,  in the future, 
their possible progress must be  taken into  account. 
121 Up to 1975, however, technological, commercial and financial factors may impede 
them  from  increasing  their  share  of  the  world  market  as  quickly  as  they  might 
wish.  In this respect, their progress in 1969 is already inferior, in percentage terms, 
to the one recorded in  1968 in relation with  1967. 
b)  Period  of  consolidation  at  the  beginning  of  the  next  decade 
For the first years of the coming decade, the expected increase in theoretical output 
capacity,  in  comparison  with  1969,  seems  to  be  moderate.  Shipbuilders  may 
anticipate a period of consolidation in 1970,  1971  and  1972.  The forecasts  made 
for  those  three  years  were  not  indicated  separately  in  table  XLV.  Under  the 
heading  "forecast  1971"  appears the  average  of  forecasts  for  output during this 
period and thus it seems possible to have an estimated output capacity comparable 
to the one for  1975. 
It is  interesting  to  note  that  the  European  shipbuilders  foresee  a  much  lower 
increase in the capacity expressed in c.grt than in the  capacity expressed  in  grt. 
This implies that they expect a growing proportion of their production to be repre-
sented  by very  large  vessels. 
In  so  far  as  Japan is  concerned,  the  level  of  9.8m.  grt  is  taken  from  a  recent 
Japanese survey which has no corresponding estimate in c.grt.  Nevertheless,  since 
large  vessels  form  a  substantial  part of  Japanese  output,  this  country  has  been 
credited  with  a  growth  in  compensated  tonnage  equal  to  the  growth  in  gross 
tonnage. 
The  American  forecasts,  curiously  enough,  reveal  a  decreasing  output  for  that 
period.  In fact,  this diminution is  due to the forecasts  given for  1970, which may 
be  explained by particularly important deliveries  of  ships  intended  for  the  Navy 
during that year. 
As regards the rest of the world, it has been estimated that the output in grt would 
keep increasing but at a slower rate than in the major shipbuilding countries.  For 
this  period,  a  certain  increase  in the  size  of  ships  built  can  be  expected,  which 
leads  one to adopt a  coefficient of  1 and thus  to  formulate the same forecast  of 
2.25m. tons in both tonnages. 
Taken as a whole, the forecast for 1971 indicates a world output capacity exceeding 
22m.  grt,  the increase of  8.3%  being essentially attributable to  a further  increase 
in the average unitary tonnage of ships, since the corresponding production in c.grt 
is  only 4.6%  higher than the capacity expected as  from  1969. 
c)  The  increase  in  the  theoretical  capacity  should  continue 
until  the  middle  of  the  next  decade 
To  establish  the  forecast  for  the  theoretical  capacity  of  the  world  shipbuilding 
industries during 1975, the replies of the national associations have generally been 
utilized  as  regards  Western  Europe and  the  United  States. 
On the  other hand,  the  evaluation  of  Japanese  output  capacity  is  not  deduced 
from  any statement from the country concerned. 
The  extrapolation  of  the  increase  which,  between  1969  and  1971,  is  given  by 
figures  of Japanese source, appearing in table XLV, would have led to a forecast 
output capacity of 10.6m. grt in 1973 and  11.3m. grt in 1975. 
122 However,  as  the  same source provided  a  forecast  of  10.8m.  grt for  1973, it has 
seemed more plausible to adopt the figure  of 11.5m. grt for  1975. 
The  forecast  in  c.grt  has  taken  into  account  the.  commissioning,  between  1971 
and  197  5,  of a  number of large  building  dock~ intended  for  giant  vessels.  This 
suggested a lower growth in output capacity in c.grt than in grt. 
For  lack  of  foliecasts  of  Japanese  origin,  some  uncertainties  remain  about  the 
capacity to be reached by the Japanese shipyards in  1975.  (1) 
Such is  also the case for the countries forming the group of "the rest of the world" 
about which there is almost no information available. 
To formulate a hypothesis, it has been supposed that their output capacity would 
keep developing in the same way as  the average  of the other countries, but with 
a  certain lag due to retardatory factors  peculiar to the  economic structure of the 
socialist and developing countries. 
Despite  these  elements  of uncertainty,  the  forecast  of  a  world  capacity  slightly 
above  26m.  grt  and of  about 17m.  c.grt for  197  5  seems  plausible.  In fact,  when 
comparing these  figures  to the forecasts  for  1969  and  1971, it  appears  that the 
expected increases remain in line with early development. 
On the whole, in relation with  the forecasts  of theoretical capacity for  1969, the 
anticipated increase does  not exceed  29%  in  grt and  16%  in  c.grt.  The  annual 
growth rate is thus 4.22% if the capacity is estimated in gross tonnage and 3.05% 
if  compensated tonnage is  the unit of measurement. 
d)  Medium  term  e v o 1 uti on  of  the  grt/c.grt  ratio according to fore-
casts  made 
Table XLV shows, under each heading, the conversion factor which  gives  output 
figures  in compensated  gross  registered  tons  when  applied  to  those  expressed  in 
gross registered tons. The variety of these factors may seem surprising, but it does 
correspond to the  strong disparities  noticed  between  the  different  factors  appro-
priate to the various groups of countries when referring to launchings in 1968, the 
last year for which figures are available, in the two units, for most countries. 
In particular, between Japan and the United States,  the conversion  factor  ranges 
from simple to double, due to the fact that the production of Japan covers a very 
high  percentage of large tankers and bulk-carriers, with conversion factors  much 
below  1,  whereas the output of the United States consists  of sophisticated ships, 
generhlly of small size. The average gross tonnage of ships launched in the United 
States in 1968 amounted to 2 216 grt whereas the corresponding figure  in Japan 
was 7 69  8 grt. 
For the whole of Western Europe, the conversion factor  is  between  those  of the 
United States and Japan.  But it must be noted that,  as  regards  the  group  of the 
Common Market shipyards, this factor is  somewhat above the one resulting from 
the information supplied by the other West European countries.  The difference is 
due to  the substantial Swedish  output, within the latter group,  including,  like  the 
Japanese production, a high number of large single-deck ships. 
(1)  The international maritime press  has circulated a  recent survey,  by Mr Onozuka,  General 
Manager of the Hitachi  Shipyard,  which  estimates  the capacity  of the  major Japanese  ship-
yards in 1975  at 12.5m. grt. 
123 For  the  rest  of  the  world,  for  lack  of  information  on  output  in  compensated 
tonnage,  the  factor  of  conversion  chosen  has  been  1.05,  thus  slightly  above  1, 
because this production comprises a high number of ships (441) the average gross 
tonnage  of which  is  relatively low  (3,750  grt).  On the  whole,  for  the  world,  the 
average conversion coefficient is  0.69 c.grt for  1 grt, launched in 1968. 
The same general conversion coefficient is  found for  the forecast  of world output 
in  1969. In fact,  the replies to the survey did not show  a considerable change in 
the conversion factors  of the various countries which supplied forecast launchings 
both in  grt and in c.grt for  that year. It can simply be noted that the statements 
of the West European countries outside the Common Market indicate a relatively 
noticeable  reduction  in  the  conversion  factor.  For the  Common  Market,  on the 
other  hand,  a  very  slight  increase  is  noted,  which  must  not be  given  too  much 
importance. 
The  conversion  factor  for  the  United  States  remains  stable  and,  for  the  other 
countries, the same figure  as  the one adopted for  1968 has been kept.  The same is 
true for Japan; the statistics of the first half-year do not suggest important changes 
in relation to 1968 as  regards the distribution of output according to types of ship. 
For longer range forecasts,  the  situation changes  and there  appears  a  noticeable 
reduction in the conversion factors.  They fall  from  0.68 in  1971  to 0.65 in 1975 
for  world  output.  This  reflects  the  generally  held  view  according  to  which  the 
average increase in the sizes of ships is  to continue due to increased production of 
mammoth  tankers,  OBO's  and  even  bulk carriers. 
However,  an  exception  is  constituted  by  the  United  States  which,  contrarily  to 
the world trend, forecast a much stronger increase in the output capacity in com-
pensated tonnage than in gross tonnage, which suggests that the American shipyards 
expect that the proportion of fast sophisticated ships in their production will  keep 
increasing. 
The forecasts communicated by the European shipbuilders' associations imply that 
these  yards  estimate  that a  growing part of  their  output  will  be  in  large  single 
deck  ships,  the  conversion  factor  of  which  is  well  below  1. 
By  197  5,  the  difference  which  now  exists  between  the  conversion  factor  of  the 
Common Market shipyards and that of the other West European countries will have 
almost disappeared. 
As  for  Japan,  it  has  been  assumed  that,  according  to  the  general  trend,  the 
conversion factor would drop again,  after  1971, reaching 0.5  in 1975. 
In the rest of the world, it seems logical to suppose that the trend towards increasing 
average sizes will  also entail  a reduction in the factor  of conversion.  It has  been 
deemed to be equal to 1 in 1971  and to fall to 0.95 in 1975. 
Considering the very heterogeneous nature of this  group which comprises socialist 
countries as Poland, East Germany and Jugoslavia as well as developing countries, 
such as  Brazil or India, these  assumptions  are of course very hazardous, but the 
significance of possible errors is  small because of the relatively low percentage of 
output of this whole group. In fact,  the forecasts for 1971  and above all for 1975 
are intended as  an indication of theoretical output capacity,  and variations in  the 
market situation will certainly affect actual production to a far greater extent than 
124 the  margins  of  error  implied  by  the  assumptions  made  when  the  gaps  in  the 
replies to  the questionnaire were filled  in. 
3.  Foreseeable  trend of the  relative  importance  of the  main shipbuilding  areas 
Starting  from  the  figures  shown  in  Table  XLV,  it  has  seemed  interesting  to 
analyse,  in Table XL  VII, the foreseeable  development of  the respective  share  of 
the major shipbuilding areas in world output up to 1975. The basis of comparison 
is  launchings in 1968  and the estimate is  made for  each year considered, on one 
hand in gross tonnage and, on the other, in compensated tonnage. 
It must be noted that the 1968 percentages are calculated according to real output, 
whereas  those  of  1969-71  and  197  5  correspond  to  theoretical  capacities.  Where 
relative  values  are  concerned,  however,  the  series  appears  to  be homogeneous 
enough. 
During  the  period  considered,  the  share  of  the  "minor  shipbuilding"  countries 
does not change much, amounting to about 10% in grt and 15% in c.grt. 
Within  the  group  of  major  shipbuilding  areas,  the  comparison  is  particularly 
interesting  between  Japan  and  Western  Europe.  The  share  of  Japan  tends  to 
decrease  slightly,  falling  from  over  49%  to  44%  in  gross  tonnage  and  from 
38% to 34% in compensated tonnage. Conversely, the share of the West European 
shipyards increases, rising from 38.4% to 43.8% in gross tonnage and from 43.5 to 
4  7.4%  in compensated tonnage.  The table shows  the special development of the 
5 shipbuilding  countries  of  the  Common  Market,  whose  share  in  gross  tonnage 
rises from  16.6% to 21 %  and, in compensated tonnage, from slightly below 20% 
to nearly 25%. 
Despite  the  many possibilities  of  error  involved  in  such  forecasts,  they  make  it 
possible  to estimate that during the  first half of the next decade,  the  percentage 
of the world output capacity reached by the Common Market countries, expressed 
in  gross  tonnage,  will  amount to  a  minimum  of  about 20%. This  level  means  a 
considerable improvement on the position during the last three years,  but it must 
be  borne in mind that the share of the  Common Market countries in world laun-
chings, stated in gross tonnage, was  20.4% in 1964 and 33.7%  in 1960. 
The output capacity forecasts established in c.grt show a relative increase of activity 
somewhat  higher  than  that  suggested  by  grt  figures.  This  seems  logical  if  the 
Common Market shipyards are to keep their traditional role as builders of sophisti-
cated vessels. 
Consequently, the forecasts  made at present by the Common Market shipbuilders 
are not unreasonable,  at least relatively,  when considered alongside  those for the 
general  trend  of  world  output  capacity.  The  point,  however,  is  whether,  with 
regard to really possible future output, in the coming years, all over the world, the 
Common Market shipyards will  be in a position to secure a sufficient number of 
orders to achieve the position they are aiming at. 
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127 CHAPTER  VII 
FORESEEABLE TREND OF NEWBUILDING SUPPLY 
AND  COMPARISON  WITH  EXPECTED  DEMAND 
1.  Supply  potential estimated in  relation  to available  delivery  capacity 
Once the foreseeable increase in theoretical world shipbuilding output capacity has 
been estimated, it is  advisable to define how the shipyards'  optimum shipbuilding 
possibilities will develop in the course of time, taking into account existing orders 
at the beginning of the period, i.e.  on 1 January 1969. 
That is  why  the  questionnaire  sent to  the  Associations  of  the  main  shipbuilding 
countries  asked  for  a  breakdown  of  their  order-books  at  that  date  by  year  of 
delivery. 
Comparing each year's forecast  deliveries  and  theoretical  capacity,  we  obtain an 
outline of  the evolution of  the  newbuilding supply potential  corresponding to the 
delivery potential for new orders placed after 1 January 1969. 
However,  theoretical  capacity  is  in  fact  always  higher  than  the  actual  delivery 
potential on the world scale during a given year. 
For 1969, the world  delivery estimates shown on table XLVI have been adopted 
and it is  seen that they are about 9% lower than the theoretical capacity. 
For  the  subsequent  years,  the  level  of  feasible  deliveries  can  be  estimated  by 
applying,  to  the  theoretical  capacity,  a  reduction  coefficient  identical  to  that 
resulting from  the figures  adopted for  1969. 
In fact,  the theoretical capacity forecasts  have  been based  on  the  assumption  of 
a  moderate  but continuous  increase.  It can  therefore  be  estimated  that  the  lag 
existing  at the  beginning  of  the  period  between  deliveries  and  output  capacity, 
should remain practically unchanged until the end  of  the period. 
For the period considered, from 1969 to  1975, a supply potential can be estimated, 
in gross tonnage and compensated tonnage, by finding the aggregate of total annual 
delivery potential which could then be compared to the demand potential calculated 
in the same units, according to the various estimates adopted during the first part 
of the present study. 
2.  Comparison  between  supply  potential  and  foreseeable  demand 
In fact,  the  prospects  of  the  market  look  different  whether  they  are  estimated 
quantitatively  in gross  tonnage  to  be  ordered  by  shipowners  or  qualitatively  in 
compensated tonnage to be produced by shipyards. The c.grt being the unit repre-
129 senting shipyards'  activity,  the latter comparison gives  a  much  better  account  of 
the future employment conditions of the actual capacity of the world industry. 
a)  Comparison  of  p o s sib  1  e  deliveries  and  expected  demand  in 
grt 
In table XL  VIII the world  shipbuilding order-book at  1 January  1969,  totalling 
49.2m. grt, has been classified according to years of delivery. 
This classification was made according to the replies from the various associations, 
but they  concerned  a  total  amount of  only  46.2m.  grt.  It was  thus  necessary to 
distribute the additional 3m.  grt corresponding to  small shipbuilding countries for 
which,  in general,  there exist no statistical data. 
Besides, some associations did not indicate the annual breakdown of deliveries and 
it was  necessary to make estimates  through extrapolations. 
The  annual  deliveries  mentioned  in  table  XL  VIII must  therefore  only  be  con-
sidered as  approximate figures. 
With the above reservations,  table XL  VIII can give  an idea of the distribution in 
time  of possible deliveries  of ships to be ordered after  1 January 1969.  The total 
accumulative amount reaches nearly 98m.  grt by the end of  1975, but this figure 
must be reduced to 86m. grt for  1 July 1975 to stay within the scope of the study 
of medium term demand. 
The comparison,  in  gross  tonnage,  of  potential deliveries  with  new  orders  to be 
placed after 1 January 1969, and commissioned before 1 January 1975, and listed 
in table XLIII, reveals a theoretical excess in newbuilding delivery capacity varying 
from  12m. grt in the case of the high estimate of the sectorial analysis, to 52m. grt 
according to the low estimate. 
The newbuilding needs corresponding to the low estimate amount to  only 34m. grt 
approximately and could, in theory, be entirely met by the potential supply as early 
as the end of the first quarter of 1973. 
The high estimate of demand, with 7  4m.  grt, would only cover the potential offer 
for  deliveries  up  to  the  end  of  197 4,  but then  no  ship  would  be  commissioned 
during the first half-year of  1975. 
It would  of course be  absurd  to  foresee,  even  in  theory,  that no  ship  would  be 
delivered in the world  over  a period of between 27  and 6  months,  up to  1 July 
1975. 
In fact,  this  "deficit" of needs in  grt will  be spread over  the  whole  period,  in  a 
way  impossible  to foresee,  since  it will  depend  on the  rate  at which  shipowners 
will  actually  place their orders. 
As  already emphasized,  this  rate will  depend  mainly,  not on the  actual  develop-
ment of world fleet  newbuilding needs,  but rather  on  the  international  economic 
situation and on the variations of the freight market. (1) 
Various  hypotheses  can  be  made  in  this  connection.  If,  as  some  may  think, 
international inflation shows  a  fall-off  in  1970 and the  freight  market records  a 
downward trend, due to the number of the vessels  commissioned, shipowners will 
(1)  Cf. for instance "Long Range Planning and Oil Tanker Supply and Demand in the 1970's", 
by R. Vaughan, in Transactions of North East Coast Institution of Engineer and Shipbuilders, 
May 1969. 
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 probably not utilize  all  the additional potential of deliveries  offered by the world 
shipbuilding industry in  1972 and  1973. 
Thus, the newbuilding  needs  still  to  be covered will  have  an impact on delivery 
levels at the end rather than at the beginning of the period considered. 
Should there be a  noticeable recovery in the freight  market in 1972-73  due  to  a 
slackening  in  deliveries,  a  fraction  of  the  tonnage  required  for  delivery  after 
1 July  1975, might  be  expected  to  be ordered  sufficiently  in  advance  to  entail 
anticipated  deliveries  wh1ch  would  take  place  at  the  end  of  the  earlier  period. 
But other likely  assumptions  could be formulated  about the short term develop-
ment of the maritime economy. 
In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the date of  1 July  1975, chosen 
as  a  limit  between  the  medium  and  long  term,  for  the  study  of  newbuilding 
demand,  corresponds  to  no  foreseeable  change  in  the  growth  rate  of  merchant 
fleet  requirements. 
Consequently, that date should not be regarded  as  representing  a  change  in the 
development of the international newbuilding market. 
As  regards  shipbuilders,  it should  be  noted  that the  anticipated  increase  of  the 
actual output of  the world  shipyards in gross  tonnage  is  unlikely,  in the medium 
term,  to  reach the regular  annual growth  rate  of  4.2%, rate  deduced  from  the 
forecasts  on theoretical  capacity. 
The quantitative  deficit  in newbuilding delivery  needs  calculated  in grt,  in com-
parison with the forecasts on output made in the same unit, will not be substantial. 
If the high growth estimate, formulated in the sectorial analysis, were carried into 
effect, it would  not exceed  14%, which  could easily be  absorbed  by the normal 
elasticity of newbuilding  supply,  even  if  the  deficit  were  not evenly  spread  over 
the  period. 
On the other hand, the low estimate of new tonnage required would lead, in grt, 
to  a level of deliveries 60%  below the potential supply of the world  shipbuilding 
industry.  In fact,  this  estimate would involve  a  combination of  all the low  alter-
natives of each sectorial forecast  and this is  most unlikely to happen. 
The  average  of the  low  and  high  estimates  of  the  sectorial  analysis  places  the 
tonnage required to  be ordered after  1 January 1969 and to be delivered before 
1  July  1975,  at 54m.  grt.  a  figure  close,  even  somewhat  superior,  to  the  one 
arriv;ed at by the overall approach which is about 48m. grt. 
For a comparison with supply for which a single forecast was established in gross 
tonnage,  it  seems  more normal to  retain this  average  estimate which indicates  a 
surplus capacity of around 3  7%. This percentage seems to exceed the limits of the 
normal  elasticity  of  the  world  shipbuilding  industry  and  would  mean  that  one 
could  not  disregard  the  possibility  of  medium-term  difficulties  for  the  world 
shipyards  within  a  context  of  fierce  international  competition,  if  supply  and 
demand were only compared in gross tonnage. However, this unit by itself can be 
misleading. 
132 b)  Comparison  of supply and  demand  in  compensated tonnage 
To make this  comparison, it is  necessary to calculate in compensated tonnage the 
delivery  potential  corresponding  to  the  expected  development  of  the  theoretical 
capacity, measured in the same unit, taking into account the distribution of orders 
according to year of delivery. 
Table XLIX shows the development of the potential of world newbuilding supply 
expressed in c.grt.  according to  the scheme adopted in Table XL  VIII for  supply 
expressed in gross tonnage. 
The annual  delivery potential likely  to  be  achieved  has  been deducted from  the 
expected theoretical output capacity, by applying the reduction coefficient already 
used for the estimate in grt. 
The  reasons  explaining  why  deliveries  are  always  inferior  to  the  theoretical 
capacity are valid whatever the unit adopted. 
However,  the estimate, in comnensated tonnage of the theoretical supply potential 
presents more difficulties than the one stated in gross tonnage. Orders at 1 January 
1969,  are  calculated  in  compensated  tonnage  by  the  AWES  and  Japanese 
statistics only.  The replies to the questionnaire supplied the figures  for the United 
States and Poland.  On the whole,  the "converted" orders amount to  28.7m. c.grt. 
for these countries, and correspond to 46.2m. grt. 
The ratio for this fraction of the world order-book is  thus 0.62 for 1 grt.  For the 
3m.  _grt.  remaining  on  the  total  order-book  of  49.2m.  grt.,  it  has  not  been 
possible  to  adopt the  same  ratio.  In fact,  it  concerns  orders  placed  with  minor 
shipbuilding countries  which  mostly  refer to low  tonnage vessels.  The coefficient 
adopted for tre production of this group of countries in  1968 and 1969, i.e.  1.05, 
has therefore been applied when estimating the corresponding orders in  c.grt.  We 
thus obtain an estimate of 31.9m. c.p:rt.  for the world order-book, which brings the 
c.grt./grt. ratio to  0.65 for all known orders at 1 January 1969.  This  estimate is 
shown on Table XLIX. 
As  regards  the  breakdown  of  these  orders  into  delivery  years,  in  compensated 
tonnage, the answers  to the questionnaire were jncomplete  and incoherent. It has 
thus  been necessary to  make  a  global  estim::1.te  based  on  the  expected  figures  in 
gross tonnage for  annual deliveries. by reducing the c.grt/  grt ratio each year, since 
the  ships to be delivered in the more distant future  are generally the largest ones. 
Therefore, for  1969, the conversion ratio of 0.69.  anticipated for  the  production 
of this year, has been retained. For deliveries in  1970, the ratio has been decreaserl 
somewhat and is 0.67. For 1971, a further reduction brings the ratio down to 0.65. 
This  figure  has to  be compared with  that of 0.68  for  the  forecast  output for  the 
same year. It is  normal that the latter should be inferior to the former,  since new 
orders  for  delivery  in  1971  mostly  concern  ships  with  compensation  coeffident 
equal or superior to 1, as the capacities of yards capable of producing large tankers 
and bulk-carriers are practically already employed for that year. 
As regards ships  on order at  1 January 1969. to be delivered in  1972 and  1973, 
the conversion coefficient has been considerably reduced to 0.40 and 0.30 respecti-
vely.  Only very large ships can be the subject of such long delivery dates. 
133 From table XLIX it appears that the potential of deliveries in compensated tonnage 
for  ships  to be ordered after  1 January 1969  and  to  be delivered  before  1  July 
1975, amounts to  about 50m. c.grt. 
If this figure is compared with the requirements for new ships to be ordered after 
1 January 1969 and calculated in the same unit in table XLIV, it can be noted that 
the  low  estimate  of  demand  in  the  sectorial  analysis  is  able  to  absorb  64%  of 
this  delivery  potential,  which,  in turn,  is  quite  insuffident  to  meet  the  demand 
foreseen  by the high  estimate  and  in fact  stands  at a level  roughly  equal  to  the 
figure  corresponding to the average  of both estimates  (61.5  c.grt). 
3.  Difficulty  of comparing supply  and demand since  the  expected  demand  differs  from  the 
one anticipated by shipbuilders as  regards the distribution of type and size of ships 
Does the expected distribution of demand, in terms of types of ship,  offer satisfac-
tory employment prospects, in the medium term, for the actual shipbuilding output 
capacity,  even  in  case  of  a  stabilisation  or  even  reduction  of  delivery  needs 
measured in grt ? 
This  question  is  significant,  since  it  appears  that  the  overall  surplus  capacity, 
revealed when comparing, in gross  tonnage,  the foreseeable  development of new-
building  supply  with  the  low  estimate  of  demand,  decreases  substantially  when 
assessed  in compensated tonnage. It even disappears completely,  as  regards  both 
total tonnage to be ordered and distribution of types  of ship,  in the event of the 
high  estimate of demand  becoming  reality. 
In fact,  one comes  to wonder what is  the value of the forecasts  made in c.grt as 
regards both demand and supply, and some remarks are to be made about it. 
a)  T h e  e s t i m at  e  o f  d e m and  i n  c.grt  a d d s  a  fur t h e r  d e g r e e  o f 
u n c e r t a i n I y  i n  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  f o r e c a s t s  m a d e  i n  grt 
First, it must be borne in mind that the bases on which the conversions of demand 
into  compensated tonnage were  made,  should  be carefully checked  and  precised 
by a thoroughly detailed study of transports, which would permit one to distinguish 
the prospects of orders for  every type of ships  forming  the world  merchant fleet, 
apart from tankers and bulk carriers. 
In fact, in the field of cargo vessels of all types and of other specialized ships, the 
forecasts  of the sectorial analysis  of demand were made more difficult,  due to the 
statistics of the fleet and shipping industry now available. 
The same remark is  to be made for the estimate concerning passenger vessels  and 
small coasters of less than 1 000 grt. 
Now  the  ships  required  in  these  sectors  form  the  greatest  part  of  the  demand 
assessed in c.grt. 
However, the sectorial analysis permits one to anticipate that the distribution of types 
of  ship,  in  demand  until  197  5  will  include  a  high  percentage  of  vessels  the 
construction of which requires a comparatively large number of working hours per 
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 ton produced. This qualitative aspect of the foreseeable  demand is  important and 
should be pointed out. 
b)  T h e  p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a c i t y  i n  c.grt  h a s  b e e n  e s t i m a t e d  a c c o r d -
ing  to  the  demand  expected  by  shipbuilders 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the forecasts  on capacity,  made both in grt 
and c.grt,  imply  some  hypotheses  of  distribution according to types  and sizes  of 
ship, of the world ship production. 
Now  these hypotheses  are in contradiction with  the  expected  distribution  of  de-
mand. 
If the c.grt were a unit giving an accurate account of the shipyards'  activities,  the 
shipyards'  production  capacity,  measured  in  this  unit,  should  be  perfectly  iden-
tical-things being equal-whatever the distribution of the yards' output may be, 
according to the various types  of ships they can build.  But the c.grt is  too recent 
a unit and neither its  bases  of estimate nor the  way  it is  used  are  accurate.  The 
estimates of capacity were most of the times  made in grt and then converted into 
c.grt. 
It can be assumed that the reduction coefficients used for large single-deck vessels 
are relatively accurate because they concern many units  of the same type built in 
recent years in all the major shipbuilding countries and for which there is  enough 
reference material. 
The forecast trend of world shipbuilding capacity shows  that it is  now orientated 
towards the completion of a growing proportion of large vessels with  a compensa-
tion coefficient well  below  1. 
Under  the  circumstances,  potential  supply  in  c.grt  reflects  the  capacity  of  the 
world's  shipyards  if this  estimate is  borne out,  but the  forecasts  may not remain 
valid  if  the composition  of demand is  the  one foreseen  by the  sectorial  analysis. 
c)  Sup p 1 y  and  demand  in  c.grt  w i 11  h ave  to  be  ad apt e d  to  each 
other 
The  shipbuilders  will  have  to  adapt themselves  to  such  demand,  and  it  can  be 
stated that even if the actual needs are close to  the high estimate of this  analysis, 
the industry wiii probably succeed in coping with the whole of shipowners' demand. 
The flexibility  it has  recently  shown  in  increasing  its  output in  grt  will  also  be 
available  if necessary to enlarge  its  capacity in c.grt. 
In this  connection,  it can also  be assumed  that the  highest  increase  coefficients, 
such  as  those  applied  to some  recent  types  of  ships:  container  ships  and  gas 
carriers,  for  instance,  will  probably  have  to  be  reduced  sooner  or  later,  when 
these sophisticated vessels are numerous enough to be built by more than a limited 
number of specialized  shipyards. 
In fact,  the c.grt is  a unit which  cannot be  defined  in absolute  terms,  and  must 
develop on  one hand according to modificaHons in the types of ships required and, 
on  the other hand,  according to  shipbuilding techniques  themselves. 
This is  why,  despite foreseeable difficulties  about the recruiting of labour, at least 
in the main shipbuilding countries, the estimates of future  capacities in c.grt may 
prove  to  be  too  moderate,  in  that  shipbuilders  will  succeed  in  adapting  their 
facilities  to the actual demand. 
136 considering the large discrepancy  between  the  composition  of  the  demand  anti-
dpated by shipbuilders and the one foreseen by the sectorial analysis, it would be 
necessary, in order to estimate more accurately the conditions under which medium 
term newbuilding supply and demand will  evolve,  to study the present and future 
capacities  of  the  world  shipyards  more  thoroughly,  and  also  to  consider  other 
factors in addition to  grt and c.grt. 
Such a survey could be based on the ideas  presented in the following  chapter. 
4.  The adaptability of world shipbuilding will enable it to meet the actual demand 
However,  taking into  account the information  obtained  about the  comparison of 
the  respective  development  of  newbuilding  supply  and  demand  until  1975,  the 
question set in chapter V  can be  answered  as  follows. 
Despite  the  moderate  growth  expected,  world  shipbuilding  production  capacity 
will  meet  the  foreseeable  demand,  even  that suggested  by  the  high  estimate  in 
the sectorial analysis,  but this  will  only be possible  if  some  shipyards  reorientate 
their  production effort. 
Indeed,  flexibility  of  supply  will  be  necessary  not  only  to  meet  quantitative 
variations  of demand,  but also-and possibly  more-to cope with  its  qualitative 
modifications. 
In  the  circumstances,  one  may  anticipate  a  demand  for  production  which  will 
provide  full  employment,  in  general  terms,  for  the  existing  world  shipbuilding 
labour force. 
Nevertheless,  one  cannot discount  the  possibility  of  the  balance  of  the  market, 
or  sections of it,  being upset,  at least temporarily,  between now  and  1975. 
137 CHAPTER  VIII 
FURTHER REMARKS ON NEWBUILDING SUPPLY 
1.  Lack of sectorial analysis of newbuilding supply 
Whereas with demand, the sectorial analysis has been used to  supplement and fill 
in the details of the overall approach in this  report, we  could only consider new-
building supply overall;  in other words,  the  world  shipyards'  capacities  were  not 
classified  according to types  or sizes  of  vessels  built. 
Obviously,  the boundaries that could be established  in such  a  study between the 
different classes of shipbuilders could not be very accurate and would  be subject 
to  many variations  in the  course  of time,  as,  in  spite  of  a  recent  trend  towards 
specialization, most of the shipyards still build many types of ship. 
There is,  however, some relationship between the size and scope of the equipment 
of a given yard and the maximum size of the ships it may produce. 
Besides,  from  the  technical  and  commercial  standpoint,  sophisticated  vessels  are 
generally built in yards having the required experience and, consequently,  a back-
ground which is  considered satisfactory by the  shipowners. 
The difference  in  standpoint noted in  the  previous  chapter,  according  to  whether 
the comparison between newbuilding supply  and demand was  based on estimates 
in  gross  tonnage or compensated gross  tonnage,  shows  that it would  be useful to 
undertake in the future-despite unavoidable inaccuracies-a sectorial  analysis  of 
supply according to  types  and  above  all  to  sizes  of ships,  to  be  compared  with 
that of  demand. 
2.  Actual output capacity is a single concept although it is expressed in  various units 
A  shipyard  or group  of  shipyards  has  one  single  output  capacity,  whatever  the 
measuring  unit  selected,  and  it cannot  be  admitted  that  any  given  shipyard  or 
group  of shipyards  shows  a  surplus  capacity  in gross  tonnage  and  not in  com-
pensated tonnage,  or vice-versa.  In fact,  any  given  yard or group is  equipped or 
anticipates  acquiring  the  equipment  required,  to  produce  so  many  ships  of  any 
given type and size according to its facilities, labour force,  experience and financial 
resources. 
Each year, the optimum output, which  a  yard tries  to  achieve  through  obtaining 
orders,  is  represented  by one  figure  in  gross  tonnage  and  another  one  in  com-
pensated  tonnage. 
It must therefore be considered that if a surplus production capacity has appeared 
on  an international scale  when  comparing supply  and  demand  in  gross  tonnage, 
it is  not simply an inflationary phenomenon that can be explained by the defects 
139 of the unit chosen. It may well be that this fact points to excessive investment in 
equipment for  building giant vessels  if  all the  programmes in hand or planned in 
this  field  are completed between now  and  197  5. 
3.  Comparison  between  the  foreseen  evolution  of  output  capacity  and  world  shipbuilding 
activity  from  1960 
From all the replies to the questionnaire provided by the shipbuilders' associations, 
except the United States,  it appears  that the foreseen  increase  of  the theoretical 
output  capacity  is  more  rapid  in  gross  tonnage  than  in  compensated  tonnage. 
As far  as  Japan is  concerned  and  although  the  shipbuilders'  association has not 
furnished  a  complete  reply  to  the  questionnaire,  it  is  clear  from  the  available 
information  regarding  the  equipment  and  plans  of  the  yards,  that  the  situation 
will probably be the same as  in the other countries under consideration. (1) 
Fig.  E  shows,  in  diagram  form,  the  expected  evolution  of  theoretical  capacities 
during the next five  years,  both in grt and  c.grt.  It makes use,  for  this  point,  of 
the  figures  given  in  table  XLV and  compares  the  evolution  of  the  two  curves 
representing world capacity in grt and c.grt with past trends of newbuilding tonnage 
output estimated from  annual launchings  since  1960. 
Launchings have been preferred to deliveries in this context since,  in spite of the 
fact  that  this  technical  operation  tends  to  lose  its  traditional  significance,  they 
provide,  on  a  world  scale,  a  convenient  and  fairly  accurate  evaluation  of  the 
shipyards' activity. 
The launching  grt  curve  is  based  on  the  figures  published  by  Lloyd's  Register, 
except for the year  1969 which has been estimated by the Working Group. 
The comparison between past and foreseen  development underlines  the fact  that 
the capacity forecasts for the next five  years correspond to a noticeable slackening 
of the increase rate recorded since  1963. 
We  find,  however, that the shipbuilders have projected the past trend towards  an 
increasing difference  between  the output curves  in  grt  and  c.grt  into  the  future. 
4.  Share of the major shipyards in  the future  capacity of the  world shipbuilding industry 
It is  with this  trend in  mind  that the recent shipyard modernization programmes 
have been put in hand.  According to a  study in the Japanese journal "ZOSEN", 
there were  already,  at the beginning  of  1969,  24  yards  in operation  capable  of 
producing ships of 250 000 tdw and over, whereas  10 more were under construc-
tion and 8 are to go  into service before  1975. 
Shipbuilders generally consider that for  a reasonable return on capital these faci-
lities must produce 4 to 6 ships per year on average. 
If we  choose the low alternative to take into  account the fact  that these  facilities 
are  still  only just going  into  service,  we  find,  for  each  unit,  an  annual  capacity 
of  1m.  tdw  if  the  average  tonnage  of  the  four  vessels  built  is  250 000  tdw. 
(1)  According to the above-mentioned study, by Mr Onozuka, in which the foreseen  capacity 
of the major Japanese yards in  1975  is  higher by  lm. grt than the figure  determined by the 
Working Group, it is  expected that in  spite of this increase of the foreseen  grt output figure, 
the  number of working hours in the  Japanese  shipbuilding  industry  will  decrease during  the 
1969-75  period and,  despite  the  expected progress  in  the  field  of productivity,  this  Japanese 
forecast  confirms  the  fact  that  the  capacity  in  c.grt  could  hardly  increase  more  rapidly  in 
Japan than in Europe. 
140 If we  multiply the number of  yards  now in service  by  6  years,  that of facilities 
under construction by 4 years-since most of them are to be commissioned at the 
end of 1970, or in 1971-and the planned facilities by 2 years, assuming that they 
will  start operating in  1973  only, we  reach a  total supply theoretical potential of 
200m. tdw for ships of over 160 000 to be built by 1975. 
Out of this total, 45m. were already on order on 1 January 1969. 
The remaining  available  theoretical capacity would  thus  be  155m.  tdw,  whereas 
the  total demand for  oil  tankers  of  all  types  is  considerably lower  than half this 
figure in the high estimate of the sectorial analysis. 
The facilities  of these major shipyards alone  would therefore  represent,  in  1975, 
an annual theoretical output capacity of some 40m. tdw, i.e.  20m. grt of 7m.  c.grt 
assuming that they would be used only for building oil tankers of the 250 000 tdw 
class. 
These figures  seem to show that the shipbuilders' associations have not taken into 
consideration the  total  theoretical  potential  of  the  major  shipyards  in  their  own 
capacity  forecasts  in  grt for  1975.  If this  were  so,  6m.  grt  only,  from  a  world 
capacity of 26m. grt would be left for the other yards. Now, in 1968, the 38 yards 
whose  annual launchings amounted to  a total of over  100 000 grt and the list of 
which  practically coincides  with  that of the  shipbuilders  who  have  completed  or 
are going to complete building facilities  for  ships  of 250 000 tdw  and over,  have 
together  launched  10.8m.  grt  out of  a  world  total  of  16.9m.  grt.  The  share of 
the  remaining  yards  thus  amounted  to  6.1m.  grt  and  it  seems  difficult  to  admit 
that  the  total  theoretical  output capacity  of the  same  yards  should  not  exceed, 
within six years, their actual  1968 output, whilst the capacity of  the  major ship-
yards  reached nearly twice  the level  of their  present output. 
Furthermore,  in compensated  tonnage,  the  major  shipyards  would  leave  for  the 
other builders in 1975 a theoretical output capacity of 9m.  c.grt. This would imply, 
for  the latter's production,  a conversion factor of  1.5  which  is  certainly too high, 
considering  the  estimates  of  type  and  size  distribution  which  have  prevailed  in 
the establishment of output capacity forecasts of the various shipbuilders'  associa-
tions. 
These  discrepancies  between  the  evolution  of  the  output capacity  of  the  major 
shipyards  alone  and the forecasts  made for  the world  industry as  a  whole,  show 
how  difficult  forecasts  on  shipbuilding  capacity  are,  owing  to  the  influence,  in 
this field,  of the type and size distribution of the ships that the builders expect to 
produce. 
In the case of the large building docks,  it is  obvious  that the  capacities,  both in 
grt and c.grt, would be very different if, instead of taking the production of 4 tankers 
of 250 000 tons as  a basis, these facilities were expected to be used for  building a 
larger  number  of  smaller  ships  of  different  types  or  a  lesser  number  of  large 
sophisticated vessels such as LNG tankers. 
5.  Probable increase of the world conversion c.grt/grt factor during the next few  years 
If we  now  consider  the  situation from  the  standpoint of  demand  as  expected  in 
the  first  part  of  this  study,  the  prospects  are  entirely  different  as  regards  the 
distribution of world production according to type and size  of ships. 
141 The orders still to be placed after 1 January 1969, for delivery until the beginning 
of 1975, represent 54m. grt, based on the average of the low and high estimates of 
the  completed  sectorial  analysis.  After  conversion,  this  average  becomes  61.5m. 
c.grt. 
In  other  words,  at the  basic  date  chosen  for  this  study,  the  average  conversion 
factor for  these future  orders is  1.14 whereas,  for  the  orders  already  booked,  it 
was  0.65. 
On the whole, for the delivery requirements of the period extending from 1 January 
1969 to 30 June 1975, the average conversion factor  is  0.91  and therefore close 
to  1,  whereas the output capacity forecasts  showed  a  decrease  of  this  conversion 
factor, for the same period from 0.69 to 0.65. 
The  errors  that may  have  been  made  in  the  conversion  of  the  tonnages  to  be 
ordered as well as  the uncertainties of the forecasts  themselves, may have resulted 
in  an  overestimation  of  demand  in  compensated  tonnage.  But if  there  has  been 
such an overestimation, it is probably not of sufficient size to explain the difference 
which has been noted. 
It therefore seems plausible that, contrary to the shipbuilders' forecasts, an increase 
of the conversion factor may occur during the  1970-75 period.  Such  an increase 
will  cause  the  actual output figures  measured  in  grt  to  come  closer  to  the  c.grt 
figures,  inversely to what has happened since  1960, and therefore in opposition to 
the direction taken by world  shipbuilding  output capacity. 
If we  refer to Fig.  E., we  find  at once that this  closeness prevents the increase of 
the  actual  world  shipbuilding  production,  measured  in  grt  from  continuing  to 
increase since the curve of the same output, measured in c.grt, cannot, in principle, 
exceed the ceiling constituted by the curve representing the foreseen  evolution of 
the  theoretical  output capacity  measured  in  the  same  unit.  In fact,  as  we  have 
seen  in  the  preceding chapter,  we  may consider  that this  future  output capacity 
in  c.grt  has  been  somewhat  underestimated  by  the  shipbuilders'  associations  in 
their forecasts for  the period up to  197  5. 
Nevertheless, we find that this unit provides the best correspondence between fore-
casts of output capacity and demand and we must therefore expect a medium-term 
increase of the actual output of the yards whose trend should not be very different 
from  that corresponding to  the output capacity curve in c.grt. 
The  average  annual  demand  in  this  unit amounts  to  15.1m.  c.grt for  the  period 
from  1969 to 1 July 1975. 
If this point were plotted on Fig. E, at the end of the first quarter of  1972, i.e.  at 
the  middle  of the period under consideration, it would  be located  slightly  above 
the output capacity curve. 
6.  The shipyards' ability to adapt to expected demand 
As  we  have seen  earlier,  there  is  a  substantial  discrepancy between  the  demand 
expected by shipbuilders and the demand foreseen  in the sectorial analysis,  espe-
cially regarding the type  and size  distribution  of  ships  in  the world's  production 
during the period up to  the middle of  197 5. 
142 It would therefore be advisable to define the conditions under which the necessary 
adaptation may be made. 
The following remarks can be  made in this respect: 
a)  As  an overall  average,  the  annual increase  of the  theoretical capacity in  c.grt 
expected  for  1969-75  is  only  3.05%  per  annum.  Such  a  rate  corresponds  to  a 
rather  slow  increase  in productivity  in  the  world  shipbuilding  industry  if  labour 
force  remains  constant,  or to a somewhat higher increase if  the reductions in the 
labour  force  and working hours  observed  during  the  past  few  years  continue  in 
the  future. 
In other words, the flexibility  of newbuilding supply during the past few  years as 
regards the increase of output measured in gross  tonnage,  should be much lower 
when  considering the situation in terms  of compensated  tonnage. 
However, as we have seen earlier, it is not impossible that, during a period covering 
6 years, it should prove necessary to reduce some of the increase coefficients which 
are  now  applied  for  the  specialized  ships. 
b)  The risk of overequipment in production facilities  for  very large vessels  does 
not imply unemployment in the yards equipped with  these  new facilities. 
On the contrary, it seems that all  their theoretical output capacity in  c.grt should 
probably be used to meet demand. 
c)  In the shipbuilding industry, the principle according to  which  "he who  can do 
more  can do  less"  is  widely  applicable  and  it  is  quite  possible  to  build,  in  big 
docks or on large slipways, ships much smaller than those of maximum size allowed 
by  such facilities. 
At all  events,  it is  better to  make use  of  existing equipment,  even  in inadequate 
technical conditions,  rather than leaving it idle,  and  this  reasoning is  even  more 
obvious in the case of new  investments which  have only  just commenced to pro-
duce a return on capital. 
d)  As  regards  production costs,  the  competitive  position  of  the  most  up-to-date 
yards  will  certainly not be as  good if sophisticated ships,  with  a  high  conversion 
coefficient,  are built instead of  series  of big single-deck ships. 
Effectively, the building dock or slipway is  only one part of the industrial concern 
formed  by a modern yard and it is  with large ships  in view  that,  in  general,  the 
lifting devices  and the metal production lines  have been designed  and,  as  far  as 
the latter are concerned,  rationalized  and  automated. 
Apart from  material factors,  the considerable changes  in  the types  of ships  built 
have  caused considerable problems in the rational use of shipyard labour forces. 
Under the circumstances, production problems may be encountered in these "super-
yards"  in building medium  sized  and/  or highly  specialized  vessels  and it is  only 
their high value per grt that will  render such contracts financially  attractive.  How-
ever,  although,  as  regards  turnover,  the  substitution  of  smaller  ships,  of  higher 
value  per unit,  for  bigger  ships  of lower  price per ton,  seems  to  bring  the  same 
end  result,  the  situation  is  quite  different  for  the  organization  of  the  shipyards 
themselves,  as  regards the use of production facilities  as  well as  the skill of labour 
and staff. 
143 e)  The foreseeable medium-term fall-off in demand for large oil tankers and bulk-
carriers will  cause the major shipyards to intensify their marketing efforts for  the 
other types  of  ships  so  as  to  obtain  the  necessary  orders  enabling  them  to  take 
advantage at least of their output capacity in c.grt,  although failing  to  reach their 
objectives  in grt.  However,  as  their  equipment will  not be used  at the  optimum 
level,  they will  have to take this factor into consideration in respect of the prices 
they will  quote on the international market. 
This phenomenon will make the competition of the major shipyards less dangerous 
for  the other yards than it could be expected at first sight. 
f)  During the next few  years,  no other shipbuilding country seems likely to  enjoy 
such a tactical position of advantage of  a  social  and economic nature,  as  that of 
Japan during the shipbuilding crisis which characterized the beginning of  the last 
decade. 
In fact,  the wage increases  granted by the Japanese  yards in the  past few  years, 
have been relatively more rapid, on average, than those of most of their European 
counterparts. 
This  evolution has noticeably diminished  the difference  in cost prices  which  was 
favourable to the Japanese yards and had enabled them to absorb  a considerable 
part of the  additional demand recorded  since  1962. 
In  the  circumstances,  it  will  probably  be  in  the  interests  of  the  Japanese  ship-
builders, during the next years, to fight against a decrease of the newbuilding prices 
on the international market,  contrary to  their  attitude  during  the  maritime  crisis 
subsequent to  the first  closure  of the Suez  Canal. 
The appearance on the international market of the yards of the socialist countries 
is  too recent and marginal a phenomenon to allow,  especially taking into  account 
the lack of flexibility of planned economic systems, to consider that some of them 
could  become,  between  now  and  197 5,  the  possible  successors  of  Japan  in  a 
dominant position on the newbuilding international market. 
In spite of these reassuring elements, there are still serious doubts  as  regards  the 
possible medium-term development of the newbuilding international market. 
The  essential  adaptations  will  be  difficult  from  both  the  technical  and  financial 
points  of  view.  They will  therefore be likely to  entail,  if  they  are  not scheduled 
sufficiently  in  advance,  deteriorations  in  competitiveness  for  a  certain  time,  at 
least for some types of ship. 
Furthermore,  it is  possible  that,  once  this  adaptation  has  been  carried  out,  the 
actual capacity in c.grt of the major shipyards may prove to be much higher when 
building a high percentage of sophisticated ships,  than in the  case  of  a complete 
specialization in the production of very large vessels. 
In order to give a more complete answer to the questions raised by the adaptation 
of newbuilding supply to  the  future  requirements  of  the world  merchant fleet,  a 
very detailed survey on the present building potential of the world shipyards would 
be  needed.  Such  a  survey  would  allow  a  better  evaluation  of  the  possibility  of 
developing  this  capacity  according  to  the  type  and  size  of  ships  in demand,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  hand,  the  flexibility  of  the  main  production 
144 factors,  among  which  we  can list:  labour force,  equipment,  supply  sources  and 
financing requirements. 
Thus, it would be advisable to take into consideration other criteria in addition to 
demand and output tonnages since, in spite of the  advantages in this field  of the 
notion  of compensation,  the  AWES  c.grt system  remains  too  closely  dependent 
on the grt because it is  not possible to multiply and/  or modify the compensation 
coefficients frequently enough to adapt them to the changing realities of production. 
In the  absence  of  such  surveys,  it  seems  however  reasonable  to  think  that  the 
development of the newbuilding world  market during the  next few  years  will  be 
better  for  the  shipbuilders  than  it  appears  from  the  plain  comparison  between 
supply and demand in grt. 
Furthermore, the whole of the world supply and demand do not, in practice, meet 
on the open international newbuilding market.  Certain domestic  orders-and not 
the smallest ones-are practically reserved,  de jure or de facto,  for the yards of 
the  shipowners'  country. 
It would therefore be advisable to classify supply and demand forecasts  not only 
according to ship  types  but also  according to flags  and shipbuilding  countries or 
groups of countries. 
The Working group had not the time nor the means to carry out such surveys which 
exceeded  widely  the  limits  of  a  medium-term  and  long-term  prospective  study 
of world newbuilding supply and demand. 
However,  they  wish  to  observe,  at  the  end  of  this  second  part  of  the  report, 
covering the evolution of the shipyards' capacity, that the influence of the situation 
prevailing  on the  international  market  must  not  be  exaggerated,  as  regards  the 
prospects  of  any  national  shipbuilding  industry  considered  separately. 
Indeed, in most national industries, the peculiar contingencies of the local economy 
play  a  pre-eminent  part and  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  their  weight  could  be 
sufficient to  cancel  most  of  the  effect of external factors. 
The above remark will be further commented in the second part of the conclusions 
of  the  present report in  which  will  be  discussed  the  particular  prospects  of  the 
group  formed  by  the  shipbuilding  industries  of  the  European  Economic  Com-
munity. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
A.  Medium  term  economic  prospects  of  the  world  shipbuilding  industry 
1.  The shipbuilding industry  belongs to a strongly growing economic sector:  that of sea-borne 
trade 
In finishing this survey, it appears essential to stress that, contrarily to a widespread 
opinion, the shipbuilding industry is  by no means threatened by technological and 
economic development. On the contrary, it is  an industry which is  growing rapidly 
as shown by the statistical data gathered in table L, opposite. It shows, in the form 
of  indices,  the  past  trend  of  the  main  economic  factors  retained  in  the  overall 
approach  because  of  their  relevance  to  shipbuilding,  and  compares  them  with 
some of the main basic indices  of world  economy,  as  calculated by the Statistical 
Office  of the United Nations. 
All these indices have a basis of 100 in the year 1963, in accordance with current 
practice in international statistics,  and their evolution can thus be compared quite 
accurately.  This  table  shows  that  the  most  rapidly  increasing  index  is  that  of 
sea-borne trade volume. It has nearly doubled between  1959 and  1967, whilst the 
other most dynamic indices,  those which indicate the production of manufactured 
goods,  the  share  of  transport in the  gross  domestic  product  and  the  volume  of 
international  trade have  increased  by  three  quarters  only. 
These  compared  developments  emphasize  that  the  share  of  sea-borne  trade  in 
international commerce is  growing  and confirm that ships will  remain  an irrepla-
ceable means of communication. However, the growth of the world merchant fleet 
is  less  rapid  than  that of international  sea-borne  trade.  This  is  explained  by  a 
regular  improvement in productivity  and  to  a  lesser  extent by the  fact  that the 
growing  number of large  ships  implies  an increase in  the  fleet  gross  tonnage less 
rapid than the one of its  carrying capacity expressed in deadweight tonnage. 
2.  Prospects of maritime economy deduced  from  past  trends 
Table  LI gives  a  biennal  summary  of  the  past  trends  of  the  economic  factors 
relevant to shipbuilding,  the ones  already detailed  in  Table L,  and extends  them 
to  1980  in  accordance  with  the  forecasts  formulated  by  the  overall  approach. 
The  forecasts  of  the  sectorial  analysis  are  also  mentioned,  in  1975  and  1980, 
regarding the sea-borne trade and the merchant fleet. 
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 The growth of the world merchant fleet, converted into indices by table L, reached 
47%  during  the  period  1959-67,  which  is  a  figure  very  close  to  the  increase 
noted by the indices of the Gross National Product of the OECD countries. 
The overall  approach,  used in  this  report to  disclose  the medium  and long-term 
trend of future newbuilding demand, has noted the double correlation showing the 
dependence of the increase of the world fleets'  gross tonnage on the growth of the 
developed  countries'  GNP,  through  the  logical  intermediary  of  the  volume  of 
sea-borne trade. 
The forecasts appearing in table Ll express, in terms of indices, basis 100 in  1963, 
the figures  given by the overall approach which,  on the assumption that the past 
correlations will be maintained, are based upon the forecast of an increase of the 
sum of the OECD countries' GNP at the average rate of 4.5% per year until 1980. 
We  shall not revert to  the reasons for  the  selection  of  such  growth  rate,  but we 
shall stress again that it is  a conservative estimate.  (1) 
Despite this reasonable level of the economic growth rate on which the correlation 
retained by the overall  approach is  based,  the increase in the volume  of interna-
tional  sea-borne  trade,  remains  rapid,  as  the  index  indicates  that it  will  double 
over ten years (level  202 expected in 1973)  and treble over  17  years,  in relation 
to  the basic year  1963. 
The  low  estimate  of  the  sectorial  analysis,  carried  out  simultaneously  with  the 
overall approach, confirms its forecast exactly. The high estimate would lead to an 
increase  of  10%  in  the trade  expected  in  1980. 
For world merchant fleet  tonnage,  the forecasts  of the overall approach include a 
growth  parallel  with  that  of  the  OECD  countries'  GNP  which  implies  that  its 
productivity will keep rising at the same rate as  in the past. 
3.  Foreseeable  trend  of newbuilding  demand  in  grt 
At the foot  of Table LI, in the form  of indices,  the  total gross  tonnage  of ships 
delivered in the world is  shown,  and from  this  a retrospective  assessment can be 
made  of  the  demand  placed  on  the  international  shipbuilding  market  to  satisfy 
the newbuilding requirements of the world merchant fleet. 
The forecasts  of  the  overall  approach  having  made  it  possible  to  calculate  the 
future  needs  for  deliveries  in  the  form  of annual  averages  for  the  two  periods 
covered by the report,  1969-75  and  1975-80, the first  one lasting six  and a half 
years  and  the  second  one  five  years,  it  has  appeared  more  homogeneous  to 
present past achievements  under  the  form  of five  year  moving  averages  of  the 
annual  delivery  figures. 
In this  series,  the basis  of  100 is  thus  provided by the  average  of newbuildings 
delivered, measured in grt as published by Lloyd's Register of Shipping each year, 
(1)  A  prospective  Japanese  survey  carried out by  Mr Onozuka,  General  Manager  of the  big 
Hitachi shipyard, dealing with the "Japanese Shipbuilding Industry in  1980"  takes,  according 
to press abstracts, the same basic factor to estimate long term newbuilding demand. For this 
forecast, the annual growth rate retained has been 4.8% with a low alternative at 4.6 and also 
a  high alternative at 5%. The latter annual rate is  also used in a  study  issued  by the Ship-
builders' Association of Japan to assess world demand for new ships by 1973. 
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 for  the period 1961-65 in the middle of which is  situated the year  1963 retained 
as a basis for the other indices. 
We  thus  have  a  means  for  comparing in indices,  on Table LI, the  development, 
foreseen by the overall approach, of newbuilding grt demand, with the  economic 
factors  which control it.  During the next decade, it seems  that the expected levels 
of deliveries for both periods considered will  keep pace with the growth of world 
merchant fleet.  The average of the indices measuring that growth at 1 July  1975 
is fixed at 163, a figure which is  not far from the index of average annual demand 
which is  situated, for an approximately equal period, at 159.  For the period from 
1 July 1975 to 1 July 1980, the average of the indices, corresponding to the fleet 
tonnage  at the  beginning  and end  of  the  period,  is  212,  as  against  210  for  the 
index  of  average  annual  demand  during  the  same  period.  The  forecasts  of  the 
sectorial analysis are very near the overall forecasts for the second period. 
4.  Change  from  the  phase  of expansion  to  a  possible  phase  of stabilization  of world  new-
building gross  tonnage  requirements 
Though this report is  essentially a long and medium term prospective survey,  and 
though,  in  this  perspective,  the  foreseeable  trend  of  newbuilding  needs  confirms 
that shipbuilding is a growing industry, the Working Group has thought it advisable 
to  examine  more carefully the  change from  the  present phase of expansion  to  a 
possible  phase  of  stabilization.  At first  sight,  the  medium  term  forecast  of  the 
overall  approach  suggests  a  plateau in the  development  of  demand:  index  159, 
which  estimates  deliveries  in  grt for  the  period  1969-75,  is  almost  at the  same 
level  as  the one corresponding to  the period  1965-69. 
However,  this  global  stabilization  of newbuilding  requirements  expressed  in grt 
is,  in fact,  as shown by the sectorial analysis,  the result of foreseeable movements 
in  opposite  directions  within  the  various  sections  of  the  world  merchant  fleet. 
The medium  term  needs  for  tankers  and bulkcarriers  are  low  owing  to  a  parti-
cularly brisk recent demand  for  these  types  (including  OO's  and  OBO's)  whilst 
the other sections of the fleet,  relatively neglected during the recent years,  require 
substantial investments in the near future. 
The distribution by types  of both past and future  demand will  produce different 
effects on world shipping and shipbuilding during the early seventies. 
a)  A  phase  of  stabilization  seems  necessary  to  restore  the  ba-
lance  within  the  world  merchant  fleet 
The sectorial  analysis  has  shown  that,  in  the  recent  past,  the  sector  on  which 
demand had probably anticipated too widely on the needs of the coming years, is 
that  of  bulk carriers.  But it may  happen  that,  for  some  other  types,  the  com-
missioning of the ships now on order, will  entail temporary surplus capacities in 
various  sectors  of  the  merchant  fleet.  The versatile  OBO  carriers  are  adding  a 
rapidly  growing  element  of  uncertainty  as  regards  the  future  balance  between 
demand and supply of transport capacity in oil,  and/  or dry bulk trades. 
These risks  would  appear if the current policies  of  economic restraint applied  in 
the  main  developed  countries  caused  a  fall-off  in  the  growth  rate  of  sea-borne 
trade, which has been particularly high in the last two  years. 
151 Because of its very dynamism, the sector of sea-borne trade is  very vulnerable to 
variations in the international economic situation; in  the past, several fluctuations 
have been experienced. However, for the future, the developed countries' economic 
policies  would  probably entail a  steadier  development. 
If the  sector bulkcarriers  seems to  be  more  in danger in  the event  of  a  slacken-
ing  in the  demand for sea-borne trade,  a  consequent drop in freight  rates would 
not  affect  this  sector  only.  The  existence  of  the  above-mentioned  fleet  of 
OBO's, which should increase rapidly, according to the recent pattern of ordering, 
implies  that the field  of  oil  transport would  be seriously  affected,  whilst the lack 
of  precise  boundaries  between  bulk-trade  and  general  cargo  trade  would  mean 
that  the  sector  of  cargo-vessels  would  probably  suffer  also.  Consequently,  if  a 
substantial  and  durable  surplus  capacity  appears  in  one  sector  of  the  merchant 
fleet,  it can be  expected that the whole  freight market would be concerned. 
b)  The  level  of  activity  in  world  shipbuilding  should  remain 
high  during  the  stabilization  period 
As  regards shipbuilding, such a situation could have beneficial effects in the long 
term if it accelerates the obsolescence of ageing ships and causes not only layings 
up but also  a strong increase in the rate of scrapping. However, in the short term, 
past experience proves  that shipowners'  orders for  new  ships  decrease  when  the 
freight  market is  weak. 
In any event,  the change from  the  expansion  phase  to  one  of stabilization  must 
result in  much less  marked fluctuations  for  deliveries  than for  orders.  As  world 
orders reached, in July 1969, the peak level of 54.75m. grt, representing work on 
hand spread over several years for  the main shipbuilders, the change from expan-
sion  to  stabilization  would  only  entail  for  them  a  decrease  in  their  orderbook 
without consequences to their level of activities, which, besides, cannot be accurately 
estimated according to  the single criterion of  gross  tonnage of ships built. 
The distribution of demand according to  types  and sizes  of ships  is,  indeed, more 
important  for  shipbuilding  than  its  overall  volume  in  grt.  The  conversion  into 
compensated tonnage of the medium term requirements for  new orders,  as  calcu-
lated by the sectorial analysis,  makes  it possible to give  a more accurate forecast 
of  newbuilding demand likely  to  materialize  in  contracts  placed  after  1  January 
1969, for  tonnage to be delivered  before  1 July  1975.  These new  orders  should 
mainly  concern cargo liners  and sophisticated  vessels,  the building  of  which  will 
require many more man/hours by grt than bulkcarriers and tankers. 
Accordingly,  despite the  overall stabilization of grt newbuilding requirements, the 
demand foreseen  should entail a moderate but real growth  in the  average  output 
of the world shipyards measured in c.grt, between now and 1975. 
5.  Future potential production of the  world shipbuilding industry 
In the  second  part of  this  report,  the  study  of  the  prospects  of  the  newbuilding 
output capacity  has  been  voluntarily  restricted  to  the  medium  term,  because  it 
has  been  deemed  that,  in  principle,  in  the  long  term,  capacity  cannot  follow  a 
different trend from that of demand. It also  appears that the period of change in 
the cycle  of newbuilding demand should probably occur during the  first  years  of 
the next decade. 
152 Despite the relative proximity, in time, of the years covered by the inquiry carried 
out by the  Working Group,  the  data obtained have proved difficult  to interpret. 
However, some  factors  likely to  influence  the  medium  term  situation  as  regards 
newbuilding supply have been covered to some-extent and they are discussed below. 
a)  T h e  t a r g e t  p r o d u c t i o n  c a p a cit  y  f or  1 9 7 5 ,  i n  grt 
Though production capacity expressed in grt does not reflect the activity of ship-
yards  very  accurately  (viz  IX-5b hereunder),  the  Working  Group has  thought  it 
useful to make the following remarks:  the newbuilding needs calculated in grt for 
the period 1969-75 do not in  any case, even according to the highest estimates of 
the  sectorial  analysis  of demand,  tally with  the aimed growth of the world new-
building output capacity, as  estimated in the same unit, according to the forecasts 
given by the main shipbuilders' associations. 
It must be stressed, however, that these forecasts obviously deal with a theoretical 
output  capacity,  which  can  be  achieved  only  on  the  assumption  that  the  best 
technical  conditions  of  operation  of  the  existing  equipment  would  be  fulfilled. 
These conditions will be fulfilled only by shipyards continuously building the biggest 
vessels corresponding to their present or planned facilities.  In practice it is  obvious 
that this ideal level of production cannot be reached by every shipyard at the same 
time  all over the world nor by a single  yard during the whole  period under con-
sideration. 
The experts of the Working Group therefore assumed that the total maximum poss-
ible  output cannot exceed  an actual  level  which  would be  some  10%  below  the 
theoretical  world  output capacity.  This  assumption is  confirmed for  1969; at the 
current level of production recorded during the first half of the year, world ship-
building will  not reach the  annual theoretical  output forecast by the  shipbuilders' 
associations  at the beginning of the year.  This fact is  particularly significant  at a 
time when the buoyant state of the market is  an incentive to almost every yard to 
reach the maximum possible level  of output. 
Moreover  the investigations  emphasized the  flexibility  shown  during recent years 
by the newbuilding supply and the  ability of the  industry to  adjust its  output to 
short-term changes in demand by increasing or decreasing subcontracting and/or 
overtime.  The normal range of this flexibility is  plus/minus 10-15%  but it seems 
that the maximum level has nearly been reached, taking into account the facilities 
and labour force  available at the present time. 
Nevertheless, in  conformity with the growing long term trend of the demand, huge 
investments  have  been or are being  made  in many shipyards.  These investments 
are  most  often  intended  for  the  construction  of  large  vessels  and  they  have 
increased  the  theoretical  capacity of  world  output,  estimated  in  grt  in  this  field 
and will  continue to  do so. 
b)  The expected growth of the world output capacity is moderate 
when estimated in compensated tonnage 
Because of the increase  in  the  average  tonnage  of ships  produced in the  last ten 
years,  the  use  of  grt  to  estimate  the  shipyards'  output  capacity,  according  to 
tradition and  the statistical data of Lloyd's Register  of shipping,  may give rise  to 
serious  errors  of  judgement particularly in the  field  of forecasts,  which  are  very 
often a projection of past trends into the future. 
153 This is  why the forecasts of output capacity have also  been made in compensated 
tonnage.  Besides,  the  c.grt is  a  unit which  represents  shipbuilding  activity  much 
better than the grt as  it is  adjusted in principle, in proportion to the value  added 
by the builder, which, in an assembly industry, is  more or less  proportional to the 
number of hours spent. 
The main obstacle to the progress of ship production during the present expansion 
phase is,  in most countries, the  shortage of labour force  which is  still widespread 
despite all  the attempts to recruit new workers.(1) 
Under the circumstances,  it is  not surprising  that the  forecasts  of the theoretical 
capacity,  expressed  in  c.grt  only  show  a  moderate  growth  rate  for  world  ship-
building taken as  a whole. 
c)  A  possible  surplus  of  giant  tanker  production  facilities 
does  not  imply  a  world-wide  surplus  capacity 
Thus, as  a whole, in the shipbuilders' Associations' forecasts,  the target growth of 
world  newbuilding  capacity  expressed  in  c.grt  points  to  a  slower  rate  than the 
same phenomenon estimated in grt. 
These discrepancies must be linked to the fact that the builders are projecting the 
past trend  towards  a  gradual  reduction  of  the  average  conversion  factor  linking 
their  production  figures  expressed  in  gross  and  compensated  tonnage  into  the 
future.  However, such  a  reduction would  mean that a  growing  proportion of the 
world shipyards' output would have to consist of very large single-deck vessels. 
Now,  at least as  regards  the  first  half of the  next decade, the conclusions  of the 
sectorial  analysis  as  to  the distribution according to  types  of ship  of the foresee-
able medium term demand, are contrary to this widespread opinion. 
This orientation of demand is  so clear as  to the relative weakness of the foreseeable 
medium term needs for large tankers, bulkcarriers and OBO's, that it is  doubtful 
whether  the building  of  new  production  facilities  specially  designed  for  ships  of 
250 000  tdw  and  above,  which  is  expected  to  be  completed  by  1975,  can  be 
considered appropriate to market conditions. 
On the other hand, on a world scale, if the foreseeable  demand is  converted into 
compensated tonnage, the expected increase of world output capacity measured in 
the same unit,  seems reasonable. 
This analysis would tend to prove that, in the medium term, there is  no fear  of a 
surplus capacity in the world shipbuilding industry.  In fact,  excluding short term 
fluctuations, the expected demand should provide full  employment for  at least the 
present labour force  in the world shipyards.  On the other hand,  the  "super-ship-
yards" at present being built or planned may, in the medium term, cause a surplus 
in production facilities  for very large ships, if  their completion is  not spread over 
a  period of time.  These facilities  will  surely not remain idle,  but it will  probably 
be  necessary for  them to maintain a  degree of adaptability. 
d)  A d a p t at i o n  o f  t h e  o u t p u t  c a p a c i t y  t o  t h e  e x p e c t e d  d e m an d 
Consequently, during the next few years, it seems that the adaptation of the world 
shipbuilding output capacity to future  demand will  have  to  be considered  rather 
in terms of type and size of ships to be built, than in quantity of gross tonnage to 
be produced. 
(1)  The  Onozuka  survey,  mentioned  above,  suggests  that,  in  relation  to  1967,  the  number 
of working hours in the major Japanese shipyards will  decrease by  9.2%  before  1975. 
154 The concept of compensated tonnage is  new  and its  use  may  lead to  some  mis-
representation, especially in the field  of forecasts.  In some cases, for new types of 
ship,  the choice of coefficients  already made seems  questionable and adjustments 
may have to be introduced in course of time. It is thus to be desired that the study 
of the questions brought up in this report be continued, thoroughly examined and 
filled  out in order that,  in the  future,  more  accurate means  will  be  available  to 
ensure a better adaptation of merchant ship supply to demand. The shipping scene 
is  nowadays changing very fast  and  shipbuilding  must be ready  to turn out new 
products using new processes requiring new  investment. 
Furthermore, it is  convenient to  examine  the  potential  demand  by  1980 for  the 
units necessary not only for prospecting, but also for  exploiting the sea-bed under 
the continental shelf and the resources of the sea in general. 
At present, part of the construction of drilling platforms is  not done by the ship-
building industry, but the more sophisticated units of the future should revert to it. 
These surveys may appear too international in character, but it seems advisable to 
proceed  with  them  at least  within  the  frame  of  the  EEC  Shipbuilding  Liaison 
Committee. 
B.  Economic  prospects  of shipbuilding  in  the  European  Economic  Community 
Thus,  on the world scale,  shipbuilding emerges  as  a  growth  industry,  due  to  the 
fast expansion of international sea-borne trade; but it is  also  confronted with the 
problems  raised  by  the  widespread  technical  and  economic  changes  which  are 
now  a  characteristic  of  this  sector. 
At the  beginning  of  this  decade,  no  one  could  foresee  the  magnitude  of  such 
changes and the multiplicity of their effects on the world shipbuilding industry. 
At the end of  1969, this situation is  still developing, this explains the discrepancies 
between the future  demand estimates published in various  countries of the world. 
Both the leaders of the industry and  the Governments  of  the  major  shipbuilding 
countries should accordingly remain in the closest touch with market movements. 
1.  The  favourable  elements of the  EEC yards'  present situation  should not conceal  the  real 
problems of this  industry 
The maritime countries of the European Economic Community, taken as  a whole, 
constitute, after Japan, the main shipbuilding area of the world. (1) 
On 1 October 1969, the orders placed with the Common Market shipyards repre-
sented 24.3%  of the world  order reserve  calculated in  gross  tonnage  by Lloyd's 
Register.  As this percentage is  higher than the share of these yards in the present 
world output, it can be assumed that they enjoy, on the whole, a higher work load 
than  others,  enabling them to  cope with  possible  short-term market fluctuations. 
In the medium  term.  the  expected  distribution of types  of ship  in overall world 
demand is  characterized by an increasing need  for  specialized  ships.  This  should 
also be of advantage to shipbuilders who, like those of the Community, have the 
benefit of a wide  experience in the use of advanced techniques. 
(1)  The EFTA  countries,  whose  total  output capacity  is  at least  equal  to  that of the  EEC 
countries, are to be considered separately since they have no common shipbuilding policy. 
155 Nevertheless,  this  assessment  of  the  prospects  of the  EEC shipbuilding  industry 
which looks favourable on the whole, should be looked upon as a general apprecia-
tion only, which covers varying specific circumstances. 
As  regards  the order reserve,  the situation varies  from  one country  to  the  other 
within the Common Market and, inside a given country, there are also noticeable 
differences from  one yard to  the  other.  Moreover,  the  conditions in which  these 
orders were  booked  and will  be fulfilled  are  as  important  as  their  volume,  and 
perhaps more important.  From this  point of view,  it can be noted that the risks 
increase  as  delivery  times  lengthen since  the corresponding contracts  have to  be 
concluded at firm prices, in accordance with international practice. 
In the future,  whatever the magnitude  and distribution  of  the world  demand for 
shipping may be, the effective share of the European Economic Community's yards 
in newbuilding production will depend on the relative evolution of their competiti-
veness on the international market. 
2.  Unlike  other  EEC  activities,  shipbuilding  cannot  be  protected  by  a  common  external 
tariff  which  effectively  creates  an  internal  market 
Now the shipbuilding industry is  entirely governed by the conditions set up by the 
overall relationship between world newbuilding supply and demand. 
Except in a  few  countries, the ship,  as  a  means of world  trade operating perma-
nently outside frontiers, is  not liable to customs duties.  Besides, there are no trade 
mark or transport and distribution cost considerations in the field of shipbuilding. 
The owner knows all the major yards of the world and, taken as a whole, they can 
always  meet all his requirements. 
The  main  feature  of  the  newbuilding  market  is  therefore  the  absence  of  any 
customs  or geographic  protection. 
As  regards  the Common Market shipowners,  whose  activities  are  not controlled 
by the Treaty of Rome, they are also  placed in this  context of competition on a 
world scale; therefore, they have to be able like their colleagues in other countries, 
to place their orders on the basis of the prices and payment conditions in force on 
the international market; they cannot in fact accept to deal at prices which would 
jeopardize their own competitiveness. 
The result is that the shipyards of the European Economic Community cannot avail 
themselves of an internal market proper, on which they could rely in the event of 
an external crisis  or a  restriction of international free  trade. 
The newbuilding international market conditions  are therefore imperative for  the 
Community's  shipbuilders  as  regards  the  whole  of  their  output,  whether  it  is 
intended for  owners in the Common Market or other countries. 
3.  EEC shipbuilders do  not control their  conditions of sale 
The owner, who has free access to the whole international market when ordering a 
ship,  chooses  such  or  such  yard  according  to  numerous  criteria  which  can  be 
grouped as  follows: 
1.  the contractual price (firm price or not, currency (1) 
(1)  Having also regard to whether it  is  firm or subject to a  sliding scale  and to the currency 
in  which it is  quoted. 
156 2.  the delivery dates offered by the shipbuilder 
3.  the  conditions  of  payment  accepted  by  the  builder  and  especially  the 
amount, duration and cost of credit granted  after delivery. 
4.  the advantages of the technical solutions proposed by the builder. 
From  the  owner's  point of view,  the  order  of importance  of  these  criteria  may 
vary according to  the period when the contract is  signed, the type of the ship, and 
his  own situation.  However,  the main consideration,  as  far  as  he is  concerned, is 
the return to be expected from  the  investment  as  a  whole.  Now,  in  most  cases, 
this return depends essentially on the price and conditions of payment. 
From the builder's point of view,  what is  really important is  the extent to which 
he  can control the  various  factors  governing  his  competitiveness. 
Contractual price and delivery time are indeed a function of the concern's organiza-
tion, employment and purchasing policies, but these criteria are also deeply affected 
by external factors,  since  organization and policies  are dependent on the frame-
work of the national economy of the country where the yard is  located. 
These external factors,  are,  in particular,  the  cost of materials,  employment  and 
wage policies, labour regulation, credit policy, monetary fluctuations  and the social 
variations. 
As  regards conditions of payment, it is  obvious that the builder has practically no 
control  over  this  factor.  They  are  most  frequently  determined  by  Governments 
Administration, whether financing of home orders or export credits are concerned. 
Thus production costs  and financing  are determined for  each builder by national 
conditions. 
Finally it is  only the technological potential of a yard which depends to any great 
extent on the management's business sense and on its  research effort.  However, it 
also  depends  on the yard's financing  facilities  which,  in  turn,  are  determined  by 
past or expected profits. 
Therefore, it must be emphasized that the circumstances allowing a yard to make 
a  profit only occur,  if  there is  a  sufficient margin between  the  production condi-
tions-national data-and the  selling  conditions-international data. 
4.  Recent rise of Japan  and decline of EEC on the world shipbuilding market 
On the international market, through the free action of supply and demand, selling 
prices  always  tend towards the level of the quotations from the group of yards in 
the national economy where production costs  are lower,  provided that this  group 
represents an appreciable share of the total potential supply and its  technical and 
commercial reputation is  well  established. 
Likewise, financing conditions show  a tendency to fall in line with those of export 
credits as  set up by the countries willing to promote the sales  of their shipbuilding 
industry in foreign countries, since this  production, due to its  very nature, is  free 
from tariff barriers, which is  not the case for  exports of other industries. 
By combining all these optimum conditions, the Japanese shipbuilders were able, at 
the beginning of the  last decade,  to impose their prices  and particularly advanta-
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foreign  counterparts. 
Under these  circumstances,  despite  their great strides  in the field  of  productivity 
and their concentration policy, the yards of Western Europe could not absorb this 
reduction  in  selling,  prices  and  rise  in  financing  costs.  As  a  result,  their  profits 
dropped and the steady increase in home production costs compelled them to apply 
for various forms of aid from their Governments. 
But this government intervention generally came too late and proved to be insuf-
ficient;  this  caused  a  considerable relative reduction of the tonnage  produced  by 
the  yards  of  the  European Economic  Community. 
When  the Treaty of Rome was  signed,  in  1958,  their  share in  the  world  market 
amounted to  3  3%. Ten years later, this  percentage had decreased to  16. 
5.  The present recovery of the relative situation of the EEC shipbuilding industry should be 
improved through a common policy 
In the year  1968,  this  recession  stopped  and even  gave  way  to  a  certain degree 
of recovery in Common Market shipbuilding activities as  compared with the world 
total.  This  shows  that the  relative  competitiveness  of this  industry has  improved. 
The fact that the proposal of the Commission to set up a common level of subsidies 
within the Community area has been accepted by the Council of Ministers  of the 
European  Communities,  with  a  view  to  eliminating  some  of  the  anomalies  in 
international  competition,  is  a  corner  stone  on  which  the  improvement  of  the 
Common Market yards' position can be built. 
This  decision of the Council of Ministers  comes  within  the  scope  of  the  specific 
sectorial  action  which  has  been  adopted  for  shipbuilding  under the  second  pro-
gramme  of medium-term economic  policy  of the Communities.  The way  is  thus 
paved towards a common policy of Member States in the field of shipbuilding, the 
only EEC industry which cannot have the benefit of the protection of a common 
external tariff. 
It should also be noted, however, that as  in the case of their colleagues of Western 
Europe, the operating conditions of the EEC builders have  also  improved  owing 
to the recent rise in the international price of ships  subsequent to  the increase of 
Japanese production costs in a sellers' market. 
Among  other  things,  this  situation  has  made  it  possible,  within  the  OECD,  to 
come  to  an  agreement  restricting  the  maximum  export  credit  conditions  which 
owners  are granted  in  the  various  shipbuilding  countries. 
However, the Common Market yards have also had significant rises  in production 
costs,  and  the  effect  of  the  general  increases  of  interest rates  is  also  noticeable. 
Therefore, their financial situation is  still not very satisfactory, more especially as  a 
long no-profit period left them without the necessary reserves to meet contingencies 
and the risks  of technological  transformation. 
The common shipbuilding policy initiated among the five  maritime countries of the 
Common Market shall  therefore have  to  be maintained  and reinforced. 
158 The Working Group has noted,  in Chapter VI of this  report,  that the  evolution 
up to 1975 of the output capacities of the major shipbuilding areas did not imply, 
in  the medium term,  deep changes in their relative positions. 
In the  middle  of  the  next  decade,  the  output  capacity  of  the  Common  Market 
yards should reach 21%  in grt and 24%  in  c.grt of the theoretical world output 
capacity. 
In  1968,  the  share  of  these  yards  in  world  launchings  was  16.6%  in  grt  and 
19.8%  in c.grt. 
So,  the  realization  of  these  forecasts  will  require  the  higher  relative  increase  in 
the output estimated in grt. But is should be remembered that most of this increase 
is  already  gained  in  1969,  since  the  estimates  of  business  for  this  year  suggest 
that the Common Market yards will build, in 1969, some 20% of the world output 
calculated in gross  tonnage. 
Similarly, in compensated tonnage, it can also be taken that, as early as  1969, the 
effective share of the Common Market yards will  approach the level of 24%  that 
was  foreseen  for  their theoretical output capacity in  1975. 
Although we  have  reasons  to be satisfied  with  such  a  fast  relative  recovery,  we 
ought not to think that it is  definitely  acquired. 
In  fact,  whatever  the  development  of  the  international  market  may  be  in  the 
future,  the share of world demand that can be obtained by the Common Market 
shipbuilding  industry will  depend,  as  in  the  past,  on  its  degree  of  relative  com-
petitiveness.  This competitiveness will  depend, as  we have seen before, on its own 
research and organization efforts in the various yards,  as  well  as  the evolution of 
numerous  political,  economic  and  social  factors  within  the  European  Economic 
Community and the national economies  of the various Member States. 
These considerations  should be borne in  mind by those who will have,  in  future 
years,  to  determine  the  policy to  be  adopted in  the field  of shipbuilding,  at both 
European Communities'  Commission  and  national  Government  level. 
In the  long  term,  in the  context  of  increasing  international  sea-borne  trade,  the 
dependence  of  the Community,  whatever  its  extent,  on  overseas  supply  sources, 
can only increase and this implies a simultaneous growth of exports towards these 
outside markets. 
This  dependence presupposes,  as  shown  by  the  Japanese  example,  that Western 
Europe constitute an adequate merchant fleet  and set up  a powerful shipbuilding 
industry. 
Therefore,  the fluctuations  which  are  always  possible  on  markets  with  so  much 
international  competition,  should  not  cause  the  responsible  Authorities  to  adopt 
restrictive  policies.  Likewise  it  is  recommended  that  internal  measures  liable  to 
reduce the relative competitiveness of the yards of the Community with their chief 
competitors should be avoided. 
It is  in  fact  essential  that the  recovery  initiated  should  be  maintained  and  even 
improved,  through  full-time  collaboration  between  Industry  and  Public  Autho-
rities,  as,  if  the  situation continues  to  improve,  it will  enable  the  shipbuilders  of 
the  European  Economic  Community  to  play  a  part  more  consistent  with  the 
importance of the Common Market in world sea-borne trade. 
159 MEMORANDUM OF WORKING  GROUP No.  1-"MARKET SURVEY"-
REGARDING THE REVISION OF THE FORECASTS PRODUCED IN 1969 
As early  as  the  autumn  of  1970,  the  Liaison  Committee  of EEC  shipbuilders 
considered that it was necessary to  update the requirement and production capacity 
forecasts  prepared by our working group at  the end of 1968 and at the beginning 
of 1969, and presented in November 1969, in a "Report on the medium and long 
term  developments of the shipbuilding market". 
The phase of very high conjuncture of the  world maritime economy in 1969 and 
1970 brought about a new  tonnage  demand from  shipowners in  excess-at least 
as  far  as  oil  tankers  and  bulk  carriers  are  concerned-of  the  medium  term 
requirement forecasts  first  issued by our group. 
Besides,  this pressure of demand has been for  two years the cause of a multiplica-
tion  of investment programmes in  the  shipbuilding industry,  which were  to  bring 
the  theoretical new  tonnage  production  capacity  up  to  a  level  much higher  than 
was appraised  through  the  results  of the  international inquiry carried  out by  the 
working group  early  in  1969. 
In  particular,  the  Liaison  Cornmittee  wished  our  working  group  to  determine 
whether  the risks of overcapacity referred  to  in  the  1969 report had lessened or 
increased as  a result of the  evolution reported, since  this document was submitted 
to  the  EEC commission,  in  the  fields  of both  seaborne  trade  supply and  world 
shipbuilding production  possibilities. 
At the present  time,  our working group  which  has  completed  the  revision  of its 
overall forecasts,  expressed in gross tonnage,  is able  to  submit its new conclusions 
on  the  expected development  of demand  and  supply  on  the  world  shipbuilding 
market by 1980, according to  the amount of new tonnage required by international 
seaborne  trade  on  one hand,  and  to  the  delivery  capacities  of the  various  ship-
building countries on the other. 
A.  Estimate of new tonnage requirements 
1)  The  revzswn  of  the  overall  approach  used  in  1969  to  obtain  this  estimate, 
expressed in  grt,  has been based on the  following  principles: 
a)  The  "crude  oil trade"  sector has been  considered  separately,  with respect  to 
shipborne volumes as  well as  fleet  gross  tonnage and,  consequently,  new  tonnage 
requirements. 
Two different series of equations of regression-one for  this crude oil trade sector 
and  the  other  for  the  whole of other sectors-were thus  used in  parallel,  in  the 
160 model set up.  This made possible a more accurate determination of the double cor-
relation  used in  1969 between,  on the  one hand,  the  growth  of OECD member 
countries' GNP and the whole of seaborne cargoes and, on the other hand, between 
the latter and the gross tonnage of the world fleet.  In particular, it was possible to 
define,  for  the crude oil trade, a regression equation of "modified geometrical" form 
which gives a better account of the  recent evolution  than  the  linear  equation  pre_-
viously  used  for  the  whole  of international  seaborne  trade.  However,  the  latter 
form  of adjustment has been maintained for  the  sector of "dry cargoes"  to  which 
it is  better sui ted. 
b)  Two  alternate  assumptions  regarding  the  effective  growth  of  the  OECD 
GNP  have  been  chosen,  this  time,  for  the  1970-1980  period,  still  covered  by 
the new estimates. 
The  high  assumption  implies  an  average  annual  growth  rate  of  5.25%,  in 
accordance  with  the  1970  forecasts  for  the  1980  range,  prepared  by  OECD 
experts,  regarding  the  economic  expansion  that  should  be  achieved  by  member 
countries "in  the absence of any major economic or political difficulties" and pre-
supposing,  besides,  that  "the  trend  towards  a  liberalization  of international  sea-
borne  trade  should be maintained". 
These reserves led the working group to adopt also a low assumption reducing the 
average  annual growth  rate  to  4.75%.  This  precaution  seems  to  be  justified  by 
the  recent developments and  by  the  expected consequences  of the  present inter-
national monetary crisis. 
However,  this low assumption is higher than  the single one mentioned in  the 1969 
report and which  implied a rate  of 4.5%  per  annum  for  the  effective  economic 
growth of OECD member countries. 
c)  As  jar  as  newbuilding  requirements  are  concerned,  due  consideration  was 
given,  for  the calculation  of the  world  fleet  replacement rate,  to  the  recent  trend 
towards  advancing  the  average  age  of  elimination  of  ships  in  operation,  a 
phenomenon which  derives  from  the  acceleration  of technological  progress. 
2)  The results of this revision are shown in Table A  herein, and call for  the  fol-
lowing comments: 
a)  The expansion  of international seaborne  trade  expected in  the  present decade, 
should be based on an average annual growth rate ranging  between 7.6 and 8.5% 
in  the "oil trade" sector,  and between 5.4 and 6%  in  the  sector "other cargoes", 
i.e.  "dry cargoes". 
b)  The  forecasts  formulated  with  respect  to  the  gross  tonnage  of  the  world 
merchant fleet in  1980 correspond to average annual growth rates ranging between 
7.2 and 7.9%  as  regards  tankers and between 4.2 and 4.7%  for  other ships. 
c)  The  total  new  tonnage  requirements  derived  from  the  expected  growth  and 
replacement rates of both sections of the  world merchant fleet  are  within a range 
extending from  244.3  to  259.3 million grt in  the  1970-1980 period. 
On an  annual basis,  these requirements would correspond to  average  newbuilding 
deliveries ranging  between 22.2 and 23.6 million grt  a year.  This  new  forecast  is 
therefore much higher than those appearing in  the 1969 report. 
161 d)  Such  a  long-term  forecast  should  be  compared  with  the  average  annual 
deliveries  of  the  world  shipbuilding  industry  during  the  previous  period-1960-
1970-which amount to  12.8 million grt. 
In centering these past average deliveries in the year 1965 and the estimated future 
average  annual requirements in  the  year  1975,  the  overall approach has made  it 
possible to  consider that the long-term trend of evolution of the world shipbuilding 
production shows an annual growth rate in the order of 5.7 to  6.3%  per annum to 
meet the  new tonnage  requirements,  assuming  that  the  latter  would not be  either 
advanced or deferred due  to  short-term conjunctural variations. 
Owing  to  these  variations,  it does  not seem  possible to  foresee  the  actual  volume 
of deliveries  in  a  given  calendar  year.  Therefore,  the  only  possible  forecasts  are 
average  annual  new  building  requirements  forecasts.  How  ever  the  extrapolation 
up to  the end of this decade of the long-term trend defined in  the overall approach, 
places the  world shipyards' average level of output at this  time  between 29.4 and 
32 million grt. 
Indeed, The Working Group consider that, over and above the short-term conjunc-
tural  variations,  the  corrective  mechanisms  existing  in  the  maritime  economy 
tend, in  the long  term,  to  align  newbuilding demand and deliveries with the actual 
requirements of seaborne trade. 
B.  Evolution of production capacities 
The  revision  of the  theoretical  capacity  forecast  for  the  year  1975 appearing  in 
the 1969 report has been conducted as  follows: 
a)  The  case  of the  major  shipbuilding  countries  was  considered  separately  but, 
apart  from  Japan  which,  due  to  its  importance,  stands  alone  as  the  main  ship-
building  centre  in  the  world,  these  countries were  grouped in  areas  according  to 
geographic,  economic  and  political  criteria:  thus,  Western  Europe  was  divided 
into  3  regions:  "North-Western",  "South-Western  and  South-Eastern"  and  the 
Common  Market  in  its  present  extension.  Likewise,  the  rest  of  the  world  was 
divided into  the  countries of the  "Socialist  Bloc",  United  States  and "Developing 
Countries". 
b)  An  inventory  of  all  the  projects  of  creation,  extension  and  modernization 
started up or announced as  decided since  the  beginning of 1969 has  been under-
taken, according  to  the  information available  at  the  end of the  Summer of 1971. 
The  extra  production  capacities,  corresponding  to  the  production  programmes 
announced-or  estimated  according  to  the  characteristics  of  investments-have 
been in each case calculated in  terms of grt for  the  year 1975. However, only the 
projects offering a high degree of credibility, due  to  their state of progression,  the 
importance and quality of the investors and the concerned country, were taken into 
account. 
2)  Table  B  herein  depicts  the  opinion  now  prevailing  among  the  working group 
members as  to  the plausible evolution in  coming years of the  production capacity, 
estimated  in  grt,  of  the  world  shipbuilding  industry.  The  figures  appearing  in 
Table B  are commented as  follows: 
162 a)  In  order  to  evaluate  the  evolution  of production  capacity  in  the  main  ship-
building  areas,  the  Working  Group  has  first  calculated  the  probable  level  of 
deliveries to  be expected in 1971  in  each of them.  Besides, it tried to  appraise the 
effects of factors  liable  to  bring  about an  increase  or  a  reduction  of the  present 
capacity,  taking  into  account the  investment plans  inventoried on one hand,  and 
the  possible  effect of recent  changes  in  the  newbuilding  market situation  on  the 
other. 
b)  It  can  be  noted that  the  level  of activities  now reached  by  the  shipbuilding 
industry  is  exactly  the  average  level  forecast  for  the  whole  1970-1980  period  in 
the  high  estimate  of  the  overall  approach.  Although  many  shipyards  may  be 
considered  to  have  now  reached  a  stage  of  "over-employment"  of  the  existing 
facilities,  it can  be feared  that the advance gained in the past years with respect to 
requirements  should  be  offset,  in  the  medium  term,  by  a  reduction  of  yearly 
deliveries  below  the  level  corresponding  to  the  correct  use  of the  present  equip-
ment and labour force. 
c)  As regards  the  evolution  forecasts  for  the  world shipbuilding  theoretical  pro-
duction capacities,  there is  still a quite marked trend toward their growth, in spite 
of the  high deceleration  rate  which  has been  admitted after  taking  the decreasing 
factors into consideration: the prevalling growth rate of 12% p.a.  should be dimin-
ishing after 1972, but the  present impulse is so  powerful that,  toward  the  middle 
of  this  decade,  the  theoretical  production  capacity  of  the  industry  will  most 
probably  reach  a  level  wh;ch  make possible  newbuilding  deliveries  amounting  to 
about 32 million grt,  of which some 30 from  the  shipyards now operating on the 
international market. 
If we situate this forecast in the calendar year 1975 and if we refer to  the average 
deliveries  of the  1960-1970  period centered on  the  year  1965, we  find  that  the 
long-term  trend  of the  theoretical  production  capacity  shows  an  average  annual 
growth  rate  exceeding 10%  whereas  the  maximum growth  rate  corresponding  to 
newbuilding requirements has been  previously  estimated at 6.3%, also  consider-
ing  the  long-term  trend  determined in  the  high  estimate of the  overall approach. 
We should remember in  this respect that the  latter makes it possible  to  anticipate 
that the annual newbuilding requirements will not reach the level of 30 million grt 
before the end of this decade. 
d)  The  Working Group wishes,  in  particular,  to  stress  the  fact  that  the  advance 
gained  by  Japanese  shipbuilders  over  their  European  competitors  in  the  imple-
mentation  of major  investment  plans  inevitably  implies  that  the  growth  of  the 
Japanese  production  capacities  can  only  be  carried  into  effect  through  heavy 
dismantlings  of  old  facilities;  the  average  Japanese  shipbuilding  productivity 
should thus increase in  the coming years. 
Contrarily,  for  the  European  traditional  maritime  countries,  the  inversion  of the 
market situation  may  bring  about  the  abandonment  of  investment  programmes 
that would have been, however, absolutely  necessary  to  enable  the  yards'  activity 
to  be maintained in  proper conditions of productivity so  that it  might be capable 
of  withstanding  the  international  competition  which  is  likely  to  become  keener 
again. 
163 This situation may aggravate  the  distortions  which already  exist,  to  the detriment 
of the European shipbuilding industry, in  the competition opposing it, on a world-
wide basis,  to  its Japanese  counterparts. It is  therefore essential  that the modern-
ization  of facilities  in  European  shipyards  should  be  continued,  even  if such  a 
policy implies a certain  increase  of capacity  that it would seem advisable,  at first 
sight, to avoid as  far  as  possible. 
Though it is not appropriate  to  attach too  much importance to  the  very  figures of 
newbuilding  capacity  and requirement overall  forecasts  expressed in  terms of grt 
(considering the sensibility of this unit to  the ship size and type distribution in  the 
shipyards'  production),  it seems that,  despite  the  very  noticeable  rise  in require-
ment forecasts,  the  risks of overcapacity referred to in the 1969 report have been 
growing since  then. 
It is the prevailing multiplication of investments in  the world shipbuilding industry, 
and  especially  in  Japan  and  Southern  Europe,  which,  beyond  the  short-term 
fluctuations  creates  the  threat of a structural disequilibrium  which might continue 
through  most of this  decade  if strict measures are  not adopted in the meantime, 
on a worldwide basis, to reorganize the market. 
The study of such measures exceeds the present terms of reference of our working 
group.  However,  it  presupposes  that  the  revision  of the  1969 report  should  be 
continued and deepened in  the field of the sectorial analysis. 
This revision will at first deal  with large  units, tankers,  ore carriers and combined 
vessels,  such  sectors  in  which  the  data  already  gathered  tend  to  situate  more 
particularly  the  excess  production capacities,  considering  the  orientation  given  to 
the investment programmes now being carried into effect. 
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Up-dating  global  approach 
Forecast  of sea  borne  trade- world fleet  gross  tonnage  newbuilding  needs for  1970 - 1980 
Forecasts  1975 
Realizations  hypothesis 
1969 
low  I 
high 
GNP/OECD 
(109  US$)  1 555  I 
2 047.71 
2 107 
Sea-borne  trade 
( 106  tons) 
1  Oil 
2  Dry 
cargo 
3  Total 
Grt.  World fleet 
(106  tjb) 
1 Tankers 
2  Other vessels I 
I 
1 230 
I 
1 030 
2 260 
77.4 
131 
3  Total  I  208.41 
NEWBUILDING  NEEDS 
(in  106  tjb) 
1 Tankers 
expansion 
renewal 
total 
2  Other vessels 
expansion 
renewal 
total 
3  Newbui1ding  needs 
Yearly  average 
1 916 
2 006 
1 390 
1 439 
3 306 
3 425 
116.9 
122.1 
163.51 
168 
280.41 
290.1 
Period  1970-1975 
low  I 
high 
39.5  44.7 
15  14 
54.5  58.7 
32.5  37 
23  22 
55.5  59 
110  117.7 
18.3  19.6 
Forecasts 1980  Average  annual growth 
hypothesis  rate  1969/1980 
low  I 
high  low  I 
high 
I 
2 582.41  1 
2 721.3 
4.751 
5.25 
2 760  7.6 
2 993  8.5 
1 825 
1 937  6 
4 580 
4 930  7.4 
165.7  7.2 
179.2  7.9 
204 
214.5  4.7 
369.7  6 
393.7 
Period  1976-1980  Period  1970-1980 
low  I 
high  low  I 
high 
48.8  57.1  88.3  101.8 
20  17  35  31 
68.8  74.1  123.3  132.8 
40.5  46.5  78  83.5 
25  20  48  42 
65.5  66.5  121  125.5 
134.3  140.6  244.3  258.8 
26.9  28.1  22.2  23.6 
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Foreseen  variation  zn  world  newbuilding  output  capacity  up  to  1975,  distributed 
by  main  areas 
(in  thousand  grt) 
Actual  Estimated  Present  Expected  effects  on  Forecasted  theore- increase  deliveries  deliveries  factor  present capacity of  tical  output  capacity 
1970  1971-1970  modifyinr; factors  towards  mid.  70s 
in  grt  I in%  increase  as 
1970 I  %  positive  I  negative  against  the 
(1)  (2)  1971 estimate 
JAPAN  110 100  4.81  111 000  1.089  1  7 800  3.800  115 000  36.3 
II -EUROPEAN~  I  ZONE OF 
OECD 
a)  NW  Europe  4 328  20.6  4 200  1.040  8 800  300  5 000  11.1 
b)  EEC  3 503  I6.7  4 400  I.256  I 800  600  5 600  27.2 
c)  SW and 
SE  Europe  I 098  5.2  1 500  1.376  2 200  500  3 200  113 
d)  Total  8 929  42  10 400  1.165 
I 
13 800  32.7 
III  - REST OF 
THE WORLD 
a) Socialist Bloc  1 150  5.5  I 200  1.043  800  300  I 700  41.6 
b)  USA  375  1.8  500  1.333  500  600  700  40 
c)  Developing 
countries  426  2  500  l.I73  700  400  800  60 
d)  Total  I 95I  9.3  2 200  1.128  3 800  36.4 
I 
IV- WORLD  I  TOTAL  20.980  IOO  23 600  1.125 
I 
31800  34.8 
(1)  Investment plans  - productivity  improvement. 
(2)  Abandonment and delays  of some  projects,  dismantling of existing  facilities. 
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